

PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen

This full text is a publisher's version.

For additional information about this publication click this link.

<http://hdl.handle.net/2066/91235>

Please be advised that this information was generated on 2014-05-21 and may be subject to change.

Social Cleavages and Political Choices

**Large-scale Comparisons of Social Class,
Religion and Voting Behavior in Western Democracies**

Giedo Jansen

G. Jansen

Social Cleavages and Political Choices

Large-scale Comparisons of Social Class, Religion and Voting Behavior
in Western Democracies

Copyright © 2011 by Giedo Jansen. All rights reserved.

Graphic Design: In Zicht Grafisch Ontwerp, Arnhem

Cover Design: Erik Vos – Het Lab, Arnhem

Cover image: '*Popoli in cammino*' © Gianluca Regnicoli 2004

Printed by: Ipskamp Drukkers BV, Nijmegen

ISBN/EAN: 978-90-9026227-7

Social Cleavages and Political Choices

Large-scale Comparisons of Social Class, Religion and Voting Behavior in Western Democracies

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de
Sociale Wetenschappen

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 28 september 2011
om 15.30 uur precies

door

Giedo Jansen

geboren op 3 maart 1984
te Nijmegen

Promotoren

prof. dr. N.D. de Graaf (Nuffield College, Oxford)

prof. dr. A. Need (Universiteit Twente)

prof. dr. W.C. Ultee

Manuscriptcommissie

prof. dr. G.L.M. Kraaykamp (voorzitter)

prof. dr. C.W.A.M. Aarts (Universiteit Twente)

dr. H.R. Coffé (Universiteit Utrecht)

Acknowledgments

This thesis results from a research project that I conducted as a PhD student at the Department of Sociology of the Radboud University Nijmegen in the period September 2006 – February 2011. In writing this thesis, I owe many thanks to several people.

First and foremost I am greatly indebted to my three promotors, from whom I learned a lot; Nan Dirk de Graaf, Ariana Need and Wout Ultee. Nan Dirk, thank you for your confidence and support on this project. I really appreciate your permanent interest and involvement in my work, even after - or perhaps especially after – you left the Sociology Department in Nijmegen. Ariana, I am grateful for your supervision and advice over the last four and a half years. It has been a pleasure working with you on both research and teaching. I also want to thank you for staying involved after you were appointed Professor in Enschede. Wout, thank you for joining my team of supervisors after Nan Dirk and Ariana both left the department. I appreciate your contribution to the final stage of this project. Your suggestions made this a better thesis. In this respect I also want to thank Marcel Lubbers, who left my team of supervisors already in early 2007, but who undoubtedly contributed to setting up this project.

For this thesis I collected and pooled many data from secondary sources. I thank everyone who contributed in making this long process shorter. I am therefore grateful to Gary N. Marks of the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research for assisting me in collecting and coding the Australian Election Surveys 1993 – 2004, to David Weakliem of the University of Connecticut for providing me with coded files of the American National Election Studies 1954-2004, to Lluís Orriols of the University of Gerona for providing and recoding the Spanish Election Studies 1979-2008, to Sara Binzer-Hobolt of the University of Oxford for providing the Danish Election Surveys, and to Florent Gougou of Sciences-Po in Paris for assisting me in collecting and coding French survey data for 1967, 1968, 1995 and 2007. I also would like to thank Hans Schmeets, Jos Beckers and Anton Kantebeen of the Central Bureau of Statistics in Heerlen for their hospitality and cooperation which made it possible to use the original occupational codes of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (1989, 1994 and 2006). I also thank Menno Wierenga for assisting me in preparing and recoding many data files in only a short period of time.

The chapters in the book have been presented at various national and international workshops and conferences. I want to thank all conference and

workshop participants and anonymous journal reviewers for their useful comments on earlier versions of the empirical chapters in this thesis. Part of the research in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis was conducted during my visit to Nuffield College, University of Oxford. I want to thank Geoffrey Evans for his co-authorship on chapter 3. I also want to thank him and Nan Dirk for giving me the opportunity to contribute to one of the most relevant books on cleavage voting in recent years. I am also grateful to the members of the manuscript committee, Gerbert Kraaykamp, Kees Aarts and Hilde Coffé, for their time and effort assessing the manuscript.

The Department of Sociology of the Radboud University is unmistakably connected to my academic life. It will always be the place where I am trained as a sociologist, first as a student, later as a PhD researcher. I thank everybody with whom I have had the opportunity of working over the last eight and a half years; students, fellow students, fellow PhD's and colleagues. In this respect I especially want to mention Roderick Sluiter, Fransje Smits, Michael Savelkoul, Marloes de Lange, Marieke van der Rakt, Natascha Notten, Jochem Tolsma and Marijke Ristvojevic-Lefering. I also want to thank Tim Mueller, Francesc Amat, Moritz Mihatsch and the rest of the 'Nuffield club' for making my visit to Oxford an even more memorable experience than it already was.

Briefly after I started studying Sociology in 2002 I was lucky to meet three gentlemen who I now consider to be my closest friends. It has been a true pleasure studying and working with them over the past years. The process of writing my dissertation would not have been the same without their companionship. I thank Hans Paardekooper, Tim Huijts and Mark Levels because I value our friendship highly. The future is inevitable.

Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my family. I thank my parents, Ton Jansen and Jacintha Weijenborg for having confidence in me and supporting me in every step along the way. I owe you much. I also thank Twan Jansen and Francine Orsel. I feel privileged having a brother with whom I can share sometimes trivial but yet important common interests. For reasons far beyond the mere completion of this thesis, I am most grateful to Cilia Daemen. Cilia, thank you for keeping faith in me and for your patience. Thank you for holding up a mirror to me every once in a while, and for representing the bright side of life.

Giedo Jansen
Nijmegen, May 2011

Contents

Acknowledgments	5
Contents	7
List of tables	10
List of figures	11
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	15
1.1 Social cleavages and political divisions	17
1.1.1 Class and religious conflict in Western democracies	17
1.1.2 Class and Religious Voting	20
1.2 Cleavage voting research	22
1.2.1 Three generations of class voting research	22
1.2.2 A fourth generation of class voting research	24
1.2.3 Religious voting research	28
1.3. Two perspectives on cleavage voting	34
1.3.1 Bottom-up: social change explanations	35
1.3.2 Top-down: political choice explanations	37
1.3.3 Towards a bottom-up and top-down design	39
1.4 Plan of the book	40
1.4.1 Research questions and data analysis strategy	40
1.4.2 Part I: Cleavage voting in comparative perspective	42
1.4.3 Part II: Trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands	45
1.4.4 Overview	47
Part I: Cleavage voting in comparative perspective	51
CHAPTER 2: REVISITING LIJPHART'S CRUCIAL EXPERIMENT	53
2.1 Introduction	55
2.2 Social Class or Religion: what do we know?	58
2.2.1 Lijphart's experiment in the literature	58
2.2.2 Findings on Class and Religion in Thirteen Countries	60
2.2.3 Findings from comparative studies	63
2.3 Data and measurement	64
2.4 Analysis	66
2.4.1 Modeling over time changes in class voting and religious voting simultaneously	66
2.4.2 Measuring cleavage strength	70
2.4.3 Comparing the strength of social class relative to religion	71
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion	80
2.5.1 Conclusion	80
2.5.2 Discussion	81

CHAPTER 3: CLASS VOTING AND LEFT-RIGHT PARTY POSITIONS	87
3.1 Introduction	89
3.2 Two approaches to the decline of class voting	90
3.2.1 Bottom-up	90
3.2.2 Top-down	92
3.3 Data and measurement	95
3.3.1 Comparative Dataset of Cleavage Voting	95
3.3.2 Comparative Manifesto Data	96
3.4 Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation	100
3.4.1 First stage analyses	100
3.4.2 Second-stage analyses	106
3.5 Conclusion	114
Part II: Trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands	119
CHAPTER 4: CLASS VOTING, SOCIAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006	121
4.1 Introduction	123
4.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the class structure of the Netherlands	125
4.2.1 The rise of a 'new' social class within the service class	125
4.2.2 Compositional changes and the blurring of class boundaries	126
4.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands	129
4.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos	129
4.3.2 The emergence of GreenLeft	130
4.4 Data and variable construction	131
4.5 Analysis	134
4.5.1 The blurring of class boundaries	134
4.5.2 Over-time changes in class voting	135
4.5.3 Interpreting the decline of class voting	139
4.5.4 Party positions and the decline of class voting	145
4.6 Conclusions	153
CHAPTER 5: RELIGIOUS VOTING, SOCIAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006	159
5.1 Introduction	161
5.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the religious structure of the Netherlands	164
5.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands	167
5.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos	167
5.3.2 Religious parties in the Netherlands.	168
5.4 Data and measurements	169

5.5 Analysis	171
5.5.1 Denomination and church attendance	171
5.5.2 Denominational groups, church attendance and voting confessional	173
5.5.3 Religious voting and party positions	179
5.6 Conclusions	188
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION	193
6.1 Introduction	195
6.2 Summary: research questions and findings	195
6.2.1 Chapter 2	195
6.2.2 Chapter 3	196
6.2.3 Chapter 4	198
6.2.4 Chapter 5	199
6.3 Reflections on research strategy and analyses	200
6.3.1 Measurement	201
6.3.2 Analyses	205
6.4 Theoretical contributions	209
6.4.1 Social change explanations	209
6.4.2 Political choice explanations	211
Summary in Dutch (samenvatting)	217
References	233
Appendix A: Data	247
A.1 Data Sources	247
A.2 Party classifications in chapters 2 and 3	254
A.3 Party classifications in chapters 4 and 5	256
Appendix B: Chapter 2	257
B.1 Model selection	257
B.2 Preferred models of cleavage change	270
Appendix C: Chapter 3	283
C.1 Model selection and additional analyses	283
Appendix D: Chapter 4	288
D.1. Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)	288
ICS Dissertation Series	291
Curriculum Vitae	299

List of tables

Chapter 1

1.1	Characteristics of studies explaining variations in class voting	29
1.2	Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV).	43
1.3	Organization of the empirical chapters	48

Chapter 2

2.1	Surveys in Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting containing relevant information on social class, denomination and church attendance	65
2.2	Assumed models of over time changes in the association between social class, denomination, church attendance and party choice	67
2.3	Most optimal model of cleavage change in 13 countries on the basis of the Schwarz' Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	69
2.4	Correlations between kappa-indices of class and religious voting in 13 countries	72

Chapter 3

3.1	Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting between 1960-2003	96
3.2	Linear Trends in LR positions of left-wing parties and LR party polarization in 15 countries	99
3.3	Descriptive statistics of second-stage variables	106
3.4	Correlation matrix of second-stage variables	107
3.5	Second-stage parameter estimations of multilevel linear regression predicting the level of class voting	110

Chapter 4

4.1	Multinomial logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference in the Netherlands, 1971-2006	140
4.2	Conditional logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference in the Netherlands, 1971-2002	148

Chapter 5

5.1	Mean church attendance by religious group in 1971 and 2006	172
5.2	Logistic regression for voting religious parties versus all other parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2006	176
5.3	Conditional logistic regression for voting religious vs. old left, new left and liberal right parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2002	182

X

List of figures

Chapter 2

2.1a	Changing strength of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 5 predominantly Catholic countries	74
2.1b	Contributed explained variance of social class and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly Catholic countries	74
2.1c	Difference in cleavage strength and contributed explained variance by social class and religion in 5 predominantly Catholic countries	75
2.2a	Changing strength of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 5 predominantly Protestant countries	76
2.2b	Contributed explained variance of social class and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly Protestant countries	76
2.2c	Difference in cleavage strength and contributed explained variance by social class and religion in 5 predominantly Protestant countries	78
2.3a	Changing strength of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 3 religious mixed countries	79
2.3b	Contributed explained variance of social class and religion predicting party choice in 3 religious mixed countries	79
2.3c	Difference in cleavage strength and contributed explained variance by social class and religion in 3 religious mixed countries	80


Chapter 3

3.1	LR-positions of Left-wing parties and party polarization in 15 countries in the period 1960-2005	98
3.2a	Estimated log-odds ratios for routine non-manual class to vote right-wing relative to manual working class in 15 countries between 1960-2005	102
3.2b	Estimated log-odds ratios for service class to vote right-wing relative to manual working class in 15 countries between 1960-2005	103
3.2c	Estimated log-odds ratios for self-employed to vote right-wing relative to manual working class in 15 countries between 1960-2005	104
3.3	Predictions of country-specific trends in class voting with a random intercept and slope for year	112
4.4	plotted effect of party polarization on the log-odds ratio to vote right-wing relative to the working class	113

Chapter 4


4.1	Trends in the percentage of social and cultural specialists and technocrats in the Dutch labor force between 1980 and 2004	127
4.2	Economic conservatism regressed on social class and year of survey assuming linear trends for the effect of social class	134

4.3	Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right	136
4.4	Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right	137
4.5a	Social-economic Left-Right positions of party groups in the Netherlands	146
4.5b	Conservative versus Progressive positions of party groups in the Netherlands	146
Chapter 5		
5.1	Trend in church membership, church attendance and denomination in percentages between 1971 and 2006	165
5.2a	Uncontrolled odds ratios for voting religious	174
5.2b	Controlled odds ratios for voting religious	174
5.3a	Emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos by political party groups in the Netherlands	180
5.3b	Controlled odds ratios for voting religious and the emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos of religious parties	180



Chapter 1 |

Introduction



1.1 Social cleavages and political divisions

1.1.1 Class and religious conflict in Western democracies

Understanding the relationship between society and politics is elemental to political sociology. Its aim is “*to map variations in the relationship between social structures, political orientations, and political action, and to explain the patterns that arise*” (Svallfors 2007: 1). The patterns of political alignment that proceed from structural divisions in societies are often referred to as social cleavages, and suppose to identify enduring conflicts within the electorate (Manza and Brooks 1999). The link between social cleavages and political conflict may reveal itself in political action of various kinds by various actors. In democratic societies elections are an important mechanism for the expression of conflict between groups in society. Therefore the relationship between the social position of individuals and their voting behavior has received ample attention of political sociologists. In this thesis we study two traditional social divisions in the electorates of Western democracies: social class and religion. The central aim is to investigate cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting. We combine comparative analyses of 15 modern democracies in Western Europe, Australia and the United States since the 1960s, with detailed analyses of cleavage voting trends in the Netherlands since the 1970s.

Social cleavage research can largely be traced back to the junction of two sociological traditions on conflict in societies. One the one hand, there is the class-based tradition of power and politics that originated from Marxist theory on societal development. And second, Weber’s distinction between social class and status (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and Brooks 1999; Dalton 2008). In the Marxist sense of the word ‘classes’ are demarcated on the basis of the relation to the means of production. Based on their relation to property Marx’ class-centered model of history distinguishes between three fundamental classes in capitalist societies; capitalists who own the means of production and hire workers, workers who sell their labor, and petty bourgeoisie who own and use the means of production without hiring others (Knutson 2007). The dominant classes seek to maintain the control over the means of production because of the political power associated with that control. Marx was therefore primarily interested in the emergence of a shared sense of class interests among the underprivileged working class to provide a basis for conflict with the ruling class (Knutson 2007).

Weber has built on the Marxian legacy by expanding the potential lines of conflict in society beyond the capital/labor divide (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and

Brooks 1999). Weber's theory is primarily concerned with life chances, access to scarce goods and services (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Inequality is not simply associated with production, but also with social esteem and social closure. Economically defined 'classes' are distinguished from broader 'status groups', which are not reducible to economic relations alone (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). Status groups are differentiated by prestige rankings and consumption patterns. According to Weber the degree of openness or closure of social groups can be determined on the basis of occupational mobility, educational access and the frequency of inter group marriages. Because the Weberian approach reaches beyond the conflict over the means of production it considers the class cleavage not to be the primary source for political conflict in a society, but rather as one among the many sources of conflict (Knutsen 2007). In Weber's theory there is great emphasis on religious prestige, and the division in social chances and access to political power between dominant and subordinate religious groups. But, implicitly the Weberian approach suggests that there exists an unlimited number of potential cleavage bases (Zuckerman 1975). The notion that political conflict is related to a limited number of 'structural' cleavages, of which class and religious divisions are the most important, can be found in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) influential book *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. In their famous introductory chapter Lipset and Rokkan laid the groundwork for our current understanding of the social-structural bases of politics. They specified a pattern of historical interaction in Europe between cleavages lines and the political behavior of parties and the electorate (Zuckerman 1975).

According to Lipset and Rokkan the class cleavage is rooted in the Industrial Revolution, and is primarily concerned with the conflict between employers (owners) versus laborers (workers). The centrality of social class in political sociology is understandable given the fact that it is more uniformly decisive than the other major cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan model (i.e. center/periphery, church/state, rural/urban). As industrialization progressed workers increasingly railed against their low wages, poor working conditions and the insecurity of their contracts. To defend their interest labor unions and socialist parties emerged at the dawn of democracy in Western Europe. Because class divisions in the labor market were relatively uniform across nations, they moved the development of party systems in a common direction (Knutsen 2007). Other cleavage lines, such as religious divisions, were often interwoven with nation-specific conflicts shaping dissimilar party structures across countries. The variety of religious-based parties, in terms of their presence, strength and affiliation, is therefore far greater than of socialist parties.

The religious cleavage in Western Europe is more complex than the class cleavage. According to Lipset and Rokkan the religious divisions in politics originated from the interplay between the Reformation and Counter-Reformation (16th-17th century) and the national state-building revolutions (1789 and after) (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 37-41). The consequences of the Reformation were therefore not only religious, but also political in nature because the religious cleavages frequently interacted with the nation-building process (Knutsen 2004: 98). In Northwest Europe, Britain and in Scandinavia Protestants were often allied to rising nationalist forces. In Southern and Central Europe, the Counter-Reformation strengthened the position of the Catholic Church and perpetuated its relationship with the old regimes. And the territories of The Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland were cross-cut by the religious frontiers of Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 37-41). The division between Catholics and Protestants, created by the Reformation and Counter Reformation therefore not only appears between people but also between nations. Once the new cleavage structures were settled, the French Revolution of 1789 was the catalyst for new religious conflicts across Europe. The secular and liberal movements, which emerged as the offspring of the French Revolution, forced both Catholics and Protestant to defend the privileges of the church in conflicts over the disestablishment of state religion, the introduction of religious freedom and the control of mass education (Knutsen 2004; 98; Lipset and Rokkan 1976).

The influence of social class on political divisions may be more universal in nature, but religious divisions are often considered to be more important. Early comparative studies emphasized the strength of religion as a determinant of political party choice. Rose and Urwin's early examination in 1969 of sixteen Western democracies led them conclude that "*religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world today*" (Rose and Urwin 1969: 12). And studying cleavage politics in four multi-cleavage countries Lijphart reached the same conclusion. He stated: '*social class is clearly no more than a secondary and subsidiary influence of party choice, and it can become a factor of importance only in the absence of potent rivals such as religion and language*' (Lijphart 1979: 53).

Conflict along other cleavage lines sometimes interferes with the class cleavage in the labor market. This taps into the distinction between 'horizontal' cleavages that are related to economic and social divisions (e.g. occupation, income, and education) and 'vertical' cleavages (e.g. religion, language, and ethnicity) that divide societies along cultural criteria (Dogan 2004). By studying

social class and religion we capture the most potent distinctions of the two types of cleavages. The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of voters in modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining economic security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, unemployment and inflation. Religion, on the other hand is related to a wide range of cultural issues; abortion, euthanasia, homosexual rights and other morality policies (Dalton 2008).

1.1.2 Class and Religious Voting

For a long time within political sociology, the relevance of social cleavages on voting remained uncontested. During the first half of the twentieth century scholars commonly assumed that there was a strong relationship between social group membership and party choices, especially in Western Europe. Political parties were considered to be the representatives of specific interest groups and members of these groups were expected to support political parties out of group interest. The working class is historically represented by political parties on the left, by socialists, communists and social-democrats. Politically, the conflict over the means of production is translated into a 'democratic class struggle' (Lipset 1960; Korpi 1983; Nieuwbeerta 1995) in which the working class, as opposed to members from other classes, supports parties that advocate the redistribution of wealth and strive for welfare state expansion. The bourgeoisie on the other hand, the self-employed and the owners of capital, support parties that reject government intervention and advocate a free-market based economy. Hence, traditional class voting predicts that while the working class is voting left-wing, the non-working class supports the right.

The association between religious groups and political parties is less clear-cut because of the diversity of religion within and between nations. Generally however, when scholars investigate the influence of religion on political alignment they assume that the voting behavior of 'religious' voters, whether in affiliation, commitment or belief, is substantially different from 'secular' voters because of their non-material interests. Historically, religious voters supported parties that defended their religious freedom in conflicts over the disestablishment of state religion and the secular versus religious control of mass education. Later, the conflict between religious and secular voters also involves other non-material interests. Religious voters, as opposed to secular voters, support parties that reject liberal political ideals about abortion, euthanasia or homosexual rights. The religion-vote association can be found under many different names and labels in

the literature, e.g.: denominational voting, religiosity voting, confessional voting or Christian voting. In this study we will use the most general term 'religious voting' to refer to all research investigating the influence of religion on party choice.

The archetypical perception of the relationship between social cleavages and party choice is subject to change. From the second half of the twentieth century most democratic societies transformed from industrial economies to advanced- or post industrial economies. Due to the decline of traditional industrial economies in Western countries the classical Marxist conflict over the means of production becomes increasingly unrelated to disagreement among voters. In recent decades something close to a 'new conventional wisdom' (Franklin 1992, Dogan 1995, Lane and Errson 1997, Dalton 2002; Elff 2007) emerged dictating the decline of social class a basis for party support in modern democracies. Clark and Lipset (2001) argue that class voting has declined in all Western-democracies for which data are available between the 1940s and 1980s (see also, Lipset 1960 1983). Based the first large-scale comparison of class voting using log-odds ratio's Nieuwbeerta (1995: 195) concludes that *'in many of the countries substantial declines in the levels of relative class voting occurred in the postwar period'*. Nieuwbeerta found that the decrease in class voting was the largest in countries where the class-vote relationship had traditionally been high. Pakulski and Waters (1996), even proclaiming the 'death of class', write that *'since the peak of class effects during the middle of the twentieth century, the significance of class as a basis for political identification and behavior and as a force for change has been declining'* (1996: 132).

This new consensus is sometimes also assumed with respect to the relevance of other traditional social divisions in politics, such as religion. Franklin *et al.* (1992) have assessed the influence of various attitudinal and social structural variables on voting in a series of sixteen country-specific analyses. They concluded that there was a widespread reduction of in the explanatory power of class and religion, on left-wing voting. Dogan (1995) reports that both class voting and religious voting have eroded in Western Europe (1992: 338). Similarly, Dalton (2002) writes that *"there has been an erosion in the ability of social cleavages (and the social characteristics derived from these cleavages) to explain electoral choice. The weakening of class and religious alignments has been accompanied by an apparent erosion of long-term partisan commitment and enduring feelings of party identification"* (2002: 338).

Despite this prevalent view cleavage voting remains one of the most debated topics in political sociology. As we will discuss later, some recent studies have

challenged the claims about the long-term, universal and unidirectional weakening of social cleavages on voting. In the next paragraph we will discuss the literature on class voting and religious voting studies over the last decades. We will focus on the differences and similarities in the two fields with respect to their theoretical and empirical evolution.

1.2 Cleavage voting research

1.2.1 Three generations of class voting research

The association between social class position and left-wing voting is certainly one of the most widely studied relationships in cleavage voting research. Long before the introduction of modern election surveys around the 1960s scholars sought to investigate the relationship between social stratification and voting behavior. These early studies often relied on ecological inferences, i.e.: drawing conclusions about voters on the basis of aggregate information (Tingsten 1937). The introduction of election surveys signals the starting point of a gradual development process in class voting research. Over time there has been an evolution in four domains of the class voting literature: (1) formulation of research problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) measurement procedures and (4) methods of data analysis. On the basis of these criteria Nieuwbeerta (1995) divided the history of this research area into three generations (cf. Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 1: 3-15; and the summary by Knutsen 2007).

The first generation of class voting research was conducted after the Second World War during the 1950s and 1960s. This generation gave attention to a broad range of research problems concerning the class-vote relationship. Research often relied on limited number of datasets and examined cross-tabulations of dichotomous (manual/non-manual) class measurements and vote choice. The Alford-index was a commonly used measure for the strength of the class-vote relationship (Alford 1963). Other illustrative examples for this generation of class voting research are the studies of Lenski (1970), Lipset (1983) and Korpi (1983). Explanations for variation in class voting were sought in social and political characteristics of countries (see for example: Lipset and Bendix 1959; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In the late 1960s the second generation of class voting research replaced the simple analyses of cross-tabulations with more sophisticated analysis techniques. This generation is characterized by more detailed class schemas and the use of

linear regression. Researches primarily examined long-term trends in single countries and differences between countries in single periods (e.g. Franklin *et al.* 1992). Hypotheses were mainly concerned with value-orientations explaining variations in class voting (Inglehart 1977, 1990).

The third generation started in the mid-1980s. Scholars of this generation often deduced hypotheses from macro-micro-macro theory that concerned compositional explanations and class mobility explanations. Instead of linear regression techniques these studies employed logistic models to study internationally standardized class schemas, e.g. the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema. Researchers of this generation argued that absolute class voting measures based on percentages differences, such as the Alford-index, were sensitive to the marginal distributions and preferred the use of log-odds ratios instead (Heath *et al.* 1985). Until the mid-1990s third generation researchers had only studied class voting trends in single countries.

At that time Nieuwbeerta published his study the third generation had yet to live up to the expectations. He characterized the precision of hypotheses and empirical tests of his generation as '*promising, but (...) still in its infancy*' (Nieuwbeerta 1995: 4). Nieuwbeerta (1995) positioned his study as the next step in the third generation of class voting research. To describe and explain cross-national and over time variations in class voting he constructed an innovatively large-scale dataset containing 113 surveys from 16 countries over the period 1956-1990. Using multi-level models he systematically assessed the effects of social and political characteristics of countries on the levels of class voting. Nieuwbeerta's work was concerned with describing and explaining variation in the effect of class (manual/non-manual vs. EGP) on left-wing voting and in the effect of class mobilization on left-wing voting. Another important step in fulfilling the expectation for third generation was presented by Evans (1999) in '*The End of Class Politics?*' and by the authors who contributed to this edited volume. In a combination of large-scale pooled analyses and successive country-specific chapters this international group of scholars offered a state of the art investigation of class voting in comparative perspective.

During the third generation Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) introduced a new measure to provide "*a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses based on suitable class and voting typologies*" (1995: 814). This 'kappa index' is an aggregate measure of class voting strength, calculated using the standard deviation of the log-odds or predicted probabilities of all possible combinations of class categories and party outcomes. The kappa index allowed researchers to

consider more differentiated party measures than previous generations (e.g. Hout *et al.* 1995; Brooks *et al.* 2006). Knutsen (2006) has exploited this measure thoroughly in study of class voting in Western Europe which enabled him to test a large set of macro-level explanations for changes in, and the comparative strength of class voting using a more differentiated dependent variable than Nieuwbeerta (1995). Others (e.g. Pakulski and Waters 1996; Clark 2001; Houtman 2003) have criticized the kappa-index for two of its properties: First, as a summary measure the kappa index does not specify relationships, or directions thereof, between particular classes and parties. It is therefore not able to detect all changes in class voting. Second, all classes, regardless of their size contribute equally in calculating the average class voting effect (Knutsen 2006: 53). The third generation of class voting research also further explored the micro level explanations for variation in class voting. Some recent work has elaborated on first and second generation theories (Lipset 1959; Parkin 1968; Inglehart 1977;1990) on working class authoritarianism, middle class radicalism and value orientations by employing the methods of data collection, class measures and logistic/multi level models of third generation class voting research (e.g. Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007).

1.2.2 A fourth generation of class voting research

Recently, a new generation of class voting research is evolving. Knutsen (2007) already announced the emergence of a new generation of class voting, but he ended his announcement with a question mark (2007: 460). Instead of signaling recent developments in class voting research, he – in line with his aforementioned large-scale comparison (Knutsen 2006) - primarily calls upon researchers to reconsider the dependent variable in class voting. We however argue that also the research problems and major hypotheses are shifting, and that the measurement procedures and analyses strategies are becoming more sophisticated. Below we will sketch the contours of what is becoming the fourth generation in class voting research.

Research problems: To begin with, there has been quite a debate about the decline of class voting in modern democracies. The study of Nieuwbeerta (1995) for the most part ended this debate. Many contemporary researchers are not concerned anymore with arguments about *whether* class voting has declined or not. The current research problem is much more *why* the class basis of voting is declining (Evans 1999b: 6).

Major hypotheses: Although three generations of class voting researchers

have proposed many hypotheses on explanations for variation (over time and across countries) in the class-vote relationship only few have systematically tried to test these explanations (see Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 4; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999; Knutsen 2006). If these studies are the forerunners of a new generation of class voting research we may expect to see a stronger focus on factors *interpreting* patterns of class-alignment. The most common hypotheses for dealignment in the class voting literature generally fit two main categories. The first category of hypotheses is concerned with sociological factors related to changes in the size and composition of classes and the relative importance of class versus other cleavage lines. The second set of hypotheses use political factors that are related to party programs and the class basis of electoral appeals that parties make (Evans 2000; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Knutsen 2006). The latter category assumes that patterns in class voting reflect the outcomes of party behavior rather than changes in social structure. In section 1.3 we elaborate on the content of the major hypotheses fitting the two categories. Here we will discuss the increasing concern of third and currently upcoming fourth generation of class voting studies for hypotheses on political change.

Although previous generations of research tested hypotheses about the impact of political influences on the class-vote relationship, stringent tests of whether political factors influenced class voting remained largely underdeveloped. Since the late 1990s/ early 2000s there is an increasing concern for the extent to which political parties and changes in the party system have any autonomous effect on class voting. The third generation of class voting research was criticized for largely neglecting political factors. In reaction to Evans (1999) and his colleagues, Mair advised that in explaining variation in class voting “*You need to look at politics as such: you need to look at the cleavage structure and how that changes: you need to look at the parties themselves – or blocks of parties – and how they interact (...) [Y]ou need to look at what competitors do; and you need to look at the institutional context in which this competition takes place. All these factors help to explain why social structure translates into politics differently from one country to another*” (Mair 1999: 311). The implication of this approach is that in studying class voting scholars should combine the theories and methods of social stratification studies with those from political science. In some of the third generation studies researchers relied on the observation of discontinuity in the strength of class voting effects to infer a political influence. The studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1991) and De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) for example contain hypothesis about marked discontinuities between different elections that

are consistent with party shifts instead of social change. The measurement of actual party positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), Oskarson (2005), Achterberg (2006) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent novelty to the field of class voting research.

Measures: The first generation of class voting used a traditional two-class schema dividing manual workers from all other classes. In the second generation more detailed class measures were used, but different studies often relied on different classifications. The third generation typically employed standardized multi-category class measures suitable for over time and cross-national comparisons (Nieuwbeerta 1995). The EGP class schema, originally developed with respect to social mobility studies, nowadays is the most influential operationalization of social class in European sociology (Knutsen 2007). Like other established class schemas the EGP schema was constructed for countries with employment structures dominated by industrial occupations, often called the manufacturing sector. The employment structures of modern democracies are evolving from industrial to post-industrial. The new generation of stratification researchers have adjusted the EGP class schema to account for this transformation by distinguishing between separate classes within the expanding service class (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004; Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a). Typically, these studies differentiate between a 'new' class of social and cultural specialists and an 'old' class of technocrats. Güveli *et al.* (2007a) for example find that the adjusted EGP class schema explains people's political orientation substantially better than the standard EGP class schema. They conclude that the 'new' classes of social and cultural specialists vote significantly more for leftist parties and differ substantially in their political orientation from the 'old' classes of technocrats.

In proposing a new generation of class voting research Knutsen (2007) notes that the three previous generation of class voting all relied on a dichotomous party choice variable that grouped parties of the left into one category and all other parties into the other category. He argues that also this division can be questioned in advanced industrial societies. Knutsen emphasizes that new-left parties receive stronger support from the higher educated and the new middle class relative to the less educated and manual workers. Moving beyond 'traditional' (left/right) class voting, Knutsen proposes that a new generation of research should consider all parties as separate categories.

Methods of data analysis: Next to the shift in research problems, hypotheses, and measurement procedures, there is also promising innovation with respect to

the methods and analysis techniques. The third generation primarily relied on logistic models of class voting. In doing so, many comparative studies on class voting use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often 'left' versus 'non-left') regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or that different parties within the same 'party family' are perhaps similar but often far from equal. This raises a problem for comparative analyses of class voting, whether over time or space, as the extent to which leftist parties advocate redistributionist policies and non-leftist parties oppose them is - falsely - assumed to be fixed. Researchers who realized this began to examine whether variation in class voting was related to the difference in the redistributive policy choices offered to voters. In the first studies that attempted to account for the 'top-down' direction in which class and vote are associated, researcher 'eye-balled' the extent to which the patterns of party change were related to class voting (Evans *et al.* 1999). The second step was to calculate the correlation between party polarization and the levels of class voting (Oskarson 2005; Knutsen 2006). In the meanwhile, studies on electoral behavior borrowed 'discrete choice models' from consumer behavior economics (McFadden 1974; Alvarez and Nagler 1998). Applied to electoral research discrete-choice models express the probability that an individual voter chooses a specific alternative as function only of its attributes, without the need to take into account the names or identities of the specific alternatives. Elff (2009) recognized the applicability of McFadden's conditional logit model in analyzing social divisions and party choice. His study confirmed that the decline in the relation between social divisions and voting behavior is attributable to parties' changing political positions. Once these changes are taken into account, Elff argues, the impact of social class and religion on voting behavior persists. Although conditional logit models have repeatedly been used in electoral research, Elff's study (2009) is to our knowledge the first to apply this model to address changes in cleavage voting.

Whether or not the recent developments in class voting truly constitute the emergence of a new research generation remains debatable. Some of the proposed innovations are subject to controversies, for example, the question whether changes in the occupational structure warrant the adjustment of established class schemas. Differences within the service class are in part associated with the expansion of the welfare state and the growth of public sector employment. And the split between those who work in the private sector and those who in the public sector is sometimes seen as one of the 'new' political divisions cross-cutting the class cleavage (Dunleavy 1980). Other developments,

such as the inclusion of party positions and the use of discrete choice models, are promising but are also still in stages of infancy. We thus draw the same conclusion as Nieuwbeerta (1995) did when identifying the first three generations of class voting research: Different generations of class voting research are not truly separated in time. There is a slow diffusion of innovation in political sociology leading to gradual scientific change, not to immediate change of practice. The third generation has matured as a result of the studies like those by Nieuwbeerta (1995), Evans (1999) and Knutsen (2006). And at the same time, these and other studies have paved the way for yet a new precision of research problems, hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collections and analysis techniques. In table 1.1 we summarize the main developments in class voting research. The summary of the first three generations are taken from Nieuwbeerta (1995: 20). The potential characteristics of the fourth generation are added on the basis of the overview above.

1.2.3 Religious voting research

Although religious voting research resembles class voting research in the sense that they both explore trends and country differences thereof in social structural divisions on party choice, the two research lines are rooted in different traditions. The generations in class voting research are anchored in the history of comparative research on social stratification (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee 1991). The introduction of new class measures and the shift to logistic modeling in this school of research not only moved stratification research from the second generation to the third, but also marked the emerge of the third generation in class voting research. Contrary, the history of religious voting research is not directly linked to developments in the social stratification literature, but much to debates about secularization in the sociology of religion. In some studies religion is used as a control for class voting (e.g. Alford 1963; Kelly and Evans 1995), but electoral studies solely investigating religion are much rarer. The body of literature on religion and voting behavior is not only smaller than the class voting literature, its history is also less well documented. Exceptions are the very useful reviews made by Manza and Wright (2003) and Esmer and Pettersson (2007). Below we will discuss the literature on religion and voting by the same criteria that are used to identify different generations in social stratification and class voting studies; (1) formulation of research problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) measurement procedures and (4) data collection and methods of analysis. With respect to data collection and analytic strategies the developments in religious

Table 1.1 Characteristics of studies explaining variations in class voting

	First generation (...-1970s)	Second generation (1960s-...)	Third generation (1980-...)	Fourth generation (late 1990s-...)
Question	Does country A, that has a higher level of class voting than country B, have a higher or lower score on country characteristic than country B	Is there a bivariate correlation between country characteristics and countries levels of class voting?	To what extent can differences across countries and changes within countries in class voting be explained by variation in these countries' (1) social and political characteristics, (2) class composition, (3) mobility patterns, (4) Value orientations	To what extent can <i>the decline in class voting</i> be explained by social changes and changes in political choices?
Explanatory hypotheses	Social and political characteristics of countries Social mobility	Value orientations	Social and political characteristics, class composition, mobility patterns, value orientations	Social changes (class composition, mobility, and relevance of other cleavages) and Political changes (Party positions and polarization)
Class measures	Manual/Non-manual class	Manual/Non-manual class, more detailed class schemas	Standardized, detailed class schemas (EGP)	Standardized, detailed class schemas (EGP) and revised 'postindustrial' class schemas
Techniques	Comparing cross-tabulations	Comparing cross-tabulations, linear regression	Logistic regression, log-odds ratios	Binary, multinomial and conditional logistic regression
Data	Small number of countries and years	More countries and years	More countries and years	More countries and years

Table based upon Nieuwbeerta (1995: 20), fourth generation is own addition.

voting research are similar to those in class voting research. We will, however, show that the boundaries between different generations in religious voting studies are generally less clear-cut.

Research problems: In contrast to class voting, religious voting research is characterized by a broader range of research problems concerning the relationship between religion and voting. Esmer and Pettersson (2007) argue that studies of religion and voting behavior generally fit two categories, i.e.: studies that compare the voting behavior of different denominational groups and studies that correlate levels of religiosity with voting behavior. In this categorization religiosity relates to both belief and practice. Although the latter is commonly operationalized as church attendance, the former may relate to a wider range of indicators of faith such as one's belief in God or Biblical literalism. Manza and Wright (2003: 299-300) even distinguish four categories of religion-vote relationships that are found in the literature: (a) church attendance; (b) denominational groups; (c) doctrinal beliefs and (d) local/contextual aspects of congregational memberships (e.g. the impact of individual churches or church leaders). 'Generational' differences between studies conducted in the 1960s versus later research do not play a substantive role in the formulation of research problems concerning different types of religious cleavages. Most studies investigate either denominational differences or religiosity, sometimes using one as a control for the other. Simultaneous investigations of various types of religious cleavages are rarer, but are found across many decades of research (Lijphart 1979; Bean 1999; Kolter-Berkowitz 2001; Raymond 2010). In the US, though, scholars 'rediscovered' the role of religion in politics in the 1990s by focusing on differences between religious affiliation, commitment and belief (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Layman 1998). This development matched debates in the sociology of religion about belonging, behaving and believing (Davie 1994; Voas and Crockett 2005; Aarts, Need, Te Grotenhuis and De Graaf 2008). Generally, the main research question in analyzing religion and party choice is not whether a relationship exists or not, but rather if, and to what extent this relationship is declining (Esmer and Pettersson 2007).

Major hypotheses: Comparative studies - both over time and space - on religious voting have been dominated by theories and hypotheses of secularization. Secularization, Manza and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of religion in the lives of individuals is declining, that the social and political influence of religious organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life by religious organizations is declining (2003; 300-301). These secularization

processes often lay at the core of hypotheses predicting religious dealignment (Broughton and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Knutsen 2004, Norris and Inglehart 2004). Norris and Inglehart (2004) postulate that: "*In recent decades (...) as secularization has progressively weakened religious identities in advanced industrial societies, we would expect to find that the political impact of denominational differences would also play less of a role in party and electoral politics*". Investigating survey data from a wide range of industrial and postindustrial countries, they conclude that: *The pattern documented (...) at both the individual and macro-level is broadly consistent with these expectations*' (2004: 211-212). On the one hand, secularization hypotheses suggest a decline in the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of education and affluence causing voters to become less reliant on '*simple religious heuristics to govern all aspects of their lives, including how they vote*' (Manza and Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, declining levels of church attendance are assumed to weaken the capacity of churches to influence the voting behavior of their members. Yet, changes in the religious structures and secularization processes do not necessarily produce a decline religion-vote relationship. Manza and Wright (2003; 313) note that while church membership or church attendance may decline, levels of religious voting can remain stable among those who remain in church. In this sense, the analogy to the third generation class voting hypotheses about social mobility is found hypotheses about changing or leaving church. Need (1997) explicitly draws this comparison by not only looking at inter- and intragenerational class mobility but also at religious mobility in the Netherlands. She finds that those who leave the church are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation non-church members.

Secularization theory is not undisputed in the sociology of religion. Most criticized is the assumption that secularization is a universal process and a one-way road. Secularization theory assumes that religious involvement weakens following a decrease in religious demand. Especially the United States are a problematic case for secularization theorists because both religious membership and church attendance are found to be high despite relatively high levels of affluence. Opposing, so-called 'supply-side', theory has argued that religious demand is stable over time and countries, but that the level of religious participation may vary depending on the level of religious pluralism (cf. Stark and Iannaccone 1994). In religious diverse 'markets' the suppliers of religion, denominations and sects, are in mutual competition to attract members. In the United States, unlike in Europe, "*the absence of a state church has resulted in the flourishing of an*

unprecedented range of denominations and sects" (Manza and Wright: 302). Supply-side theory assumes that religious diversity results in high levels of religious involvement. However, empirical tests show little evidence to support supply-side theory: in most western societies, churches continue to lose member (Aarts 2010).

Despite the recent critique of religious market theory on secularization in the field of sociology of religion, religious voting studies are often almost entirely focused on demand-side arguments predicting secularization (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Yet, the evidence for the decline of religious voting is, also in Europe, far from close to scholarly consensus. Knutsen (2004) finds that there is no uniform or clear decline in the relationship between religious denomination and party choice in Western Europe. For some specific periods the average correlation even increases, and although he finds long-term decreases in some countries, Knutsen deems the size of such decline to be small. Also Elff (2007, 2009) reject the notion of a universal decline in religious voting: "*Reports of the death of social cleavages are exaggerated. While the consequences of class positions seem to have weakened in some of the countries, the consequences of the division between religious and secular people have not*" (2007: 289). Hypotheses on election-specific fluctuations and reversals in religious voting trends, attributed to the mobilizing effort of particular religious organizations, are mostly found in studies on American politics (Manza and Brooks 1997; Manza and Wright 2003). The religious pluralism of the US also led to the formulation of more group-specific hypotheses, like the 'Catholic Dealignment Thesis' and the 'Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis' (Manza and Brooks 1997). In section 1.3 we will discuss the content of these hypotheses in more detail, and compare them to the major hypotheses in the class voting literature.

Measures: The fact that religion can be broken down into various aspects not only caused diversity in research questions and theoretical approaches, but also brought about a wide selection of categorizations and measures of religious membership, behavior and belief. Wald and Wilcox (2006) emphasize the complexity of measuring religion in political science by establishing that the American National Election Study in 2004 had 135 categories of religious affiliation, including 18 for Baptists alone. The diversity of the religious structure in the US is in sharp contrast to the Protestant state churches in the Nordic countries or the dominance of the Catholic Church in Southern Europe. Classifications of church membership may therefore strongly vary between studies from different countries. There are also large inconsistencies in the way church attendance is

measured across studies. Church attendance is often used to measure attachment to the church. A lot of cleavage voting studies use a dichotomous measure of 'regular church attendance', but rely on different classification of what counts as 'regular' (e.g. weekly, once a month, or twice a month). Church attendance is even more complex because the frequency of religious services may vary between denominations (Wald and Wilcox 2006). The frequency of attendance that is associated with strong religious attachment may thus differ from one faith to the other. More sophisticated, i.e. multicategorical or ordinal, measures are sometimes used instead of binary variables. Affiliation and church attendance are indicators for respectively religious belonging and behaving. As a third aspect of religion, the measurement of religious beliefs is heavily debated in the sociology of religion, but it is far less central in studying the religious cleavage in politics.

Methods of data analysis: Already in early 20th century the relationship between religion and voting behavior was subject to scholarly attention. Like class voting, early studies on religion in politics were primarily based on aggregated data of single countries or single elections. In 1904 Blank, for example, published an ecological analysis the electoral support for the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) that aimed to reveal the intervening role of religion in class politics. A similar analysis in the Netherlands was conducted by Den Uyl (1951) who investigated the association between denomination and party choice in the Dutch 1948 elections. The advent of election surveys marked the starting point of systematic empirical research on religious voting. The study of De Jong (1954) is probably the first (cf. Lijphart 1979) cross-national survey-based analysis of voting behavior. Investigating a series of cross-tabulations De Jong concludes that "*across Western Europe there is at least a certain association between religion and political choice*" (1956: 125). In seeking explanations for differences between countries in this association he suggests both individual level (church attendance, religious belief) and contextual level (state churches, Catholic hegemony) explanations. De Jong therefore not only pioneered in empirical descriptions of religious voting in cross-national perspective, but also in addressing explanatory questions.

Class voting research has moved away from the examination of cross-tabulations a long time ago. In religious voting research there are great differences in methods employed to analyze the influence of religious cleavages on voting. Cross-tabulations were common in the 1950s and 1960s (De Jong 1954; Scoble and Epstein 1964), but are still employed in some very recent studies (Minkenberg 2010). Also in studying trends recent, prominent comparative studies have analyzed religious differences in voting on the basis of percentage differences

and bivariate correlation coefficients (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Knutsen 2004). Via researchers in Britain (Heath *et al.* 1985, 1991, 1995) logistic regression models and odds ratios found their way from class voting studies to religious voting studies in the 1990s (Ultee, Arts and Flap 1992; Manza and Brooks 1997; Need 1997). Religious voting research is therefore increasingly connected to the third and coming fourth generation of class voting studies (Need 1997; Bean 1999; De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Oskarson 2005; Brooks *et al.* 2006; Elff 2009).

1.3. Two perspectives on cleavage voting

In this section we will further discuss the most common hypotheses raised in the literature explaining variation in class and religious voting. We will show that the same logic is applied in formulating explanations about the decline in religious voting as to explaining the decline in class voting, albeit sometimes under the guise of different names and labels. With respect to class voting various, more or less equivalent, categorizations of explanations can be found across the literature (see: Manza *et al.* 1995; Goldthorpe 1996; Evans 1999; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999; Knutsen 2006). Most of these summaries are mainly concerned with explanations in which social changes are the primary source for changes in class voting. But next to hypotheses about changes in the attributes, attitudes and aptitudes of *voters*, the class voting literature contains explanations with respect to the characteristics of *voting*, i.e. hypotheses about party strategy, electoral appeal and the choices offered to voters (Manza *et al.* 1995: 146). This distinction is most explicitly made by Evans (2000) and Evans and Whitefield (2006) who use the term 'bottom-up perspective' to refer to all explanations that approach the decline in class voting as a consequence of *social changes*, i.e.: changes in the composition of classes and the relative importance of class versus other cleavage lines. For explanations that use changes in *political choices* as the primary source for changes in class voting the term 'top-down' perspective is adopted. In this study we use this distinction, and apply the theoretical insights from both perspectives. By discussing hypotheses about religious voting simultaneously with hypotheses about class voting we aim to illustrate that 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' processes are applicable to both social cleavages.

1.3.1 Bottom-up: social change explanations

Social mobility: In class voting research mobility hypotheses involve that the level of class voting declined due to increasing inter or intra-generational mobility across the boundaries of social classes. Mobile voters are expected adopt a middle position between their class of origin and class of destination. Upwardly mobile voters are expected to be more right-wing than those who remain in their origin class, and more left-wing than those in their destination class. The reverse may be expected for downwardly mobile voters (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath 1995). With respect to religious voting mobility hypotheses are primarily concerned with outflow mobility. The boundaries between those who are in church and those who or not are expected weaken because those who leave the church are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation non-church members (Need 1997).

Heterogenization: Related to mobility is the social structural composition of social categories and the heterogenization of specific groups in particular. With respect to social class, compositional changes involve transformations in labor market structure of advanced industrial economies. As a result of continuing de-industrialization and market liberalization the share of manual laborers in the workforce sharply declined in Western democracies after the Second World War. In the same period, the service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly heterogeneous. This is the reason why scholars of the third generation distinguished sub-classes within the 'non-manual class' and why scholars of the fourth generation even further differentiate within the service class. In this respect, the distinction between the manual and non-manual class has become less relevant due to changing class structures. With respect to religious voting compositional changes are primarily concerned with the growth of the secular portion of the population. Due to religious outflow the secular group becomes more and more heterogeneous; enlarged by first and second generation church leavers from various religious origins. For this reason students of religious voting differentiated 'secular voters' from 'church leavers' or included parental religious affiliation (Need 1997). In this respect, the distinction between the church members and non-members has become less relevant due to changes in the religious structure of societies.

New social divisions: Another type of hypotheses that is put forward to explain the decline in cleavage voting is related to the emergence of 'new' social divisions. Although typically raised in relation to class divisions, both industrial (e.g. class) and pre-industrial (e.g. religion) cleavage lines are expected to be replaced or

cross-cut by new 'post-industrial' cleavages. Various 'new' forms of social differentiation have been raised, e.g.: gender, ethnicity, education, sector employment or new identity and interest groups. Class and religious voting are expected to decline in post-industrial democracies as such new social cleavages are increasingly relevant for political interests.

Cognitive mobilization: The 'Cognitive Mobilization Thesis' implies that voters increasingly possess the cognitive skills and resources that enable them to make independent political choices without relying on constraining loyalties to political parties or specific interest groups (Dalton 2007). Class and religious voting are expected to decline as educational expansion and the rise of mass media transformed voters from being driven by cleavage-based loyalties into calculative, preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; Inglehart 1990).

Growing affluence: Rising incomes and improved living standards have enhanced the economic security of many voters in advanced industrial democracies. In class voting research hypotheses about the consequences of growing affluence are known as the 'Embourgeoisement Thesis'. The working class-support for left-wing parties declines because workers increasingly have incomes, living standards and consumption patterns that overlap with those of the middle class and they no longer need to struggle to improve their economic situation. (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechfofer and Platt 1968; Knutsen 2006). In religious voting research a similar line of reasoning is employed to explain the narrowing of differences in voting behavior between Catholics and Protestants in the US. This 'Catholic Dealignment Thesis' states that Catholic voters are shifting away from the Democratic Party as they become more affluent over time, matching or even surpassing the economic position of Protestants (Manza and Brooks 1997). Moreover, increasing economic security may also have undermined the importance of religious values (Inglehart 1990; Dogan 1995). General secularization theory therefore suggests a decrease of religious voting among all religious categories as economic security increases.

Cultural conflict: Hypotheses about cultural conflict often emphasize the importance of value change and the rise of 'new' attitudinal cleavages as opposed to 'old' social-structural cleavages. In the literature this 'New Politics Thesis' builds upon two arguments to explain the decline in class voting. First, the rise of a materialist/post-materialist dimension has increased the concern for 'new' political issues such as democratization, civil rights and environmental protection among the middle class. Traditional left-right class voting declined because of middle class realignment away from right-wing parties to 'new left' parties. The

primary source for such realignment is so-called 'middle class radicalism'. As a counter-reaction, some portion of the working class may have shifted to right-wing parties to reaffirm the traditional emphasis on material values (Knutsen 2006).

Second, the advent of cultural issues in politics has evoked the rise of 'new right' parties that appealed to working class voters on non-economic issues, such as anti-immigration, anti multiculturalism, nationalism and law and order. In either way, new non-economic conflict weakens the class basis of traditional left-right divisions. The emergence of cultural conflicts has also led to the formulation of new hypotheses with respect to religious voting. The most prominent is the 'Culture Wars Thesis', based on conflicts in the US over social morality and ethical issues, e.g.: family values, gay rights, evolutionary biology and abortion. This argument is however used to explain both decrease and increase in religious voting. On the one hand, growing concern about moral issues is expected to further *intrad denominational* conflict, therefore breaking down traditional denominational alignments. This also taps into the 'Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis', which identifies the shifts among liberal Protestants, characterized by dropping levels of regular church attendance, as the primary source of decline in religious voting in the US (Manza and Brooks 1997). On the other hand, cultural conflicts may have increased political divisions by lining up religious conservatives of all denominations against both religious liberals and secular voters (cf. Manza and Wright 2003).

1.3.2 Top-down: political choice explanations

Electoral Trade-off: Parties are unable to successfully appeal to all groups in society, and they therefore adopt a trade-off strategy in appealing to different groups of voters. Hypotheses in class voting research about the consequences of party strategy are often built on what has become known as the 'Dilemma of Electoral Socialism' (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Left-wing parties face an electoral dilemma if they want to win elections: Since their core constituency, the working class, is an electoral minority left-wing parties must seek support from the middle class as well. Following this reasoning, the electoral dilemma causes class voting to decline in two ways. First, the working class is shrinking in size, and class voting declines as far as working class parties succeed in compensating this decline by attracting members from other social classes. Second, as left-wing parties extend their appeal they undermine class identity and discourage class-based appeals in politics as a whole. Socialist parties become the parties of workers as individuals not as a collectivity. "*Workers are no longer mobilized as*

workers but as consumers, taxpayers, parents, economic prosperity, 'the poor', 'the [hard working, own addition] people', ect." (Sainsbury 1990: 31; Knutsen 2006: 8). The rise of new issues on the political agenda may have reinforced this process. In endeavoring to be more inclusive left-wing parties may appeal to the non-material values of the new middle class. In turn they estrange themselves from workers that do not share the cultural liberal middle class-values.

The same logic may be applied to religious voting. Kalyvas (1996) has translated the electoral dilemma to the consequences of the electoral strategy of confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, confessional parties gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature hindered Christian Democrats to successfully mobilize non-religious voters. In order to maximize the numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize religion without destroying the confessional character of the party. This 'Confessional Dilemma' led Christian parties to redefine the position of religion in politics. They broke their organizational dependence on the Church, and reinterpreted their electoral appeal by replacing specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and abstract moral values. From this view religious voting thus declines as Confessional parties extend their appeal beyond their core constituency of religious voters (Kalyvas 1996: 242-244).

Party system convergence: A second, though related, set of explanations for changes in cleavage voting concerns the relative positions of political parties with respect to class-related or religion-related policy issues. The emphasis here is on the difference between the main party choices that voters face. In their landmark publication *The American Voter* Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 364) write that casting a class vote is more likely if voters '*perceive that differences exist between parties that are relevant to class interest*'. Class interests are associated with the degree of left-right polarization. Polarization is large when parties adopt different, distinguishable positions with respect to socio-economic policies. It is hypothesized that class voting declines as parties converge towards the political centre, and the socio-economic differences narrow between the major leftist and rightist parties. Contrary, programmatic divergence (or growing political polarization), may increase the levels of class voting. Political campaigns may revive old loyalties and re-engage differentiation between groups in society. As class-relevant, economic issues are more salient this may give rise to political polarization and reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem 1993: 386). Party strategy, programmatic polarization and electoral appeals may therefore not only be used to explain a decline, but also temporary fluctuations or

increases in the class-vote relationship. When translated to religion it can be hypothesized that the levels of religious voting are correlated with the degree of polarization on traditional moral policies (Oskarson 2005). The religion-vote relationship is expected to decline as confessional parties narrow the differences with secular parties by de-emphasizing particular moral issues. In American research on religious voting, hypotheses on political strategy have been raised to explain increases in the political alignment of conservative Protestants in the late 1970s/ early 1980s and late 1990s/ early 2000s. The 'Christian Right Thesis' attributes the reinforcement of the linkages between Evangelicals and the Republican Party in these periods to the rise of moral issues on the political agenda, the candidacy of openly religious candidates like Ronald Reagan, Pat Robertson and George W. Bush, and organized efforts to mobilize Evangelicals by Christian Right organizations (Manza and Brooks 1997: 42-43; Claassen and Povtak 2010: 13).

1.3.3 Towards a bottom-up and top-down design

In this study we are not able to test all major hypotheses mentioned above. Especially the lack of relevant variables on voters' characteristics restricts our ability to test specific hypotheses in the category of 'bottom-up' explanations. We will therefore use the theoretical insights of various explanations to derive a more general expectation about the influence of social changes on the level of cleavage voting. We expect social groups, whether class or religious categories, to lose their distinctiveness as social mobility, compositional changes, educational expansion, value changes and the rise of new political issues have eroded the divisions between them. We expect that this process, in subsequent chapters referred to as 'the blurring cleavage boundaries' diminishes the relevance of traditional class and religious conflict for voters' political choices.

'Top-down' explanations differ from 'bottom-up' explanations in two ways: First, most 'bottom-up' explanations implicitly assume that political changes are reflections of social changes. Political parties are supposed to respond to changing social circumstances: As traditional group boundaries are blurring, or as particular social groups shrink in size it is expected that the cleavage-based parties adjust their strategy and broaden their appeal. From this line of reasoning 'bottom-up' changes determine both the political strategy of parties and the voting behavior of individuals. Contrary to this sociological determinist perspective 'top-down' explanations use political changes as the primary source for changes in cleavage voting. Sartori (1969: 84), as an early influential advocate of the

'top-down' perspective, argues that the politicization of class divisions by parties produces class consciousness rather than the other way around. And although Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that political parties respond to social changes, their electoral dilemma implies that the voting behavior of individuals is influenced by the party strategy rather than by class conditions. From the 'top-down' perspective - as was also a central feature in the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage model of party system formation - political and social factors interact to produce the social basis of voter alignment. Political changes are thus contributions towards, rather than simply reflections of changes political cleavages. Second, 'bottom-up' processes often assume that the decline in cleavage voting is relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Changes in party strategy, electoral appeals or programmatic polarization imply that the importance of social cleavages for party choice can increase as well as decrease. Explanations for more time-specific changes and possible reversals in cleavage voting may therefore be attributed to changes in the political circumstances under which voting takes place, rather than to sociological conditions. In the next section we will formulate the research questions of this study. Theoretically we will draw hypotheses based on the premise that political factors may have an autonomous influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting additional to the effect of social changes. To test our hypotheses we rely on different data analysis strategies. In the next section we therefore also pay attention to measurements procedures, data collections and analysis techniques used in various chapters.

1.4 Plan of the book

1.4.1 Research questions and data analysis strategy

By reviewing the literature in political sociology, we transposed class voting and stratification research to the study of religious voting. On the one hand we have shown that the precision of research questions, hypotheses, measures and methods in class voting research promises the rise of a new generation. On the other hand, we demonstrated that the empirical developments in class voting studies are increasingly applied in studying religious voting. By categorizing the major hypotheses for class and religion voting simultaneously we showed that there are overarching theoretical mechanisms behind how social structure and political choices produce variation in cleavage-based voting. However, the review has also shown that the emerging fourth generation of class voting research

raises new or unresolved theoretical and empirical questions, and that in terms of comparability the research on religious voting is not yet of the same generation as the research on class voting. Because of the lack of integration of the two research traditions, and because the fourth generation of class voting research has not yet fully crystallized some important questions remain understudied or require more stringent empirical tests.

The following chapters are used to answer specific questions about cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting in Western democracies. To improve on previous research problems theoretically as well as empirically we subdivide the book into two parts. The first part consists of large-scale comparative investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 modern democracies in Western Europe, the United States and Australia in the period 1960-2008. Using more data than previous studies we are able to make better generalized inferences about the variation in class and religious voting from a cross-national and over time perspective. For this purpose we have constructed a new large-scale dataset, the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV) which provides the richest source of pooled individual-level surveys on the relations between social position and political choices available for Western countries in the post-war period. As we will discuss later, this comparative approach has some drawbacks with respect to the level of detail at the respondent level and with the availability of comparable variables across surveys.

In the second part of the book we therefore examine trends in cleavage voting in one country, i.e.: the Netherlands. For this purpose we use data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006. We focus on the Netherlands because there are survey data available for elections over a long period in which both the societal and the political circumstances have changed considerably. As in many other advanced industrial countries the Dutch occupational structure transformed as de-industrialization progressed and the service sector grew in size. Dutch society has also rapidly secularized: Both church attendance and denominational membership rates substantially dropped in the period under study. Moreover, during this period there were remarkable changes in the political landscape of the Netherlands. Using more detailed measures and more sophisticated analyses techniques than previous studies (including part I of this book) we further investigate whether changes in cleavage voting can be explained by 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' changes. In this thesis we will therefore answer two central research questions:

- (1) *To what extent are there cross-national and over-time differences in Western democracies in the relative influence of social class and religion on voting?*
- (2) *To what extent are social and political changes able to explain (a) the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies and (b) trends in class and religious voting in the Netherlands?*

1.4.2 Part I: Cleavage voting in comparative perspective

For the international comparative part of this book we constructed an integrated dataset of 196 national surveys. Half of these surveys were originally integrated in the *International Social Mobility and Politics* (ISMP) file (Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). The ISMP-file contains individual information on social class and voting behavior in 16 democracies in Western Europe, North America and Australia from 1956 to 1990. For our research we have updated the ISMP-file and improved the scope of analysis: We nearly doubled the number of surveys, and extended the number of years included for most countries. The ISMP file contained only ten countries for which the information covered more than ten years, and only five countries covering a period longer than twenty years. For three countries the file even included only one survey, and in four countries only two. Given these limitations Evans (1999c) for example doubted the generalizability of the finding that class voting declined in most countries (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999). In our updated file all countries have at least five included surveys and cover at least a twenty-year period. In ten countries there is information covering thirty years or more, and in two countries even forty years or more. We exclude Canada and Ireland from our file because there is only a single survey available for Canada (CES 1984) and two for Ireland (ISSP 1989, 1990), and we are unable to integrate additional surveys for these countries. Moreover, only four out of 113 surveys integrated in the ISMP-file are from Catholic countries in Southern Europe (three from Italy and one from France). In this book we aim not only to improve the generalized inferences with respect to class voting, but also to examine comparative patterns of religious voting. For this purpose we added more data from countries outside northwest Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. In our updated file we in total included nine surveys for both France and Italy, and expanded the file with nine other surveys from Spain.

In total, we used 105 out of the 113 surveys from the ISMP file, and added 91 national surveys for 15 countries. The newly constructed dataset, which we label the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting*, contains information on Australia,

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States between 1960 and 2008 (Table 1.2., see appendix A.1 for the original data sources). The scope of the CDCV-file in terms of period and countries covered is uniquely rich for data on the social bases of politics. However, the expansion of the ISMP file comes at the cost of the number of included variables. Unlike Nieuwbeerta we did not restrict ourselves to surveys containing information about both individual and parental (i.e. fathers') social class. Because we updated the ISMP-file for respondent's individual variables only we are not able to address questions about the effect of social mobility on voting behavior. We also allowed a lower level of detail measuring the social class position of respondents. Additional variables on the socio-economic characteristics of voters (e.g. income, home ownership, employment sector) are neither consistently available in the ISMP-file nor in all surveys added here. Moreover, also information on religion is not consistently available in all surveys. Therefore only 125 out of 196 surveys in our updated file contain sufficient information on church attendance and/or church membership. Given the discrepancy between the availability of information

Table 1.2 Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV)

Country	Period	Number of surveys
Australia	1965 – 2004	15
Austria	1974 – 2003	7
Belgium	1975 – 2003	5
Denmark	1971 – 2001	13
Finland	1972 – 2003	6
France	1967 – 2007	9
Germany	1969 – 2005	23
Italy	1968 – 2006	9
The Netherlands	1970 – 2006	20
Norway	1965 – 2001	10
Spain	1979 – 2008	9
Sweden	1972 – 2002	11
Switzerland	1971 – 2003	10
United Kingdom	1964 – 2005	17
United States	1960 – 2004	32
Total	1960 – 2008	196

on social class and religion we are not able to make use of the full range of the CDCV dataset in all chapters of part I of this book.

In chapter 2 we aim to connect the trends in class voting with trends on religious voting. We therefore only make use of the 125 surveys in the CDCV-file which include sufficient information on both class and religion. Still, this 13-country analysis provides the largest simultaneous comparison of trends in class and religious voting available in the literature. We begin this chapter with an extensive overview of literature about the *relative influence* of class and religion on voting. We will show that it is difficult to compare results across studies because there are large differences in the way cleavages are measured and how their influence on voting is analyzed: Class and religious divisions are measured on the basis of different contrasts, categorizations and indicators across studies. The dependent variables are often too country-specific to compare internationally. And, above all, there is large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a cleavage. The aim of this chapter is to systematically analyze cross-national differences and trends in the magnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as social bases of voting behavior in thirteen countries. But unlike the few previous studies comparing the magnitude of cleavage voting we uniformly measure cleavage-strength based on a multi-category typology of cleavages and parties, focus on the relative influence of religion vs. social class, and model changes in the effects of class and religion simultaneously. Moreover, we measure cleavage strength using appropriate and comparable measures across countries and time, the kappa-index. And we compare our results on cleavage strength with the differences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class. Further details about the operationalization and analysis techniques are discussed in chapter 2.

In chapter 3 we shift from descriptive to explanatory questions. In order to make use of a broader range of surveys in the CDCV-file we only focus on class voting. Most previous studies that explain the class-vote relationship have often focused on 'bottom-up' social factors, but paid little attention to 'top-down' political factors. In this chapter we estimate the impact of the Left-Right positions of parties on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis of integrated data from 15 countries in Western Europe, the United States and Australia (1960-2005) supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in

(‘quasi’)sentences in a program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven policy domains (i.e. external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party positions in each country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of the corresponding election year or the last preceding election. To test our hypotheses we select all surveys from the CDCV-file in period for which manifesto data is available. This results in a selection of 188 surveys between 1960-2003 (2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). In this chapter, instead of reporting the strength of class voting as an aggregate kappa-index, we present the log-odds ratios of voting left-wing for three classes relative to the manual class. Next, we test cross-nationally the two versions of the ‘top-down’ thesis as we discussed earlier. The first concerns the effect of the ideological position of left-wing parties on the level of class voting. The second version involves the differences between the ideological positions of various parties, and is concerned with the effect of party polarization on the level of class voting between and within countries. In doing so, this chapter provides an important step towards expanding the examination of cleavage change beyond ‘bottom-up’ processes to those involving the relevance of the choices that parties provide for voters.

1.4.3 Part II: Trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands

In the second part of this book we examine class and religious voting in the Netherlands. For this purpose we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. We use information from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 [N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). We excluded the 2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational codings were available. In order to improve on third generation class voting research we require detailed information on respondent occupation to use a more differentiated measure of social class. The availability of four-digit ISCO scores (or CBS84 occupational classifications) allows us to use a modified version of the EGP class schema (Güveli 2006). With respect to the surveys of 1989, 1994, and 2006 we obtained the most reliable and detailed codings directly from the Central Bureau of Statistics in Heerlen (the Netherlands). Next to information on social class we also harmonized the variables in the 11 DPES-surveys with respect to church membership, church attendance, economic ideology, education, party choice and some social background characteristics. We supplement the

integrated DPES-surveys by data of the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch political parties. The central question of this part of the book is to what extent changes in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands since the 1970s can be explained by social and political changes?

In chapter 4 we examine trends in class voting in the Netherlands. Again, we especially focus on the effects of political changes on the class-vote association. Using multinomial logistic models, more years and better differentiated measures of social class and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf *et al.*'s (2001) question whether the emergence of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. Next, using conditional logistic regression models we examine the interaction between the party positions and social class. We aim to test whether class voting in the Netherlands is affected by changes in party's 'old' social-economic positions and 'new' conservative-progressive positions. We set out to examine these 'top-down' changes after accounting for the 'bottom-up' process of blurring class boundaries. To account for the heterogenization of the service class we differentiate between a 'new' class of social and cultural specialists and an 'old' class of technocrats within the service class of the traditional EGP class schema (Güveli 2006).


A similar strategy is adopted in chapter 5 with respect to examining changes in religious-based voting in the Netherlands. Also in this chapter we investigate two types of changes in political choices in the Netherlands. First, we build on previous research that demonstrated that there was an abrupt decline in religious voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) (cf. De Graaf *et al.* 2001). Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the consequences a more recent political merger in 2002; that of two minor Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examine time-specific changes in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the party system. Second, we include direct measures of party positions in order to account for parties' moral traditionalism using the Comparative Manifesto Data. We again employ conditional logistic regression analyses to examine the interaction between the party positions and religious denomination and church attendance. We investigate the effects of these political changes after accounting for the 'bottom-up' process of blurring religious boundaries. Instead of simply inferring societal homogenization between religious and irreligious voters we test whether trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church attendance and growing effects of education.

1.4.4 Overview

In sum, this thesis consists of four empirical chapters. The two chapters in the first part of the book involve cross-national comparisons of trends in cleavage-based voting. Chapter 2 investigates the relative importance of social class versus religion on voting behavior in 13 countries between 1960 and 2008. Chapter 3 is mainly concerned with the impact of 'top-down' factors on the class-vote association in 15 countries between 1960 and 2005. In the remaining two empirical chapters we study trends in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands. In this second part of the book address the question to what extent the changes in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands in the period 1971-2006 are explained by 'bottom-up' as well as 'top-down' factors. Chapter 4 investigates over-time variation in class voting in the Netherlands, and chapter 5 investigates over-time variation in religious voting. In table 1.3 we summarize the organization of the empirical chapters: the key questions, explanations, measures, analysis techniques and data sources.


Table 1.3 Organization of the empirical chapters

	Part I		Part II	
	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5
Question	To what extent are there cross-national and over-time differences in the relative influence of social class and religion on voting?	To what extent are the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies explained by social changes and the positions of parties?	To what extent can the decline of class voting in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?	To what extent can the decline of religious voting in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?
Explanatory hypotheses		1. education, gender 2. LR-party positions	1. class composition 2. education, ideology 3. party merger 4. party positions	1. religious disintegration 2. education 3. party mergers 4. party positions
Measures	4-category social class 3-category denomination 2-category church attendance	Standardized 4-category social class (based on EGP classes)	7-category social class (revised EGP schema)	5-category denomination
Techniques	Series of nation-specific multinomial logistic regression analysis (max. 3 party contrast), Kappa index	Two-Step Hierarchical Regression analysis of log-odds estimates (2-party contrast)	Multinomial logistic regression (4-party contrast), Conditional logistic regression (4-party contrast)	Logistic regression Conditional logistic regression (4-party contrast)
Data	125 surveys from 13 countries, 1960-2008	188 surveys from 15 countries, 1960-2005	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, 1971-2006	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, 1971-2006



Part I |

Cleavage Voting in Comparative Perspective




Chapter 2 |

Revisiting Lijphart's Crucial Experiment^{*}

A Comparison of the Relative Influence of Class and Religion on Party Choice
in 13 Modern Democracies, 1960 – 2008.

^{*} A slightly different version of this chapter was presented at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology,
July 16 2010: Gothenburg, Sweden. Co-authors are Ariana Need, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Wout Ultee.



2. 1 Introduction

'Social class is clearly no more than a secondary and subsidiary influence of party choice, and it can become a factor of importance only in the absence of potent rivals such as religion and language' (Lijphart 1979: 53). More than three decades have passed since Lijphart presented this conclusion. This conclusion was derived from his 'crucial experiment' on cleavage politics studying the impact of religious divisions, linguistic divisions and class divisions on voting in a four-country comparison (Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland) where these cleavages were simultaneously present. Although Lijphart was not the first to suggest that religious divisions are more important for voting than social class (Sartori 1969; Rose and Urwin 1969; Converse 1974), he pioneered in systematically addressing this question in terms of a hierarchy between social cleavages.

Lijphart (1979: 53) interprets the relative importance of religion over social class by stressing that religious divisions are accompanied by 'primordial' communal loyalties stemming from a pre-industrial age. Several studies have referred to Lijphart's claims to emphasize the enduring relevance of religion in contemporary politics (Broughton and Rudd 1984; Breen and Hayes 1997; McDonough, Shin and Moisés 1998; White and McAllister 2000; Liddle and Mujani 2007). Above all, Lijphart's study contributed to establishing the idea that religious divisions generally outweigh class divisions (e.g. Schubert 1980; Bakvis 1981; Zuckerman 1982; Ragsdale 1983; Jennings 1984; Inglehart 1988; Kim and Ohn 1992; Weakliem and Biggert 1999; Ventura 2001; Belanger and Eagles 2006; Reed 2007). Although his experiment is often cited, surprisingly few studies have followed Lijphart's lead in addressing the question on the relative influence of class and religion on voting. There are however good grounds to do so.

First, with reference to Sartori (1969) Lijphart portrays the strength of social class as depending on a society's religious divide. *'Class is a major determinant of voting behavior only if no other cleavage happens to be present'* (Sartori 1969: 76). Consequently, the relevance of class voting is conditional upon the presence or absence of religious divisions. However, this condition may be too demanding. There is almost certainly no country, not even in the "secularized" West where religious differences are entirely non-existent. Even in the predominantly Protestant countries of Northern Europe and in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe there are differences among voters in their religiosity and church attendance. In this chapter we therefore examine to what extent stronger effects of class on voting are associated with weaker effects of church membership and church attendance on voting.

Second, after Lijphart compared four countries using 1970s data, new data allowing a more stringent test of the hierarchy between class and religion have become available. Since Lijphart put forward his study of what he called the '*prime determinants of party choice*' (1979: 43) many scholars have used these new data to demonstrate that the role of social class is waning in contemporary modern democracies (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). A universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically however less clear-cut. Comparative studies have presented evidence for stable associations between religious divisions and party choice in Western Europe (Knutson 2004; Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight increase of the effect of religion on party choice (Van der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009).

Third, despite the persistent and widespread scholarly attention for the magnitude of class and religious-based voting, there has been little systematic attention for questions on the *hierarchy* between social cleavages. In this chapter we will start by reviewing the literature in order to show that it is difficult to compare results across studies because there are large differences in the way cleavages are measured and how their influence on voting is analyzed: First, class divisions are measured on the basis of different class contrasts and different class schemas or derived from related variables such as union membership, class identification and income. And whereas religious divisions are sometimes measured on the basis of church membership, other studies use church attendance or religious beliefs. Second, the dependent variable, what party contrast(s) is/are studied, are often too country-specific to compare internationally. Third, there is, above all, large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a cleavage, i.e.; explained variance, Alford-index, beta-coefficients, sheaf-coefficients, (log) odds ratios, kappa-index. Our review shows that the study of Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2006) is among few studies to systematically investigate variation in the impact of class and religion on party choice for six countries over long time period.

Brooks *et al.* (2006) argue that most previous studies assess the relevance of social cleavages for voting by considering modest numbers of over-time and cross national comparisons, often focusing on single country cases investigating one particular cleavage and ignoring the possibility that changes in one cleavage may be related to changes in other cleavages. To a large extent they overcome such limitations by analyzing comparable survey data from six Western countries in the period 1964-1998. For each country Brooks *et al.* simultaneously modeled changes in the impact of the class and religious cleavage. Using the kappa-index

(Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995) they systematically measured the magnitude of the cleavages, and thus were able to compare their relative weight across countries and time.

Brooks *et al.* cross-nationally compare cleavage strength based on a multi-category typology of cleavages with multinomial logistic regression models. Their study, therefore, is an important contribution to the literature on cleavage voting. We intend to improve on this line of research in four ways. First, we extend the analysis to a larger pool of countries. We examine the effects of social class and religion on party choice in thirteen modern democracies in the period 1960-2008: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. For this purpose we constructed the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV). This new file is a large source of pooled surveys with multi-category variables of social class, religion and party choice¹, available for Western countries since the 1960s. We constructed this file by updating the *International Social Mobility and Politics* file (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). Second, the CDCV-file enables us to differentiate between two aspects of religious division: church membership and church attendance. Third, we systematically and more elaborately than in previous studies model a vast amount of scenarios of cleavage change to evaluate the interrelationship in class and religious voting, and changes therein. And fourth, we will not only report the kappa-index to measure cleavage strength, we will also compare these results with the contributed proportion of variance explained by social class and religion. As we will discuss later, using explained variance as the decisive criterion to determine which cleavage is more important can lead to different conclusions than with evaluations of indices derived from regression coefficients.

Finally, we argue that our country-sample and the distinction we make between church membership and church attendance allow more generalized inferences about the relative influence of class and religion on voting compared to previous studies. The scope of our analyses is not only uniquely rich in terms of countries and period covered, the thirteen countries in our study are also good cases to test the relative influence of religion and social class on party choice. Class differences are rooted in the contrast between workers and owners and arose from transformations in the occupational structure during the Industrial Revolution (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The origin of class divisions across our (post-)industrial democracies is therefore similar. Religious cleavages in the West can generally be traced back to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation which brought about

different religious structures across Europe (and indirectly in the New World). Brooks *et al.* (2006) presented evidence from five predominantly protestant and religious-mixed countries (Australia, Britain, Germany, Netherlands and the United States) but only one Catholic country (Austria). They concluded that religion outweighs class in only two countries, the Netherlands and the US, and not in Australia, Austria, Britain and Germany. In this chapter we extend the analysis with four extra traditionally Catholic countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain), two Protestant Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) and an additional religious mixed country (Switzerland).

In sum, in this chapter we will investigate to what extent there are cross-national and over-time differences in Western democracies in the level of and change in the influence of social class and religion on voting. Ultimately we aim to answer two central questions with respect to the strength of the class cleavage *relative* to the strength of the religious cleavage, and the changes therein. (1) *To what extent is a strong class-vote relationship in a country accompanied by a weak religion-vote relationship?* (2) *To what extent are the differences between the strength of the religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries declining, increasing or stable?* In the next section we present an overview of previous research concerning the relative influence of class and religion on party choice. In section 2.3 we discuss the scope of our pooled dataset and the measurement of class, religion and party choice. In section 2.4, using multinomial logistic regression models we analyze for each country separately over time changes in class and religious voting. Section 2.5 discusses the central conclusions with respect to the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of the religious cleavage.

2.2 Social Class or Religion: What do we know?

2.2.1 Lijphart's experiment in the literature

We examined all studies that cite Lijphart (1979) to assess whether they test the dominance of religion over class. In total we consider the results of 68 studies² in the period 1979 to 2010. Only 9 of these studies report findings which shed light on the relative impact of class versus religion in (post-) industrial societies. The most relevant findings with respect to the 13 countries in this chapter are discussed below in order of publication. We in particular report the operationalization of social class and religion and the measurement of cleavage strength.

McDonough, Pina and Barnes (1981) and McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1988), comparing beta weights, suggest that political choices in Spain in the early 1980s are more strongly determined by religiosity - measured as church attendance - than by subjective class identity. Eisinga, Felling and Lammers (1994) study the log-odds ratios of religious denominations and income groups on party preferences in the Netherlands (1964-1992). They show that religious denomination was more important to predict party choice than income. However, Eisinga *et al.* demonstrate that both the effect of religion and the effect of income declined over time. Heath, De Graaf and Need (1997) investigate the British 1992 elections and report a stronger effect of class (5-class schema) compared to denomination (6 categories) in England. With respect to the association between religion and voting (measured as kappa-indices) in US presidential elections (1960-1992) Manza and Brooks (1997) find that the religious political cleavage declined in magnitude. With reference to their other findings on cleavage voting (Brooks and Manza 1997) they conclude that the effect of religion on voting is twice the size of the class effect (1997: 73). Comparing the social bases of voting in Britain and the US between 1992 and 2000 Andersen and Heath (2003) find that whereas class has a strong effect in Britain, the regression coefficients of class in the US are hardly significant.

As mentioned, contrarily to most other studies Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2006: 109) do not find that the impact of religion (protestant vs. catholic vs. non-affiliation) on party choice measured as kappa-indices is generally larger than the impact of social class (5-class schema). They find that the class cleavage is typically larger than the religious cleavage in Australia (1965-98), Austria (1974-95), Britain (1964-97) and Germany (1969-98), but that religion is stronger in the US (1964-98) and the Netherlands (1970-98). Contrarily to Lijphart they suggest that class voting may condition religious voting instead of the other way around: '*declining class divisions may encourage individual voters to distinguish among parties on the basis of other social identities such as religion or gender*' (2006: 93).

McAllister and White (2007) investigate the importance of social cleavages in 20 democracies. They measure religious and class divisions respectively as affiliation vs. non-affiliation and worker vs. owner. They report the relative weight of these contrasts on the basis of their share in the proportion of explained variance predicting left-right self-placement. McAllister and White show that class adds more to the explained variance than religion in Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, the US and Britain). In the Netherlands class and religion contribute

about equally to the proportion of explained variance. In Belgium, and Germany the effect of religion adds more to the explained variance than class. McAllister and White's findings demonstrate that using explained variance as the decisive criterion to determine which cleavage is more important can lead to different conclusions than when regression coefficients are evaluated. As Heath *et al.* (1997) pointed out minority groups can produce large regression coefficients but may contribute little to the explained variance.

2.2.2 Findings on class and religion in thirteen countries

Next, we more closely examine the thirteen countries in this chapter. Most studies do not explicitly aim to assess whether religion or class is more important for party choice. Nevertheless, we will try to identify whether social class and religion are relevant cleavages in each country, whether or not they retained their initial impact on vote choice and whether such changes caused the dominance of either class or religion to diminish.

In *Australia* class and religion were both influential in shaping the political party system. Typically, social class is identified as being more important for Australian politics than religion (McAllister 1992; Kelley and Evans 1995; Charnock 1997). But, especially class differences are weakening and evidence suggests that gap between the religious cleavage and the class cleavage has narrowed over time (Bean 1999; Brooks *et al.* 2006).

In *Austria* the image is somewhat mixed. On the basis of late-1980s survey data Kelley and Evans (1995: 173) conclude that not class but religion is the most striking political difference in Austria. However, as mentioned earlier, Brooks *et al.* (2006) find that in general the class cleavage is larger than the religious cleavage in Austrian politics (1974-95). Furthermore, their analysis demonstrates that the difference between the two cleavages is not particularly large. But they argue that the class cleavage neither increased nor decreased, whereas religious voting slightly declines, mainly due to the 1995-survey.

In *Belgium* the hierarchy between social class and religion ends in favor of the religious cleavage. Not only Lijphart (1979) concluded that religion emerged as the strongest factor, but Hill (1974) and Knutsen (1988) reached the same conclusion. Moreover, Knutsen (2004) showed that the association between religious denomination and party choice in Belgium is quite stable and that long-term decreases are small.

Also in *France* the association between religious denomination and party choice is fairly stable (Knutsen 2004). Several studies have argued that religion is

a prominent determinant of party choice in France, and is more important than social class (Lewis-Beck 1984; Knutsen 1988). Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1992) demonstrate that the relative importance of religion and class is stable over time, and that the impact of religion in French elections is generally twice as large as the impact of social class.

Although research on *Germany* consistently identified the religious cleavage as relatively more important than social class (Janowitz and Segal 1967, Knutsen 1988; Kelley and Evans 1995; Oskarson 2005) Brooks *et al.* (2006) deem the class cleavage to be generally more important than the religious cleavage, although the differences between the two cleavages in their analysis are small. Nevertheless, both Oskarson and Brooks *et al.*, show that in the long run especially the importance of class has declined somewhat whereas religious voting remained stable.

In the 1960s religion and class were of crucial importance in *Italian* politics (Mackie, Mannheimer and Sani 1992). With respect to the relative impact of both cleavages Hazelrigg (1970) suggested that the association between religion and political orientation was twice as strong as the association between class and political orientation. The trends reported by Bellucci and Heath (2007) in Italy (1968-2006) suggest that the magnitude of the religious cleavage, although declining, was far stronger than the class cleavage until the 1990s. It has been found that after the collapse of the Christian Democratic party (DC) in 1994 there was a large and sudden decline of the effect of religion on voting (Segatti and Vezzoni 2008) eventually nullifying the dominance of religion over class in 2006 (Bellucci and Heath 2007).

In the *Netherlands* it has been systematically found that religion is more important than social class (Knutsen 1988; Oskarson 2005; Brooks *et al.* (2006). According to De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) both the influence of social class and religion on party choice declined since the 1970s. As in Italy, this decline can partially be attributed to party changes. De Graaf *et al.* show that the levels religious-based voting in the Netherlands abruptly declined after the merger of three denominational parties into a single Christian Democratic party (CDA) in 1977.

Although *Norway* is commonly put forward as a textbook example of a class-dominated political system Oskarson (2005) shows that this picture may be misleading: In Norway there is not only a considerable and steady decline of class voting, but religious voting is both continually relevant as well as more important. The latter is supported by Knutsen (1988) who demonstrates on the basis of 1981-Eurobarometer data that of all social divisions in Norwegian politics

religion had the strongest impact on party preferences.

As mentioned, McDonough *et al.* (1981, 1988) have shown that political choices in *Spain* during the 1970s and 1980s were more strongly determined by religion than by social class. Lancaster (1992) even argues that church attendance explains more variance than any other socio-demographic variable when predicting left-voting in Spain's 1984-elections. In the face of accounts announcing the decline of religious voting Calvo and Montero (2002) show that religion was still a strong determinant of party choice in Spain during the 2000-election.

Social class has been a key factor in *Swedish* politics, although the class-vote association has decline substantially since the 1970s (Stephens 1981). Long-term decline in class voting is also reported by Oskarson (2005) who notes that the decrease is most pronounced in the 1960s and 1980s. The role of religion in politics has traditionally been far less prominent in Sweden. The Swedish Christian Democrats (KD) passed the electoral threshold relatively late in 1991, more than a quarter-century after their formation in 1964 (Madeley 2000). However, already in the 1960s, as Särilvik (1970) remarked, specific linkages existed between members of the "free churches" (minor protestant denominations) and the Swedish Liberal Party (FP) and between the Church of Sweden and the Conservative Party (M). But Särilvik concluded that religion was merely a subsidiary factor in Swedish politics.

In *Switzerland* religion was an important factor shaping the party system, but the religion-vote association has continuously declined since the 1970s (Nicolet and Tresch 2009). Using the same 1972-survey data Lijphart (1979) and Kerr (1974) reached different conclusions about the relative importance of class and religion for party choice in Switzerland. Lijphart attributed this discrepancy to the different party contrasts they analyzed, and argued that Kerr did not give religion a fair chance by dichotomizing party choice in Socialist and Communist versus all other parties. And conform Lijphart's study Trechsel (1995) and Hug and Trechsel (2002) show that the influence of religion on electoral behavior was stronger than the influence of social class, although both cleavages weakened (1971-1991).

In politics of the *United Kingdom* it is widely held that class differences play a larger role than religion (Janowitz and Segal 1967; Books and Reynolds 1975; Knutsen 1988). Since the 1960s class divisions declined in Britain, whereas religious voting has been rather stable (Evans and Tilley 2011). But despite the narrowing of the gap between class- and religious voting the impact of class continues to exceed the impact of religion on party choice (Oskarson 2005; Brooks *et al.* 2006).

In the *United States* religion has always been more important than social class. Various studies have reported about declining levels of traditional class voting in the US since the 1940s (Books and Reynolds 1975; Dalton 2008) and 1960s (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995; Brooks *et al.* 2006). Although Books and Reynolds reported relatively stable patterns of religious-based voting between the 1940s and 1970s³, Dalton shows that the denominational basis of voting declined since the 1970s. Manza and Brooks (1997) argue that the single factor in the decline of religious-based voting in the US is the political de-alignment of liberal Protestants, because the political alignment of both conservative Protestants and Catholics is very stable.

2.2.3 Findings from comparative studies

Some of the aforementioned studies are part of larger comparative researches. Typically, comparative books are set up by a series of single country chapters written by country experts (Evans 1999, Broughton and Ten Napel 2000, Clark and Lipset 2001). And although these books are valuable for assessing changes in the impact of class or religion in modern democracies, they are in general not ideal for formal cross-national comparisons. Because these studies usually focus on one phenomenon, class and religion are typically not studied simultaneously, making an investigation of their relative impact on party choice impossible.

Franklin *et al.* (1992) present analyses with multiple social and attitudinal variables predicting left-wing voting behavior. In each of the 16 country-specific chapters they elaborately assess the influence of social-structural variables, including class (i.e. working class occupation) and religion (i.e. church attendance) on voting (i.e. left vs. non-left). However, Franklin *et al.* do not compile the country-specific results on the relative influence of social-structural variables in a final comparison. Because the comparisons among countries remain restricted to the percentage of variance in voting behavior explained by social variables they bypass the question about differences between countries with regard to the relative effect of social class and religion (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1993).

Oskarson (2005) reports the trends in the association between social position and party choice in six Western European countries, and explicitly notes whether class or religious voting is stronger in four of these countries⁴. She measures class voting as log-odds of the working class to vote left-wing rather than anything else compared to the non working class. Religious voting is measured as the odds that a frequent church attendee votes for a Christian Democratic party rather than another party compared to non-religious people. The results presented by

Oskarson (2005: 94-95) reveal that in general the difference between class and religious voting are the smallest in Germany and are relatively large in Britain, Netherlands and Norway.

2.3 Data and measurement

To provide a uniform and systematic test of the relative influence of social class and religion on voting we constructed the new dataset, the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting*. See Chapter 1 and appendix A.1 for further details about the CDCV-file. For this chapter we only use surveys and respondents for which information on both class and religion (denomination and/or church attendance) is available, see table 2.1.

Social class: Although the scope of the CDCV-file is uniquely rich for data on the social bases of politics in terms of period and countries covered, the number of pooled surveys comes at the cost of detail at the respondent level. Consequently, we use a simplified version of the Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) class schema. We distinguish between four social classes: (1) the manual working class (collapsing the skilled and the unskilled workers), (2) the self-employed (petit bourgeois and farmers), (3) the routine non-manual class and, (4) the service class (lower and higher service class). Where possible the EGP class position is derived directly from the original file, either on the basis of an originally included EGP variable, or otherwise on the basis of an occupational code. In the latter case we converted ISCO-68 or ISCO-88 codes into EGP categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2009). Some surveys contained class- or occupational information on the basis of nation specific or simplified coding schemas. In such cases we used national conversion tables to recode the national categories into the most appropriate EGP category.

Church attendance: We distinguish between church attendees and non-attendees. Respondents are categorized as 'non-church-goer' if they never or seldom attend religious services, and are labeled 'church-goer' if they attend church at least a few times a year.

Denomination: on the basis of the respondent's reported church membership we distinguish between Protestants (including Anglicans), Catholics and respondents with no (or another) religious affiliation. In Norway and Sweden most surveys do not contain information on denomination, but because of the religious tradition of state churches in these countries it is plausible that most religious

Table 2.1 Surveys in Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting containing relevant information on social class, denomination and church attendance

Country	Period	Surveys	N
Australia	1965 – 2004	14	20,645
Austria	1974 – 2003	7	3,227
Belgium	1991 – 2003	4	6,766
France	1967 – 2007	8	17,872
Germany	1969 – 2005	22	25,244
Italy	1968 – 2006	9	9,989
The Netherlands	1970 – 2006	18	18,049
Norway	1981 – 1997	5	7,563
Spain	1979 – 2008	5	12,725
Sweden	1985 – 2002	6	9,958
Switzerland	1971 – 2003	6	9,115
United Kingdom	1964 – 2005	9	16,564
United States	1960 – 2004	12	10,585
Total	1960 – 2008	125	157,728

respondents belong to a Protestant denomination. In these countries we only investigate the cleavage between church-going and non-church going respondents. We followed a similar procedure in predominantly Catholic countries (Spain and Italy) where information on denomination is not available. In the other predominantly Catholic countries, Austria, Belgium and France, we divide respondents into Catholics vs. non-Catholics and church-goers vs. non-church goers.

Party choice: In most surveys respondents were asked to name to the party they voted for in the most recent election or vote intention for the upcoming election. When available, one of these variables used to measure voting behavior. In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is measured as voting intention “what would you vote if election were today/ next Sunday?” or party identification. Because the party structure in some countries has changed substantially over time (e.g. France, Italy, Netherlands) it is impossible to distinguish between individual parties in a multinomial logistic regression analysis when covering long time periods. And because for each country we aim to model over time changes that are comparable to other countries it is unavoidable to

consistently group political parties across countries. In order to allow a cross national and over time comparison of class and religious voting we distinguish three categories of party choice: (1) left-wing parties (socialist, communist, left-socialist), (2) right-wing parties (liberal, conservative, agrarian, and new/far right) and (3) Christian parties (Christian Democrats and other denominational parties). We primarily relied on party categorizations by Lane and Ersson (1999). For details consult Appendix A.2. Respondents who voted for another party are excluded from the analyses.

2. 4 Analysis

2.4.1 Modeling over time changes in class voting and religious voting simultaneously

In this chapter we model changes in the class-vote relationship and religion-vote relationship on the basis of multinomial logistic regression analysis. We start with modeling the changes in each of the 13 countries separately. In each country-specific model we simultaneously include categories for the groups comprising the three cleavage lines: three dummy-variables for social class (with the manual working class as the reference category), dummy-variables for denominations (with non/other religion as the reference category), and a dummy-variable for church attendance. We also include dummy-variables for all years in which the surveys in a country were held, with the first survey as the reference category. Next, we assume that over time changes in the magnitude of a particular cleavage may take three possible forms: stability, gradual change, and non-gradual change. Gradual changes are modeled as interactions between a linear measure of year and the categories comprising a particular cleavage. Because cleavage changes are not necessarily linear processes we model non-gradual changes by including interactions between the groups comprising a cleavage and year-dummy variables. In this way we impose no time constraints on the effect of a cleavage on party choice. Assuming that the over time pattern of each of the three cleavages may take three possible forms we have to evaluate 27 models of cleavage change for each country, see table 2.2. It is however possible that the impact of social class is weakening with respect to the left vs. right party contrast but that this not the case with respect to voting for a religious party. On the other hand, changes in the effect of religion may be relevant for voting religious, but irrelevant for voting left vs. right. Therefore, we estimated the 27 models of cleavage change twice in

Table 2.2 Assumed models of over time changes in the association between social class, denomination, church attendance and party choice

Model	Social Class (C)	Denomination (D)	Church attend. (A)	Model	Constraint changes *
1	stable	stable	stable		
2	stable	stable	gradual change	2b	A
3	stable	gradual change	stable	3b	D
4	stable	stable	unconstrained	4b	A
5	stable	unconstrained	stable	5b	D
6	stable	gradual change	unconstrained	6b	D, A
7	stable	unconstrained	gradual change	7b	D, A
8	stable	gradual change	gradual change	8b	D, A
9	stable	unconstrained	unconstrained	9b	D, A
10	gradual change	stable	stable	10b	C
11	gradual change	stable	gradual change	11b	C, A
12	gradual change	gradual change	stable	12b	C, D
13	gradual change	stable	unconstrained	13b	C, A
14	gradual change	unconstrained	stable	14b	C, D
15	gradual change	gradual change	unconstrained	15b	C, D, A
16	gradual change	unconstrained	gradual change	16b	C, D, A
17	gradual change	gradual change	gradual change	17b	C, D, A
18	gradual change	unconstrained	unconstrained	18b	C, D, A
19	unconstrained	Stable	stable	19b	C
20	unconstrained	Stable	gradual change	20b	C, A
21	unconstrained	gradual change	stable	21b	C, D
22	unconstrained	stable	unconstrained	22b	C, A
23	unconstrained	unconstrained	stable	23b	C, D
24	unconstrained	gradual change	unconstrained	24b	C, D, A
25	unconstrained	unconstrained	gradual change	25b	C, D, A
26	unconstrained	gradual change	gradual change	26b	C, D, A
27	unconstrained	unconstrained	unconstrained	27b	C, D, A

[Stable = no over time change in effect, gradual change = linear change in effect, unconstrained = no time constraints in effect]

* for social class effects (C) changes are constrained for religious voting, for denomination (D) and church attendance effects (A) changes are constrained for voting left vs. right

countries with religious parties. In the second series we constrained the changes in the class effects with respect to voting for a religious party, and we constrained the changes in the effects of religion with respect to voting left vs. right-wing. For some countries we are not able to estimate the full series of 27 models. In the four countries where the denominational cleavage is not measured (Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden), we are only able to examine changes in church attendance. Due to small number of religious votes in Sweden, we do not consider models without time constraints in the Swedish case.

On the basis of goodness-of-fit statistics we select the most optimal model for each country. In Appendix B.1 we report for each estimated model, the number of respondents (N), -2LL, the number of consumed degrees of freedom (df), as well as Schwarz' Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The BIC statistic takes the -2 Log-Likelihood into account together with parsimony of the model and the sample size: $BIC = -2\log\text{-likelihood} + \log(N)df$. For each country we rank order the estimated models of cleavage change according to their BIC value. The model with the lowest BIC index is often considered to be the preferred model. Because the BIC leads to the selection of more simple models (Lammers, Pelzer, Hendrickx, Eisinga 2007) we test whether the decrease in -2LL between subsequent models on the ranking list is significant. Sometimes it thus happens that the model with the second or third lowest BIC index is selected as the most optimal model in favor of the best ranking model.

In table 2.3 we summarize the preferred models for cleavage change. Given the different religious structures between countries, we categorize our results on the basis of a country's religious tradition, i.e.: Catholic, Protestant and religious-mixed countries. On the basis of the multinomial logit-estimations of these models (see appendix B.2) we indicate whether the effect of a cleavage has remained stable, gradually declines or changes non-gradually over time. Table 2.3 clearly shows that, in support of the thesis of the decline of class voting, in 8 out 13 countries (i.e. all but Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Spain) the most optimal model assumes gradual decline in the class-vote relationship. With respect to the religious cleavage our model selection procedure suggests that in only 3 countries (Austria, Spain and United Kingdom) the effect of both church attendance *and* denomination (if measured) on voting has remained stable in the period covered. Interestingly, we find that the preferred models often assume stable relationships between denomination and vote, but the effect of church attendance declines over time.

Table 2.3 Most optimal model of cleavage change in 13 countries on the basis of the Schwarz' Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)

Country (period)	Social Class	Denomination	Church attendance
Catholic countries			
Austria (1974-2003)	Stable	Stable	Stable
Belgium (1991-2003)	Stable	Gradual decline ^(b)	Stable
France (1976-2007)	Gradual decline	Stable	Gradual decline
Italy (1968-2006)	Gradual decline ^(a)	-	Gradual decline ^(b)
Spain (1979-2008)	Stable	-	Stable
Protestant countries			
Australia (1965-2004)	Gradual decline	Stable	Gradual decline
Norway (1981-1997)	Gradual decline ^(a)	-	Gradual decline ^(b)
Sweden (1985-2002)	Stable	-	Gradual decline ^(b)
United Kingdom (1964-2005)	Gradual decline	Stable	Stable
United States (1960-2004)	Gradual change ^(c)	Gradual decline	Stable
Religious mixed countries			
Germany (1969-2005)	Stable	Stable	Gradual decline ^(b)
The Netherlands (1970-2006)	Gradual decline ^(a)	Gradual change ^(b)	Gradual decline ^(b)
Switzerland (1971-2003)	Gradual decline	Stable	Gradual decline

[Stable = no over time change in effect on party choice, gradual decline = linear decline in effect on party choice, gradual change = contradictory changes among groups comprising a cleavage]

(a) class voting time trend constrained to zero for religious parties

(b) religious voting time trend constrained to zero for left vs. right-wing parties

(c) in the US class differences vs. working class are declining with exception of the self-employed

(d) in the Netherlands, religious differences are declining vs. non-religious, with exception of Protestants

For the Catholic countries we find in table 2.3 that the preferred models allow gradual decline in the class-vote relationship in France and Italy, but assume no changes in the class-vote relationship in Austria, Belgium and Spain. In Austria and Spain also the religious cleavages are assumed to be stable over time. Only in Belgium the most optimal model suggests a gradual decline in the effect of having a Catholic denomination. In France and Italy we find that the preferred model allows a gradual decline in the church attendance-vote association. The selected models in the Protestant countries allow the effects of social class to decline over time. Exceptions are the estimates for Sweden where the most optimal model assumes no over time change in the class-vote association, and the contrast between the

working class and the self-employed in the U.S. The U.S. are the only Protestant country where the most optimal model allows a decline of denomination-vote relationship, but assumes the effect church attendance to be stable over time. In Australia, Norway and Sweden the parameter estimates according to the optimal model suggest that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. The preferred model selected for the UK suggests that both the effects of church attendance as well as denomination are stable over time.

In all three religious-mixed countries the optimal model suggests that the effect of church attendance is gradually declining. In the Netherlands also the effects of social class and denomination are weakening. In Switzerland the preferred model allows the effect of class to decline gradually, but the effect of denomination is assumed to be stable. In Germany, the effects of both denomination and social class are assumed to be stable over time.

2.4.2 Measuring cleavage strength

In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of the social cleavages on voting we use the kappa-index (Hout *et al.* 1995) as a measure of cleavage-strength. The kappa-index is calculated using the standard deviation of the log-odds or predicted probabilities of all possible combinations groups (e.g. social classes, religious groups) and parties. This measure was introduced by Hout *et al.* to provide “a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses based on suitable class and voting typologies” (1995: 814). We calculate the kappa-index on the basis of the most optimal multinomial logistic regression model. Therefore we define the kappa-index as follows (cf. Brooks *et al.* 2006; Lachat 2006):

$$\kappa_{ct} = \left[\frac{1}{P \cdot S} \sum_{P=1}^P \sum_{S=1}^S (\pi_S^P - \bar{\pi}_S^P)^2 \right]^{1/2} \quad [1]$$

where, π_S^P is the average predicted probability of a member of social group S to vote for party P, and where $\bar{\pi}_S^P$ is the mean probability of all S groups comprising a cleavage to for vote P. Because we estimate multinomial regression models with three vote outcomes we sum across both social groups and categories of party choice. The *ct* subscript for κ indicates that there is a single kappa-score for each country-year combination based on the pattern of change resulting from the most optimal model selected for each country. The calculated kappa-indices range between 0 and 0.5, and a higher value indicates a stronger association between a cleavage and party choice.

We set out to compare the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of the religious cleavage across countries and over time. Because we disentangled church attendance and denomination as two distinct aspects of the religious cleavage we have to integrate the two kappa-indices again into a single overall measure for the strength of religious voting. To do so, we rely on a measure introduced by Brooks and Manza (1997) for the total size of cleavage voting. This measure, the so-called lambda-index, is calculated as the mean of separate kappas in order to determine the total magnitude of all cleavages within a particular country at a given point in time (Brooks and Manza 1997; Brooks *et al.* 2006). We use this measure not to analyze the *total* magnitude of *all* cleavages but rather the *overall* magnitude of the *religious* cleavage. We therefore define the lambda-index as follows:

$$\lambda_{ct} = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^R \kappa_{ct}}{R} \quad [2]$$

In this equation there are R religious cleavages with kappa score κ . In our case R is 2 (r=1 the denominational cleavage, r=2 the church attendance cleavage) and thus λ_{ct} expresses the average size of the religious cleavage in country c at time t.

Lambda is the mean of separate kappas, and accordingly kappa and lambda both have the same metric. We are therefore able to compare the strength of the class cleavage with the overall strength of the religious cleavage. Next, we also examine whether using explained variance instead of effect size as a decisive criterion for the comparative strength of cleavages leads to different conclusions. We obtained the contributed proportion of variance explained by social class and religion by conducting separate series of multinomial logistic regression for each country-year combination. We look at the decrease of the Nagelkerke pseudo-R² when excluding the class or religious variables (taking denomination and church attendance together) from the model.

2.4.3 Comparing the strength of social class relative to religion

Our first research question is whether stronger levels of class voting are associated with weaker levels of religious voting, and vice versa. In the literature we found that this assumption is often not supported. Although the relationship between religion and vote is found to be declining in some countries, this development is rarely accompanied by an increase of class voting. Here we present for each country the correlation between the kappa-index of class voting on the one hand and on the other hand the kappa-index of denominational voting, church

attendance and the lambda-index of overall religious voting. The correlations presented in table 2.4 suggest that the levels of class voting are generally *positively* associated with the levels of religious voting. Negative correlations are found in four countries, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and the US. With respect to the correlation between class voting and denominational voting we only find negative correlation in Belgium and the U.S. By and large, the results therefore indicate that class differences are more important for voting when also religious differences are larger. The premise that class may have a strong influence on voting only if there is no competing influence of other cleavages is therefore not very sound, given that in most countries the correlation between class and its most obvious rival is positive rather than negative. We now turn to answering our second research question about the trends in the differences between the strength of the religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship.

Table 2.4 Correlations between kappa-indices of class and religious voting in 13 countries

Country (period)	N	Kappa index of class voting		
		Kappa-index denomination	Kappa-index church attendance	lambda-index overall religion
Catholic countries				
Austria (1974-2003)	7	0.81	0.87	0.85
Belgium (1991-2003)	4	-0.45	-0.39	-0.42
France (1976-2007)	8	0.72	0.51	0.63
Italy (1968-2006)	9	-	0.06	0.06
Spain (1979-2008)	5	-	0.53	0.53
Protestant countries				
Australia (1965-2004)	14	0.62	0.92	0.87
Norway (1981-1997)	5	-	-0.06	-0.06
Sweden (1985-2002)	6	-	-0.54	-0.54
United Kingdom (1964-2005)	9	0.70	0.56	0.83
United States (1960-2004)	12	-0.60	0.44	-0.45
Religious mixed countries				
Germany (1969-2005)	22	0.50	0.43	0.47
The Netherlands (1970-2006)	18	0.51	0.64	0.60
Switzerland (1971-2003)	6	0.88	0.88	0.90

Catholic countries: In figure 2.1a we report the over time changes in the kappa-index of the class cleavage, church attendance and - if measured - the denominational cleavage in the five traditionally Catholic countries. Figure 2.1b presents the contributed proportion of explained variance by social class and religion. And in figure 2.1c we compare the difference in contributed explained variance between class and religion with the difference in cleavage strength. The difference in contributed explained variance is calculated as the proportion of Nagelkerke R^2 explained by religion minus the proportion explained by social class. The difference in cleavage strength is calculated as: lambda-index of religious voting minus kappa-index of class voting. In figure 2.1c values on the y-axis above 0 therefore present the extent to which the religion is more important for voting than class, and values lower than 0 represent the extent to which class is more important than religion.

Figure 2.1a shows that in three Catholic countries, Belgium, France and Spain, religious cleavages are more important than social class throughout the whole period in terms of kappa-index. In Spain we find that the difference between the strength of the class cleavage and the religious cleavage are stable over time. Throughout the whole period the cleavage strength of church attendance is about 1.5 times the strength of social class. Also with respect to the contributed proportion of explained variance we generally find that religion outweighs social class, with the exception of the 1986 election, see figure 2.1b. In Belgium and Italy the dominance of religion over class is waning in terms of cleavage strength as well as explained variance. As indicated by figure 2.1a the cleavages based on denomination and church attendance were about 2 times stronger than the class cleavage in Belgium in 1991, but religion had lost this relative strength during the 2003-elections. Figure 2.1b and 2.1c suggest a similar pattern with respect to differences in contributed explained variance. In the Italian case we observe (figure 2.1a) a sharp and sudden decline in 1994 of the impact of church attendance on voting. The strength of the class cleavage on the other hand increased after the 1994 election. Consequently, the relative strength of religion in Italy has declined from being about two or three times stronger than class in the period before 1994, to being about 1.5 times less important in 2006. We do not observe a sudden drop of religious voting with respect to the explained variance. Although figures 2.1b and 2.1c suggest that the variance explained by religion is decreasing, the process appears to be more gradual in nature than the decrease in kappa. In France denomination and church attendance were about 1.5 times more important than the social class in the 1960s. We find that especially the strength of church

Figure 2.1a Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 5 predominantly Catholic countries




Figure 2.1b Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2) of social class and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly Catholic countries





Figure 2.1c Difference in cleavage strength^(a) and contributed explained variance^(b) by social class and religion in 5 predominantly Catholic countries



(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
 (b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2)

attendance gradually dropped to the level of class voting in 2007. The difference between class and religion in explained variance has not changed substantially in France. Although the explanatory power of both cleavages declined, religion remains relatively more important compared to class. In Austria the class cleavage outweighs the two religious cleavage lines throughout the whole period, but only by a factor smaller than 1.5. We find different results in terms of contributed explained variance (see figure 2.1b-2.1c). In the period 1989-1995 religion contributes more to the explained variance than social class.

Protestant countries: In figure 2.2a we report the changing strength of class, denomination and church attendance in five predominantly Protestant countries. Figure 2.2b shows the proportion of explained variance contributed by social class and religion. And in figure 2.2c we present the difference between class and religion in contributed explained variance together the difference in cleavage strength. For Australia we observe in figure 2.2a that class differences are consistently more important than both denomination and church attendance.

Figure 2.2a Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 5 predominantly Protestant countries




Figure 2.2b Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2) of social class and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly Protestant countries





Figure 2.2c Difference in cleavage strength^(a) and contributed explained variance^(b) by social class and religion in 5 predominantly Protestant countries



(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
 (b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2)

Although all three cleavages lines are declining the class cleavages remains about 1.5 to 2 times stronger than the denominational cleavage. The impact of church attendance is declining the most in Australian politics and therefore the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of church attendance has nearly doubled between 1965 and 2004. Also in terms of explained variance, see figure 2.2b, we find that class and religion lost their much of their power to predict voting. Overall, as indicated by figure 2.2c the relevance of class over religion has largely been stable in Australian politics in terms of cleavage strength. Also in the United Kingdom we find social class to be the dominant political division, although it has particularly decreased in strength (figure 2.2a) between the 1960s and 1980s. Before the 1980s the class cleavage was about two times stronger than the denominational cleavage and even nearly four times stronger than church attendance. After the 1980s this was respectively 1.5 and 3 times stronger. Figure 2.2a-2.2c suggest that also with respect to explained variance the comparative influence of class relative to religion is decreasing. For Norway we find that the relative importance of social class and religion has reversed over time. Figure

2.2a indicates that the class cleavage in Norway declined from being about 1.5 times stronger than religion in 1981 to about 1.5 less important than religion in 1997. We find a similar reversal regarding the proportion of explained variance in figure 2.2b. In Sweden class voting outweighs religious voting throughout the 1985-2002 period, in terms of cleavage strength as well as explanatory power. We find that class differences were about 2.5 times more important than church attendance in 1985, and this dropped to 1.75 in 2002. Also the differences in explained variance between class and religion are decreasing in Swedish elections. The US case stresses the importance of distinguishing between denomination and church attendance. Denominational differences are, although declining, generally 1.5 to 2 times more important than class divisions in the United States, as indicated by figure 2.2a. Church attendance on the other hand is about 2.5 times less important than social class throughout the whole period but the cleavage is relatively growing in strength. The increasing effect of church attendance however cannot compensate the decline of the denominational effect. This implies that overall the class cleavage has come to outweigh the religious cleavage in US politics, as is indicated by figure 2.2c. In terms of explained variance we find that the differences between class and religion are not particularly declining nor increasing.

Religious-mixed countries: In figure 2.3a we report the changing strength of social class, denomination and church attendance in three religious-mixed countries. In the Netherlands and to a lesser extent also in Switzerland we observe that the two religious cleavages are generally more important than the class cleavage. We find that in the Netherlands, denomination and church attendance are about 2 times more important than social class throughout the period 1970-2006. In Switzerland the relative importance of denominational differences has gradually declined from being about 1.5 times more important than class in 1971 to nearly no difference in 2003. Church attendance and social class were about equally strong in the 1970s, although church attendance seems slightly more important over the whole period. The dominance of religion over social class in the Netherlands and Switzerland is also illustrated by the share in explained variance of the two cleavages in figure 2.3b. For Germany we find different results when comparing the differences in cleavage strength with the differences in explained variance. In terms of kappa the class cleavage and the two religious cleavages were about equally strong in the 1960-1980s, see figure 2.3a. Throughout the whole period we find that denominational differences are in general somewhat stronger than

class-based differences, and that particularly after the 1980s church attendance has gradually become 1.5 times less strong relative to the class cleavage. Overall, as indicated by figure 2.3c we find that from the 1990s onwards class has become a stronger cleavage than religion. On the basis of contributed explained variance we find that the explanatory power of both class and religion declined, but that religion continued to outweigh class over the entire 1969-2005 period.

Figure 2.3a Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 3 religious mixed countries




Figure 2.3b Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2) of social class and religion predicting party choice in 3 religious mixed countries





Figure 2.3c Difference in cleavage strength^(a) and contributed explained variance^(b) by social class and religion in 3 religious-mixed countries



(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
 (b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2)

2.5 Conclusion and Discussion

2.5.1 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to systematically analyze cross-national differences and trends in the magnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as social bases of voting behavior in thirteen countries. But unlike the few previous studies comparing the magnitude of cleavage voting we uniformly measured cleavage-strength based on a multi-category typology of both cleavages and parties, focused on the relative influence religion vs. class, and modeled changes in the effects of class and religion simultaneously. Moreover, we measured cleavage strength using appropriate and comparable measures across countries and time, the kappa-index. And we compared our results on cleavage strength with the differences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class.

We answered two questions. First, we set out to examine to what extent a strong class-vote relationship in a country is associated with a weak religion-vote relationship. We answered this question by analyzing data on social class, religion and party choice from 13 countries in the period 1960-2008. Our results indicate that the relevance of class differences and religious differences on voting often run more or less parallel. We generally find positive correlations between a country's degree of class voting and degree of religious voting. These findings contest Lijphart's claim that class may have a strong influence on voting only if

there is no competing influence of religion. Nevertheless, in five countries we find that social class is more important than religion, i.e.: Australia, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In six countries, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, the religious basis of voting is stronger than the class basis.

Second, we focused on over time changes in the relative influence of social class and religion on party choice. In support of reports proclaiming the decreasing significance of traditional cleavages we find that in most countries the association between party choice and both class as well as denomination and/or church attendance is weakening. However, despite the decline of the magnitude of cleavage voting in most countries, the hierarchy between class and religion for the most part endures. Religion nowadays is more important than social class in the largely same countries as in the 1970s. However, we find that the relative influence of religion over class is waning in Belgium and Italy and is even reversing in Germany and the US. In the other countries, the dominance of religion over class generally persists. Class continues to be more influential relative to religion in Australia and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect of class over religion decreased considerably. Yet, in the last decade under study (1997-2007) we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In Sweden the kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of explained variance is found to be twice as strong when compared to the effect of religion. In the same period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the Netherlands, where the effect of religious voting compared to that of social class is about two times stronger, and nearly 15 times in terms of explained variance.

2.5.2 Discussion

We faced unavoidable limitations in our large-scale comparison. First, although we set out to keep away from unnecessary dichotomies, the number of countries and period covered imposed restrictions to the level of detail measuring cleavage groups and vote outcomes, such as the suboptimal four-category measure of social class. It has been argued that also the distinction between Protestants, Catholics and those with another/no religion oversimplifies the complex religious structure in some countries, such as the within-Protestant differences in the US (Manza and Brooks 1997) or the Netherlands (De Graaf *et al.* 2001). In this chapter we merged all different types of Protestant denominations into a single category. In chapter 5 we will show that there are considerable differences between orthodox and liberal Protestant groups in the Netherlands in the sense that orthodox

Protestants are much more likely to vote for a Christian party. For the Netherlands the use of a more differentiated denominational classification in this chapter would therefore not have substantially changed the fact that religion outweighs social class. For other countries with a large variety of Protestant groups the implications of lumping them together might be more serious. According to the 'Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis' (Manza and Brooks 1997) religious voting in the US is only declining among liberal Protestants, and is stable (or even increasing) among conservative Protestants. Moreover, research has shown that there is little change in the extent to what Jewish voters in the US support the Democratic Party (Manza and Brooks 1997). By only differentiating between Catholics and Protestants we therefore have underestimated the association between religion and party choice in the US, and over-estimated the decline in this association. Our finding that class has come to outweigh religion in US politics in recent years may therefore be approached with care. We were, however, able to distinguish between frequent and infrequent church attendees. Our finding that the association between church attendance and political preferences in the US, as one of the few countries, has increased over time supports earlier findings by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Identifying church attendance as a distinct aspect of the religious cleavage next to church membership allows including religious homogeneous countries into cross-national comparisons of religious voting without neglecting denominational differences in religious heterogeneous countries. Moreover, within-denomination differences between moderate and conservative church members are roughly accounted for. In this way, we were able to broaden the scope of our research beyond previous studies and account for the relevance of the ties of church members to their religious communities.

Second, some have criticized the kappa-index calling it a "naïve" measure (Clark 2001; Houtman 2003) because it ignores the direction of group-party relationships. We are aware that the kappa-index does not reveal associations between specific social groups and parties. In the next chapters, we use log-odds ratios to measure the group-specific associations of class and religious voting. Log-odds ratios are perhaps more informative for specific group-party associations, but they are not necessarily useful if one wants to compare the total magnitude of cleavages cross-nationally and over time. For that purpose we consider the kappa-index to be appropriate; as the 'aggregate' effect of all groups comprising a multi-categorical cleavage on multiple vote outcomes. We have compared the relative strength of kappa for social class and religion with the


differences in contributed explained variance. On average, we found similar results using two different criteria to evaluate the hierarchy of social class and religion in determining party choice.

Third, in this chapter we modeled up to 27 scenarios of cleavage change for each country. Point of departure for this exercise was our assumption that there are three possible forms of changes: gradual-changes, non-gradual changes and stability. Although most of the preferred models assumed either gradual changes or stability in the effects of class and religion on voting, we do not rule out the possibility that other forms of non-linear change may fit the data better for some countries. For the Netherlands and Italy for example we earlier referred to discrete interruptions of continuous changes in religious voting (De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Segatti and Vezzoni 2008). We leave it to future research to more exhaustively investigate the country-specific scenarios of cleavage change beyond the models evaluated in this chapter.

For future research, our approach can easily be applied to analyze the hierarchy between other (multi-)categorical determinants of party choice. The analytical approach taken in this research could therefore provide useful insights for the study of old vs. new social inequalities, e.g.: social class vs. education, or religion vs. ethnicity. Next to descriptive questions on the relative influence of other social cleavages on party choice, future comparative research could address explanatory questions. In this chapter we have shown that the class cleavage is only likely to be more important than religion in predominantly Protestant countries. But our results do not suggest that the religious tradition in a country plays a role in whether the differences between the strength of the religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries are declining or not. We welcome studies that aim to determine under what conditions religion outweighs social class, and vice versa. In the other chapters of this book we consider the role of both social and political factors conditioning the processes of class- and religious de-alignment. But these explanations are hardly ever used to investigate the changing hierarchy between cleavages. The next chapters of this thesis make clear that next to social factors political factors may be important to understand why social cleavages translates into voting behavior differently from one country to another.

Notes


- 1 Our comparative setting does not allow the investigation of language as a third factor because the necessary information is not included in our data. Because Lijphart selected four countries on the basis of the presence of linguistic minorities we do not examine the same countries. Our investigation does not include Canada and South Africa. The political and economic history of South Africa is evidently different from the advanced industrial democracies in the United States, Australia and Western Europe. For Canada we were unable to match the relevant information on social class to our pooled dataset because several waves of the Canadian Election Studies do not include the relevant information on self-employment.
- 2 Web of Science listed 60 articles. Additionally, we found 8 published articles using Google Scholar. We excluded unpublished working papers or conference papers and books in which only short references are made to Lijphart's study.
- 3 With the exception of the high index-score of religious voting in 1960 when the association between Catholics and Democratic voting was exceptionally high due to Kennedy's presidential candidacy, see also Manza and Brooks (1997).
- 4 Oskarson (2005) studies cleavage voting in (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark), but does not report about religious voting in Sweden and Denmark due to insufficient data on church attendance or insufficient votes for Christian parties.



Chapter 3 |

Class Voting and Left-Right Party Positions^{*}

^{*} A slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.), *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk De Graaf.



3.1 Introduction

"In all democratic nations, including the United States, there has been a correlation between socioeconomic status and political beliefs and voting. The less privileged have supported parties that stood for greater equality and welfare protection, through government intervention, against the strain of a free enterprise economy. (...) This pattern has changed in recent decades" (Lipset 1991: 208). This statement by Seymour Martin Lipset paradigmatically encapsulates the central concern of class voting as a research subject for comparative political sociologists. It not only identifies socioeconomic inequality between groups as a driving force of political disagreement in societies, but also stresses interest in redistributionist policies as the rationale for the support of left-wing parties. Moreover, much of the scholarly debate on the politics of class has concerned the strength of the correlation between class and vote, and in particular the alleged decline or persistence of this association (cf. Evans 1999b; Knutsen 2007). Many scholars have deemed social class to be on the wane as a basis for voting behavior (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995, Knutsen 2006) while a universal decline is rejected by others (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1987; Manza, Hout and Brooks, 1995; Evans 1999b; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006; Efff 2007). What Lipset also makes clear however, and this has been less frequently observed, is that students of mass political behavior should concentrate upon parties as much as voters. The structure of political supply is not constant: Policy positions of parties as well as the range of party positions within party systems vary across countries and over time. Such differences in political supply can affect voter decision-making by providing them with choices of varying relevance to their economic interests.

This thesis has become known as the 'top-down' perspective on class voting (cf. Evans 2000). From this perspective patterns in class voting reflect the outcomes of party behavior rather than 'bottom-up' changes in social structure. As Evans (2000: 411) points out, *'the adoption of class-relevant policy programs should be associated with an increase in the class basis of partisanship'* and vice versa. Thus variations in class voting are argued to derive from difference in the redistributive policy choices offered to voters. This raises a problem for comparative analyses of class voting, whether over time or space, as the extent to which leftist parties advocate redistributionist policies and non-leftist parties oppose them is assumed to be fixed. Many comparative studies on class voting use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often 'left' versus

'non-left') regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or that different parties within the same 'party family' are perhaps similar but often far from equal (Knutsen 1998; Mair and Mudde 1998; cf. Elff 2009).

In this chapter we address this concern by estimating the impact of the Left-Right positions of political parties on the association between class and vote through a broad comparative analysis of integrated data from 15 countries in Western Europe, the United States and Australia between 1960 and 2005. We aim to answer the question: *To what extent are social and political changes able to explain the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies?* For this purpose we make use of our large-scale dataset, the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV) which provides the richest source of pooled individual-level surveys on the relations between class position and political choices available for Western countries since the 1960s. Left-Right positions of parties are estimated using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). In combination this evidence allows us to examine patterns of class voting across both countries and time, and test the general claim that variations in parties' Left-Right positions account for variations in the class-vote association.

3.2 Two approaches to the decline of class voting

3.2.1 Bottom-up

The salience of social classes in contemporary Western societies seems in many respects to have decreased in recent decades. Unsurprisingly, social class has also lost ground as a predictor of political behavior (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). Many of the explanations offered for this decline in class voting are driven by social structural arguments (for elaboration see Chapter 1). We will refer to these explanations as the 'bottom-up' approach to class voting. 'Bottom-up' explanations of declining class voting have taken various forms: rising living standards and the spread of affluence (Clark and Lipset 1991), the changing gender composition of class positions (Kitschelt 1994), the decline of traditional communities which has undermined class solidarity and led to more privatized, individualistic and instrumental voters (Franklin 1985; Rose and McAllister 1986); growing intra- and intergenerational social mobility (Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf and Ultee 2000), with upwardly mobile voters being more right-wing than those who remain in the working class, but also more left-wing than those in

their destination class (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath 1995). Class conflict is also believed to be replaced by new social cleavages such as gender, ethnicity and sector employment, or to have been cross-cut by new value cleavages (Knutson 1988; Kitschelt 1994; Inglehart 1997; Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007). From this perspective the association between class and vote is declining because cultural (conservative) issues are increasingly relevant to party choice for the working class. Finally, it has been claimed that educational expansion, accompanied by a general increase of 'cognitive mobilization' has transformed voters from being driven by particularistic loyalties (such as social class) into calculative, preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; Inglehart 1990), thus further weakening class divisions.

In sum, the 'bottom-up' approach to class voting has assumed that structural changes run parallel to, and account for, levels of class voting. Classes have lost their distinctiveness as social mobility, educational expansion, and compositional changes on the labor market have eroded the divisions between them. This in turn diminishes the relevance of traditional class conflict for voters' political choices, causing a gradual decline of class voting in Western countries. With our dataset we cannot test each of these explanations directly, but we can infer the pattern of decline produced by such changes. Their gradual, slowly changing character should produce a relatively slowly changing impact on class politics. Any observed changes consistent with 'bottom-up' processes should take the form of a gradual decline, which should not include reversals (i.e. increases) in the strength of association. Hence we formulate the 'gradual change hypothesis': *The association between class and vote for left vs. right-wing parties has monotonically declined since the 1960s (H1).*

To infer the causes of changes in class voting from the patterning of such change is not novel. Other studies of class voting (see Evans *et al.* 1991; Goldthorpe 1999; De Graaf, Heath and Need 2001) have also relied on evidence concerning the volatility and abruptness of changes in the class-vote association to indicate the likelihood that changes in association can be seen as social or political in origin. We can go further however and include in our models some indicators of social change that have been thought to contribute to the weakening of class voting. This 'social change hypothesis' contends that the blurring of social boundaries through processes of social and economic change as demonstrated by the growing spread of further and higher education through the class structure and the growing impact of gender divisions can be expected to have weakened

the effects of class position on party choice. We can therefore hypothesize that controlling for changes in the relationship between these social characteristics and social class should reduce the observed pattern of changes in the class-party association, i.e.: *Over-time differences in the association between class and vote are (partly) explained by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters, such as education and gender (H2).*

3.2.2 Top-down

If social change is assumed to be relatively gradualist and unidirectional, political change is considered to take a more discrete form, traceable to changes in party strategies and the emergence of new parties that shape the focus of political debates and interest representation. The degree to which parties offer choices that are more or less relevant to differences in interests between classes should condition the extent of class voting. From a 'top-down perspective', class voting is not only a consequence of the strength of the class divide in societies, but is also conditioned by the extent to which political parties are seen to be associated with interests of different social classes (Evans, Heath and Payne 1999; Oskarson 2005; Elff 2009). An influential advocate of the 'top-down' perspective Sartori (1969: 84) even argues that the politicization of class divisions by parties produces class consciousness rather than the other way around. From this perspective the salience of social class in politics depends on party strategy. As class-relevant, economic issues are more salient this may give rise to political polarization and reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem 1993: 386). Similarly, as Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954: 147) argue, political campaigns revive old loyalties and re-engage differentiation between groups in society. In this respect the strength of class voting is conditioned by the extent to which political parties present themselves as representatives of working class interests, and to the extent they incorporate class-related issues in their political messages. By adopting a more middle class orientated appeal left-wing parties weaken their support among the manual working class and increase it among the middle class.

A similar argument is made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) in their discussion of the 'Dilemma of Electoral Socialism'. They argue that because manual workers are not the numerical majority in most societies, Socialist parties aim to assure long-term survival by appealing to middle class voters as well. This strategy undermines working class political identity (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Of course, this approach is not exclusively 'top-down' because it argues

that party strategy itself is dependent on class conditions. The policy orientation of parties reflects to some degree the composition of electorates. Processes like de-industrialization, market liberalization and globalization transformed the highly industrialized economies of Western Europe of the 1960s into the contemporary post-industrial economies (Esping-Andersen 1999). Whereas the new service and middle classes expanded, the manual class shrunk substantively (Kitschelt 1994; Knutsen 2006). On average, the size of the labor force employed in industry fell by nearly 40 percent between 1960 and 2005. Conversely, the share of the labor force employed in services has gradually risen over the same period to an average of approximately 65 percent of the labor force (own calculations on the basis of CPDS data; Armingeon *et al.* 2008). Left-wing parties can be expected to place less emphasis on traditional working class issues as the proportion of manual laborers in the population is smaller⁵.

However, the empirical validity of the 'top-down' approach to class-based voting remains uncertain. In support of the approach, Evans, Heath and Payne (1991) and de Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) show evidence of marked discontinuities between different elections that are consistent with party shifts not social change, while Andersen and Heath (2003) suggest that political representation of social groups by parties enables social conflict to become politically relevant. They state that the impact of race in U.S. elections is a reflection of firm Democratic standpoints on racial issues (Andersen and Heath 2003: 322). Furthermore, Hill and Leighley (1996) argue that, at US state-level, the Democratic Party is better able to mobilize lower class voters if it is more liberal. But these studies all rely on the observation of discontinuity in the strength of class voting effects to infer a 'top-down' influence. They do not measure actual party positions. Studies that have done this show less conclusive results. Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), Oskarson (2005) and Elff (2009) find evidence of party position effects, but Weakliem and Heath find no support for the idea that the ideological difference between parties influences class voting. They find that class voting is not higher when voters perceive real ideological differences between parties (Weakliem and Heath 1999).

In this chapter we specify and test cross-nationally two versions of the 'top-down' thesis. The first concerns the absolute ideological position of left-wing parties. If parties are economically more to the left (e.g. support typical class related issues, maintain strong ties to labor unions and call for a strong welfare state to protect disadvantaged groups) it may further the salience of class in politics. And without such class orientated party strategy Evans, Heath and Payne

(1999: 88) argue class and vote are less strongly associated: '*Party positions therefore create class allegiances*' and show in their study of Britain between 1964 and 1997 that class voting diminishes when the Labour Party moves to the political centre. This thus implies that the effect of belonging to a particular social class on the probability of voting left-wing will be smaller when left-wing parties are positioned closer to the ideological centre. Therefore we formulate the 'left-wing party position hypothesis': *The association between social class and vote for left vs. right-wing parties is weaker as the Left-Right position of left-wing parties is more centrist (H3).*

The second version of the 'top-down' thesis concerns the relative positions of the parties on the left-right ideological dimension. The emphasis here is on the distance between the main party choices that voters face, rather than the degree to which Left-wing parties are 'anchored' in left-wing positions. Thus the British Labour Party is not unique in its attempt to renew its social-democratic principles in an era of post-industrialization, market liberalization and globalization (Kitschelt 1999). After 1989 most socialist parties no longer advocate the socialization of industry but strive instead for a more humane form of capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1999; Lipset 1991; Przeworski 1985). Keman and Pennings (2006) have shown that many Social Democratic parties in Western Europe have experienced moves to the centre of their party systems during the 1990s. They also argue that Christian Democratic parties moved to the centre of party systems as well, causing political choices to converge. Keman and Pennings argue that convergence of traditional political parties creates the opportunity for new parties from both the left and right to fill the void on the wings of party systems or to challenge the positions of established parties.

Therefore the polarization of a party system, as an aggregate of all party positions, may affect class voting. If underprivileged classes support leftist parties because they favor redistributionist policies then the voting decision is dependent on the proximity between voter and party on socio-economic issues. From a set of alternatives a voter will pick the party closest to his/her own political beliefs (Downs 1957). Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 364) write that casting a class vote is more likely if voters '*perceive that differences exist between parties that are relevant to class interest*' and Wessels and Schmitt (2008) have shown that the more polarized party systems are, the more relevant proximity is for voting. We expect that class differences in support for left-wing parties are smaller when the Left-Right polarization of a party system is weaker. Hence, our

'polarization hypothesis' reads that: *The association between social class and vote for left vs. right-wing parties is lower in less polarized party systems (H4).*

A final implication of the 'top-down' approach is that party changes in ideological positions can explain patterns of change in class voting. Thus if there has been a general pattern of movement to the centre by Left-wing parties or a convergence in the Left-right divisions between parties over time, this can explain over time changes in the class-vote relationship. By controlling for over time changes in the ideological position of Left-wing parties or the extent of ideological divisions between parties we expect to statistically remove the downward trend in class voting. We thus formulate the 'political change hypothesis': (a) *Movement to the ideological centre by left-wing parties over time or (b) over time de-polarization of a party system should explain over time decline in class voting (H5).*

3.3 Data and measurement

3.3.1 Comparative Dataset of Cleavage Voting

To test our hypotheses we make use of the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV). In this chapter we select all surveys from CDCV-file in period for which Party Manifesto data is available. This results in a selection of surveys between 1960-2003 (2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). We include only those respondents with valid information on party choice, social class, age (in years), gender (female=1) and education (recoded into years of education and standardized by country). Ultimately, our analyses are based on 188 surveys from 15 countries with a total of 238.429 respondents. Table 3.1 shows the period covered for each country, the number of included surveys and the total number of respondents.

In order to measure social class position we use the same four class-categories as in chapter 2: the manual working class (i.e. skilled and unskilled workers), the self-employed (i.e. petit bourgeois and farmers), the routine non-manual class, and the service class (i.e. lower and higher service class).

In order to allow a cross-national and over time comparison of voting behavior we use a dichotomized measure of party choice. Therefore, we first standardized the respondent's party choice by applying a fairly conventional party family categorization (primary source: Lane and Ersson 1999). Second, we dichotomized these party families on the basis of their traditional socio-economic appeal;

Table 3.1 Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting between 1960-2003*

Country	Period	Number of surveys	N of respondents	% of total N
Australia	1965 – 2001	14	21,529	9.0
Austria	1974 – 2003	7	3,222	1.4
Belgium	1975 – 2003	5	7,355	3.1
Denmark	1971 – 2001	13	18,490	7.8
Finland	1972 – 2003	6	3,333	1.4
France	1967 – 2002	7	14,611	6.1
Germany	1969 – 2002	22	25,680	10.8
Italy	1968 – 2001	8	9,728	4.1
The Netherlands	1970 – 2002	19	18,226	7.6
Norway	1965 – 2001	10	10,974	4.6
Spain	1979 – 2000	7	14,130	5.9
Sweden	1972 – 2002	11	17,792	7.5
Switzerland	1971 – 2003	10	10,600	4.4
United Kingdom	1964 – 2005	17	27,997	11.7
United States	1960 – 2004	32	34,762	14.6
Total	1960 – 2005	188	238,429	100.0

*2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK.

distinguishing between left-wing parties (socialist, communist, left-socialist) coded as (0) and right-wing parties, including religious parties (i.e.: liberal, conservative, agrarian, Christian democrats, and far right) coded as (1). For details consult Appendix A.2. Voters who voted for another party are excluded from the analyses⁶

3.3.2 Comparative Manifesto Data


To determine the ideological position of the parties and party blocs we construct a scale using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in (“quasi”) sentences in a program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven policy domains (i.e. external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare

and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party positions in each country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of the corresponding election year or the last preceding election.

First, we construct a Right-Left party position only based on economic and welfare policy issues. Because these two policy domains are about class-relevant issues like social inequality, redistribution, the protection of underprivileged groups, welfare state expansion and economic principles, they are perhaps more closely associated with the traditional class conflict than the broad left-right scale by Laver and Budge⁷ (1992). We use three pre-constructed scales from the CMP data files: The *planned economy* scale is composed of the joint emphasis on the policy categories 'market regulation: positive', 'economic planning: positive' and 'controlled economy: positive'. The *welfare* scale consists of the policy categories 'social justice: positive' and 'welfare state expansion: positive'. And the *market economy* scale is constituted by the policy categories 'free enterprise: positive' and 'economic orthodoxy: positive'. We combine these three scales with three items on social groups, i.e.: 'labour groups: positive', 'middle class and professional groups' and 'labour groups: negative'. The first item measures '*favourable references to labour groups, working class, unemployed; support for trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees*', whereas the second item measures '*favourable references to middle class, professional groups, such as physicians or lawyers; old and new middle class*'. 'Labour groups: negative' measures the 'Abuse of power by trade unions' and otherwise the reverse of 'Labour groups: positive'. We create a social-economic Left-Right position (hereafter: *L-R. position*) by combining the scales as ((market economy + middle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned economy + welfare + labour groups)).

We use this L-R scale to measure the *Left-Right position of Left-wing parties*. Because our hypotheses are concerned with the position of left-wing parties as a group instead of individual parties we construct a weighted mean of this scale for the left-wing party group in each country-year combination. The weight of a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages. Because the CMP data only includes so-called 'significant' parties (parties with coalition potential or the ability of political blackmail, see CMP coding instructions) not all parties in Western post-war electoral history are covered in the CMP dataset. Therefore, we are not able to include the position of minor left-wing parties in calculating the mean position of the left-wing party group. In order to measure *Party System Polarization* we employ a measure suggested by Dalton (2008). Like

Figure 3.1 LR-positions of Left-wing parties and party polarization in 15 countries in the period 1960-2005



other indicators of party polarization (e.g. Sigelman and Yough 1978) this index is calculated on the basis of the standard deviation from the average position of parties in a party system weighted by party size.

$$P_i = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N \left[f_i \frac{(x_i - \bar{x})^2}{5} \right]} \quad [1]$$

Where, N is the number of parties in the party system, f_i is the vote share of a specific party, x_i is the LR-position of a party and \bar{x} is the average LR-position of all parties in the party system. The metric of this index runs from 0 (all parties occupy the same position) to 10 (full polarization along the ends of the L-R scale).

Table 3.2 Linear Trends (correlations with election year) in LR positions of left-wing parties and LR party polarization in 15 countries (1960-2003^a).

Country	N	LR position left-wing parties	LR party system polarization
Australia	17	0.41*	-0.51**
Austria	13	-0.18	0.01
Belgium	14	-0.33	-0.82***
Denmark	17	-0.28	-0.21
Finland	12	0.19	-0.19
France	11	0.31	0.20
Germany	12	-0.23	0.42
Italy	11	-0.06	0.26
The Netherlands	13	0.62**	-0.63***
Norway	11	-0.10	-0.36
Spain	8	-0.13	0.41
Sweden	14	0.63**	-0.43
Switzerland	11	-0.12	0.38
United Kingdom	11	0.20	-0.23
United States	12	-0.16	-0.15
Total	187	0.11	-0.22***

^a 2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project, Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006, own calculations

* p. < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Figure 3.1 shows the position of left-wing parties on the L-R scale, as well as the L-R party system polarization country by country from 1960 onwards. On the y-axis on the left-hand side, a higher score on the L-R scale means a more rightward (or centrist) position of left-wing parties. The second y-axis on the right-hand side portrays the degree of polarization of a party system based on the L-R scale. Whether or not the observed patterns in figure 3.1 follow a linear course is tested in table 3.2. This table shows the correlations between election year and the LR positions of left-wing parties for 15 countries separately as well as the correlation between election year and the party system polarization.

The patterns in figure 3.1 and table 3.2 tell us that there is no clear sign of a universal movement of left-wing parties since the 1960s and where such movement is observed it does not follow a linear trend in most cases. This was also a conclusion of Achterberg's (2006) analysis of the overall salience of class issues in elections using the CMP data between 1945 and 1998. The only clear signs of de-polarization in table 3.2 are observed in Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Sweden. In these countries there has been a rightward shift of left-wing parties since the 1960s and the L-R party system polarization decreased over this period has well.

3.4 Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation

3.4.1 First stage analyses

Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation method (Achen 2005) involves estimating a separate regression analysis for each survey (188) within our dataset. Given the categorical nature of our dependent variable we use binary logit models for these first-stage estimations. These models provide the multivariate effects of social class (with the manual class as the reference category) controlled for age, gender, and education on the probability of voting right versus left-wing. The 'net' class coefficients (i.e. with controls) then become the variables to be explained at the second level. We use the natural logarithm of the odds ratios as the dependent variables in the second stage analyses, because it has the advantage of being asymptotically normally distributed (Agresti 2002). The log-odds ratio is a relative measure of cleavage strength and has been used in previous research to study class voting (see Chapter 1). In the analysis at the second stage, we take into account that the estimated log-odds ratio's from the first stage differ in reliability, due to differences in sample size or to differences in the extent of class voting.

Therefore, we use a case weight in the analysis which gives more weight to log-odds ratios with a lower standard error (Smits and Park 2009). In a second series of first-stage analyses we also estimated the 'gross' effects of social class, i.e.: without controlling for age, gender, and education. We hypothesized that over-time differences in the association between class and vote are (partly) explained by accounting for changes in the composition of electorates. We therefore present an evaluation of both series of the first stage estimations. First, we present country-by-country graphs of the net log-odd estimates in figures 3.2a (routine non-manual class), 3.2b (service class) and 3.2c (self-employed) as well as the fitted trend lines. In order to visualize the degree of uncertainty surrounding the estimates we also present the corresponding standard error intervals. Second, because of the sometimes modest difference between the net and gross log-odds ratios we do not present the gross effects in figure 3.2, and thus we confine ourselves to the implied fitted trend lines.

We first discuss the gross association between class and vote. Over all countries and years in our first stage models, the results confirm the expectation that the working class is generally less right-wing than other classes. As expected we find the largest differences in voting between the manual working class and the self-employed (mean log-odds ratio = 1.39), followed by the service class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.83). The smallest differences in voting in our models exist between the manual working class and the routine non-manual class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.56). In general we see the differences between classes decline in the period between 1960s-70s and the 2000s. For the routine non-manual class, the service class and the self-employed it holds that the odds of voting for a right-wing party generally have decreased over the last four decades, causing the political choices of different classes to convergence over time. Despite this decline the order of right-wing voting between classes for the most part persists: In 2000-2005 the self-employed are most different from the manual working class (mean log-odds ratio = 1.13); followed by the service class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.34) and the routine non-manual class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.19). But we clearly observe a sharp decline in the political differences between the manual working class and the service class.

With regard to cross-national differences figures 3.2a-3.2c reveal that class-based voting is the strongest in Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) and the United Kingdom. Also in Norway relatively high log-odds ratios are observed, but figure 3.2b also shows a clear decline in this country in the differences between the service class and the manual working class in the period

Figure 3.2a Estimated log-odds ratios for routine non-manual class to vote right-wing relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005




Figure 3.2b Estimated log-odds ratios for service class to vote right-wing relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005





Figure 3.2c Estimated log-odds ratios for self-employed to vote right-wing relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005



1965-2001. The lowest levels of class voting are found in Italy, France, Switzerland and the United States. Nonetheless, in all countries that we observe the political differences relative to the working class are most prominent for the self-employed, and are the smallest for the routine non-manual class. Moreover, in most countries the general pattern of declining class differences is confirmed⁸. The boundaries between the routine non-manual class and the working class seem to have declined only modestly in the majority of cases, but this is hardly surprising giving the finding that the political differences between these two classes were always smaller compared to the distance between the working class and other classes. In nearly all countries the decline of class voting is most apparent with respect to the working class versus service class. But the self-employed are also, in almost all countries, decreasingly inclined to vote right-wing relative to the working class. The most notable exception to the general pattern is the United States. In the US differences in voting between working class voters and the self-employed increased rather than decreased.

Let us now turn to the net log-odds estimates in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Over all countries and years the net estimates are, as expected somewhat weaker than the gross estimates, but the differences are rather small. Controlling for age, gender and education only modestly explains the voting differences between the routine non-manual class and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline = 0.04) and between the self-employed and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline = 0.03). Controlling for age, gender and education has the largest effect on the political differences between the service class and the working class (mean log odds ratio decline = 0.14, which is on average about 20 percent of the association). With respect to the service class figure 3.2b shows that not only the net log-odds ratios are on average lower than the gross log-odds ratios but also that in most countries the slopes of the fitted trend lines are weaker in case of the controlled association. With regard to the routine non-manual class and the self-employed the differences between the controlled and uncontrolled fitted slopes are less apparent.

What is not shown in the figures is that in general older people more often (mean $b = 0.008$) and females less often (mean $b = -0.04$) vote right-wing, although the effects of age and gender are often not significant. In this sense the most prominent control is education. On average for all the whole period between 1960-2005 we find that the more years of education the more likely a person is to vote right-wing (mean $b = 0.19$), but in most countries this association is weakening over time. These findings to some extent support the social change hypothesis

that over-time differences in the association between class and vote are explained by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters. Our results indicate that the changing composition of the electorate is partly responsible for the decreasing political differences between the service class and the working class, but not so much for the differences between the working class and the routine non-manual class or self-employed.

3.4.2 Second-stage analyses

At the second stage each survey is used as one observation (N=188), and we use the net log-odds ratios as the dependent variables measuring the levels of class voting. Because we investigate three different class contrasts we have three dependent variables at the second stage. Because our observations at this stage are hierarchically clustered in countries we employ a multilevel analysis⁹ analyzing 188 survey-observations nested in 15 countries. We use robust standard errors in a multilevel linear regression where we add case weights to control for the standard errors of the estimated log-odds ratios (c.f. Smits and Park 2009). Descriptive statistics of the second-stage variables are presented in table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of second-stage variables

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Log-odds routine non-manual class ^a	188	0.52	0.33	-1.45	1.40
Log-odds service class ^a	188	0.69	0.46	-0.22	2.34
Log-odds self-employed ^a	188	1.36	0.70	-0.01	3.66
LR position of left-wing parties	188	-20.51	8.41	-57.65	1.12
LR party system polarization	188	1.08	0.48	0.10	2.44
Year of survey	188	1985	10.39	1960	2005

^a cases weight on the basis of their first-stage standard error estimation

We begin our second-stage tests by examining the correlations between the log-odds ratios measuring the strength of class voting and the independent variables. Table 3.4 shows the zero-order correlation matrix of the second-stage variables. Naturally, we observe positive correlations between the log-odds ratios corresponding to different class contrasts. On the basis of table 3.4 we notice the differences in whether these log-odds ratios correlate with the independent

variables. First, the log-odds ratios of the routine non-manual class do not seem to be correlated with the LR position of left-wing parties. But there is a positive correlation ($r=0.294$) with party system polarization. The larger the left/right polarization between parties the more likely routine non-manual class voters will support a right-wing party instead of a left-wing party relative to the working class. Second, the log-odds ratios of the service class and self-employed both show significant correlations with the two manifesto-based scales. Service class and self-employed voters less often vote right versus left-wing as left-wing parties adopt more rightist positions ($r=-0.227$ and $r=-0.404$) and more often vote right-wing as the party system polarization is greater ($r=0.363$ and $r=0.309$).

The correlations between the log-odds ratios of class voting and a linear measure of year confirm our findings based on the plots in figure 3.2. Year of survey is positively correlated with the log-odds ratios of the routine non-manual class ($r=0.241$) and the service class ($r=0.330$), suggesting declining differences in class voting over time. With regard to the self-employed, we however find no significant correlation between the log-odds ratios and year in table 3.4. However, if we exclude all observations based on US-surveys and calculate the correlation based on the remaining 156 observation we find a significant and positive correlation between log-odds ratio and year for the self-employed ($r=0.280$). This finding confirms what we already noted in figure 3.2c. In spite of a general decline

Table 3.4 Correlation matrix of second-stage variables

	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Log-odds routine non-manual class (N=188)	0.692***	0.309***	-0.100	0.294***	-0.241***
2. Log-odds service class (N=188)	-	0.544***	-0.227***	0.363***	-0.330***
3. Log-odds self-employed (N=188)		-	-0.404***	0.309***	-0.072
4. LR position of left-wing parties (N=187) ^a			-	-0.399***	0.108
5. LR Party System Polarization (N=187) ^a				-	-0.215***
6. Year of survey					-

^a Correlation based on 187 observations in Comparative Manifesto Dataset (2001, 2006) for all election years between 1960 and 2005 for 15 countries

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

of the political differences between the self-employed and the working class in most countries, we observe an increase of these differences in the US.

Finally table 3.4 shows a negative correlation between the LR position of left-wing parties and party system polarization ($r=-0.399$). In other words, as expected a more right-wing position of left-wing parties is associated with low party system polarization. However, as we already found in table 1, contrary to our expectations the LR position of left-wing parties is not significantly correlated with year. This finding suggests that there is no sign of a gradual, universal movement of left-wing parties in the period 1960-2005. Party system polarization on the other hand is linearly associated with year ($r=-0.215$). This negative relationship suggests a pattern of gradual depolarization, although we have seen in table 3.2 that this is not the case in all countries.

We continue our second-stage test by presenting the results of a series of multilevel linear regression analyses. Because we investigate three class contrasts we show the results of our models for three different log-odds ratios as the dependent variable. We start in table 3.5 by reporting a null model which shows the extent to which there is within-country and between-country variation in the levels of class voting. With respect to the routine non-manual class the null model shows that the survey-level variance is 0.070 and the country-level variance is 0.045. The implied intra class correlation ($(0.045/(0.045+0.070)) = 0.39$) indicates that not only is there variation in the estimated log-odds between surveys but also considerable variation between countries. With respect to the service class and the self-employed the intra class correlation is even higher, 0.45 and 0.75 respectively.

Next, we model trends in class voting by introducing a linear measure of year. Given the fact that the plots of the first stage estimated log-odds in figure 3.2 showed that the decline of class voting is not entirely a gradual process and that trends differ from country to country we tried to model these trends in various ways (i.e. 10-year categories, 5-year categories, linear with a random intercept, linear with both random intercept and slope). Goodness-of-fit statistics and likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) showed that including year of survey linearly with both a random intercept and slope in general proved to be the preferred model. Only with respect to the routine non-manual class the random slope model is rejected in favor of the random intercept model. In model I we therefore first present a random intercept model with the effect of year fixed over countries, and in model II we present a random coefficient model with a random slope of year for each country. To interpret the mean intercept of the random coefficient model we

centered the linear measure of year (1985 = 0). Both models I and II show negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. These estimates confirm that differences in voting between the working class and other classes has declined in recent decades. The most clear sign of decline is found with regard to the service class (mean slope = -0.213). Because the random slope variance is significant with respect to the service class and self-employed this confirms that the linear trends in class voting vary between countries. In figure 3.3 we plotted the country-specific trends on the basis of table 3.5, model II. The association between class and vote for right vs. left-wing parties has indeed declined since the 1960s in most countries, again with the self-employed in the US as the most notable exception. The linear trends in figure 3.3 show great resemblance to the fitted trend lines in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Despite observed deviations from the linear trend in figure 3.2 we find support for our *gradual change hypothesis* in table 3.5. In additional analyses we estimated models I and II on the basis of the gross instead of net first-stage log-odds ratios (see appendix C). By comparing the 'gross' mean slopes of year with the 'net' results in table 3.5 we can assess to what extent social changes account for the linear decline of class voting. With respect to the controlled and uncontrolled log-odds ratios of the self-employed the mean slope of linear year does hardly differ. In case of the service class and the routine non-manual class, the mean slope of year respectively is 25% and 35% weaker regressing the controlled log-odds ratios instead of the uncontrolled log odds ratios. These findings support the *social change hypothesis* in the sense that gradual decline of the association between class and vote is partly accounted for by social characteristics of voters.

In model III of table 3.5, we include the LR position of parties. Critics of the Comparative Manifesto Project argue that they are most appropriate for within-country comparisons but not necessarily for between-country comparisons. In preliminary analyses we therefore included random slopes of the manifesto scales allowing these variables to have a different effect in each country. However, testing the variance of these slopes using likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) we found that allowing random slopes did not result in better model fits. We therefore rejected the random-coefficient models in favor of the random-intercept models and included the LR positions of left-wing parties with a fixed slope over countries. We find that, allowing country-specific trends in class voting, positions of left-wing parties do not significantly affect the log-odds ratios for the routine non-manual class, the service class or the self-employed. In other words, the likelihood of other classes voting right-wing relative to the working class does not


Table 3.5 Second-stage parameter estimations of multilevel linear regression predicting the level of class voting
(measured in 'net' log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party)

log-odds ratio to vote left versus right manual working class = reference group	Routine non-manual class		Service class		Self-employed and farmers	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Null Model						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.476***	0.060	0.689***	0.087	1.524***	0.170
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.070***	0.011	0.116***	0.024	0.132***	0.021
Level 2 Variance	0.045***	0.017	0.095***	0.026	0.390***	0.121
-2 Loglikelihood	65.5		162.9		205.8	
Model I						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.492***	0.059	0.728***	0.091	1.538***	0.175
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)	-0.105***	0.025	-0.199***	0.035	-0.146**	0.057
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.060***	0.008	0.076***	0.012	0.109***	0.017
Level 2 Variance	0.044***	0.016	0.104***	0.024	0.405***	0.124
-2 Loglikelihood	36.1		90.4		172.9	
Model II						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.499***	0.057	0.737***	0.089	1.555***	0.170
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)	-0.114***	0.025	-0.213***	0.033	-0.189***	0.041
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.058***	0.007	0.068***	0.012	0.087***	0.011
Level 2 Variance	0.042***	0.015	0.104***	0.023	0.395***	0.120
Random Slope linear year	0.002	0.002	0.007*	0.004	0.017**	0.009
-2 Loglikelihood	34.6		82.1		144.4	

Model III					
<i>Fixed Effects</i>					
Intercept					0.198
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)					0.041
LR position of left-wing parties * 10					0.026
<i>Variance Components</i>					
Level 1 Variance					0.010
Level 2 Variance					0.117
Random Slope Linear year					0.009
-2 Loglikelihood					143.5
Model IV					
<i>Fixed Effects</i>					
Intercept					0.167
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)					0.040
LR Party System Polarization					0.055
<i>Variance Components</i>					
Level 1 Variance					0.011
Level 2 Variance					0.109
Random Slope Linear year					0.009
-2 Loglikelihood					138.2

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; N_{surveys} = 188, N_{countries} = 15

Figure 3.3 Predictions of country-specific trends in class voting^(a) with a random intercept and slope for year




(a) measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)

decrease when left-wing parties are further to the ideological right. This finding refutes the *left-wing party position hypothesis*

In model IV we add party system polarization to our models. We find significant and positive effects of polarization on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. As the ideological polarization in a party system is greater the first-stage estimated log-odds ratios for voting right-wing increase. This finding suggests that, allowing country-specific trends in class voting, the routine non-manual class (0.104), the service class (0.125) and the self-employed (0.137) are more inclined to vote right-wing as the differences between political parties are larger. Thus the association between social class and vote declines as the party system polarization decreases, therefore the *polarization hypothesis* is supported¹⁰, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The latter is indicated in figure 3.4 by the plotted effect of LR party system polarization on the basis of model IV. However, the negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing are not substantially reduced by including party system polarization. In both model III and IV we observe negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. Therefore the *political change hypothesis* is refuted: neither shifts to the center by left party families nor party system polarization account for the over time linear decline of class voting.

Figure 3.4 Plotted effect of party polarization on the log-odds ratio to vote right-wing relative to the working class (year is fixed at 1985)



3.5 Conclusion

Social class is undeniably weakening as a basis of party choice. We not only observe patterns towards smaller class differences in the majority of the countries in this chapter, we also find a general pattern towards converging class differences in the pooled analyses. The differences between the service class and the working class have lost much of their strength. The difference between the self-employed and the working class is also, in general, weakening. The most apparent exception to the general pattern is the United States, where differences in voting between the working class and the self-employed are increasing rather than decreasing.

Although, our results are consistent with the erosion of class voting in modern democracies, they do not signal the end of class politics. Class continues to have an impact on party choice in most countries and, despite the decline of the magnitude of differences, the order in which classes favor left or right parties for the most part endures: thus across the 45 year period the self-employed are the most different from the manual working class, followed by the service class and the routine non-manual class. Moreover, as shown by the plotted country figures the process of a class politics breakdown is not always gradual in nature. But despite the deviations from the linear trends in particular countries the general pattern based on our cross-national analyses is one of gradual decline.

We also aimed to explain variation in the association between class and vote by accounting for changes in both the social structure and political structure of societies. Our results support the idea of compositional changes leading to changes in class voting; changes in background characteristics (age, gender, and education) are partly responsible for the decline in political divisions between classes. This is primarily due to changes in the relationship between education and class position. As educational level is generally rising in post-industrial societies this development offers a 'bottom-up' explanation for changes in levels of class voting - especially between the routine non-manual class/service class and the working class.

As well as examining 'bottom-up' explanations for the levels of class voting we tested two versions of the 'top-down' perspective on class voting. We did not find evidence for the idea that left-right positions of left-wing parties alone influence the association between class and vote. We do find, however, that when ideological differences between political parties are smaller the association between class and vote is weaker (see also Elff 2009). This indicates that the extent of class-related political choices presented to voters does influence the extent to which they vote

along class lines. There is therefore evidence of a 'top-down' direction of influence. In order to detect this, however, it is important to investigate party positions of different parties in relation to each other. The absolute position of left parties on the ideological continuum is not predictive of levels of class voting. Only the extent of left-right party system polarization appears to matter. This suggests this 'top-down' effect relates to instrumental calculations about the differences between parties presented to voters, rather than simple voter-party proximity.


What this pattern of 'top-down' influence fails to do, however, is explain the over time trends in class voting. The reason for this can be seen from the lack of any consistent correlation between left-party moves to the centre, or party ideological convergence, and time itself. In some countries left parties have moved to the centre over time and/or there has been ideological convergence, but in others these patterns have been absent. At a country level we might expect to find party ideological convergence accounting for a decline in class voting (Evans, Heath and Payne 1999) but we should not expect to find this at the more general level examined here. In the next chapter we will investigate whether class voting in the Netherlands is affected by differences and changes in party's social-economic positions and as well as their 'conservative vs. progressive' positions. The Netherlands are particularly interesting because it is among the few countries in this chapter where we found a clear pattern of depolarization of the party system on the traditional left-right dimension.

Clearly this analysis represents an early stage of systematic research into 'top-down' effects, the presence of which have previously usually been inferred from narrative accounts of party strategies (i.e. Mair *et al.* 2004), and the limitations of the study need to be kept in mind. There is undoubtedly measurement error in the CMP data and because of the need for cross-national comparability our measures are of the Left-right position of party family groups rather than individual parties. In further work it might be useful to compare the effect of party positions on class voting using different methods of measuring party positions, i.e. manifesto data, expert surveys and perceived party positions. Within-country comparisons in single country studies may also be necessary to allow more detailed measures of party positions. Currently, however, the Comparative Manifesto Data is the only available evidence on party positions across a wide range of countries over many years. The scope of our large-scale comparison did also not allow the use of more refined measures of social class and party families. In the British case for example our categorization of party choice results in merging the Liberal-Democrats with the Conservatives instead of Labour. With

this recoding we are unable to detect the collapse of class voting in the 1997 elections as found by Evans and Tilley (2011). Moreover, our pooled data also do not allow the inclusion of other individual level background characteristics, and these other factors may well play a significant role in explaining declining levels of class voting. Given the emphasis on redistribution of resources as a rationale for left-wing voting individual ideology on the economic left-right dimension, for example, may be such a factor. Neither of these limitations undermine the evidence we have presented showing party system polarization impacts on class voting however. So this chapter provides an important step towards expanding the examination of cleavage change beyond 'bottom-up' processes to those involving the relevance of the choices that parties provide for voters: in other words, 'top-down' influences.


Notes

- 5 However, socio-demographic change alone is not sufficient to explain party behavior: As Kitschelt (1999: 344) points out, party strategy depends on political-economic conditions, and the competitive setting of elections as well as party organizational features. Kitschelt (1994: 41) calls it 'naïve' to treat left-wing electoral support as a direct function of the proportion of blue-collar workers in the labour force.
- 6 In our categorization far-right or nationalist parties as treated as right-wing despite their appeal to the working class. Excluding far-right parties from the analyses does not substantially change the results. On average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat higher, and the trends modeled at the second stage are somewhat less steep. But there are no substantial changes in the effect of LR positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization. The category of left-wing parties does not include Green parties. Including Green parties in the analyses also does not substantially change the results. On average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat lower, and the trends modeled at the second stage are somewhat steeper. But again there are no substantial changes in the effect of LR positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization.
- 7 We also used the Left-Right scale as given by Laver and Budge (1992) which we coded in such a manner that it (theoretically) ranges from completely left (-100) to completely right (+100). Because this scale is a combination of 26 policy categories (13 left - 13 right) related to all seven policy domains in the CMP data it is a measure of the overall Left-Right party position. However, our analyses showed that a scale based on more specific class-relevant policy issues is more strongly associated with levels of class voting.
- 8 With regard to the extent to which the trend lines fit the estimated points country by country (Achen 2005: 455) we emphasize the relatively poor fit of the trend lines for Switzerland in figure 3.2a and Finland in figure 3.2b.
- 9 Multilevel models in this chapter are estimated using the STATA program GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008).
- 10 We employed two robustness checks. First, we repeated the analyses while each time excluding one the countries. In the case of all three dependent variables, excluding specific countries did not produce substantially different results with respect to the parameter estimates of party polarization. In all cases a higher level of party system polarization is associated with higher log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. Second, we tried another indicator for polarization. We replace party system polarization with the *ideological range in a party system* (measured as the distance on the L-R scale between the most right-wing party and the most left-wing party in a party system). No substantially different results were found, and these findings confirm our results with respect to party system polarization.



Part II |


Trends in Cleavage Voting in the Netherlands



Chapter 4 |

Class Voting, Social Changes and Political Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006 *

* A slightly different version of this chapter is accepted for publication in Electoral Studies. Co-authors are Nan Dirk de Graaf and Ariana Need.



4. 1 Introduction

Like in many other Western European countries class-based voting has become much weaker in the Netherlands (De Graaf 1996; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; Need 1997; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999; Van der Kolk 2000). Although there is a fair amount of speculation about the causes of this trend, there is not much research that systematically tries to explain the decline in class-based voting. Among the few studies addressing the decline of traditional social cleavages in the Netherlands De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have explored the interaction between the available political options and the class position and religious affiliation of voters. Theoretically, their study contributed to the idea that “*in understanding the evolving political impact of social divisions it is important to recognize that political behavior results from the interplay between social and political forces*” (2001: 3). De Graaf *et al.* showed that the decline in religious-based voting in the Netherlands was affected by the merging of the three main denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). With respect to class voting they did not find that the downward trends were influenced by the merging of four radical left-wing parties into GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*).

In previous chapters we labeled the distinction and interaction between social changes and political choices as the ‘bottom-up’ and the ‘top-down’ perspectives on class voting. Most explanations in the literature for the decline in class-based voting are of sociological nature and emphasize factors related to the class composition of electorates and the relevance of class divisions in society. These ‘bottom-up’ explanations often assume one or more of the following processes (see also Chapter 1 and 3): The income and living standard of workers are rising and are increasingly similar to those of the middle class, partly because there is also a growing group of low-paid and low-status white collar employees (Dalton 2008); New ‘post-industrial’ and value-cleavages have replaced or cross-cut the class-based conflict; And rising levels of education and ‘cognitive mobilization’ have enlarged voter’s ability to make political choices independent from old class-based loyalties. The traditional economic boundaries between classes have, as is often assumed, become blurred. The social and political distinctiveness of social classes have in consequence declined. Due to processes like de-industrialization and market liberalization the number of working-class laborers declined. At the same time the service class grew rapidly and became increasingly heterogeneous, creating new lines for political conflict. What all these explanations have in common is that they use changes in social structure as the main source

for changes in political choices, therefore shaping the class-vote relationship from the bottom up.

Political parties are assumed to adapt to the changing social circumstances. As the working class is shrinking and the service class is growing, political parties, especially those on the left, are expected to target middle class voters instead of working-class laborers (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). And when the economic boundaries between classes are weakening, all parties may be expected to address new political issues that appeal to voters in non-economic terms. The significance of new political issues in society may also reveal itself in the emergence of new parties with new political agendas. For all these processes, the implication is that the political relevance of class is reduced because parties respond to social change. Evans (2000) and De Graaf *et al.* (2001) have contrasted this 'sociological determinist' perspective with the alternative view that political changes are contributions towards, rather than simply reflections of, the evolution of political cleavages. They argue that an actual voting choice will reflect the political options available to voters as well as their social situation. From this perspective class voting is conditioned by the extent to which political parties emphasize class issues rather than with the strength of class divisions in society (Oskarson 2005). De Graaf *et al.* (2001) argue that under different political circumstances identical social structures may in theory result in different patterns of voting behavior. These arguments add a 'top-down' perspective to a 'bottom-up' perspective: Not simply social changes, but also class-relevant policy choices offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote relationship (Evans, Heath and Payne 1999; Oskarson 2005; Elff 2009). The Netherlands is particularly interesting because not only social changes have been prominent, but, as we also observed in the previous chapter there have also been substantial changes in Dutch politics. The question that we aim to answer in this chapter is: *To what extent can the decline in class voting in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?*

The effects of political factors on the class-vote association are rarely directly measured. Most studies infer a 'top-down' influence by examining time-specific changes in the strength of class voting that coincide with party shifts or changes in the party system (Evans, Heath and Payne 1991; Hill and Leighley 1996; De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003). The measurement of actual party positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), Oskarson (2005) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent innovation to the class voting research. In this chapter we investigate two types of changes in political choices in the

Netherlands. Using more data and more differentiated measures of social class and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf *et al.*'s question whether the emergence of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. But additionally, using data of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006) we examine the interaction between party positions and social class. We aim to test to what extent class voting in the Netherlands is affected by changes in party's 'old' social-economic positions and 'new' conservative-progressive positions. We set out to examine these 'top-down' changes after accounting for the 'bottom-up' process of blurring class boundaries. De Graaf *et al.* (2001) assume a process of blurring boundaries by modeling linear class voting trends in the Netherlands without accounting for the social distinctiveness of classes. Instead of simply inferring societal homogenization we test to what extent trends in class voting are interpreted by differences between voters in their economic ideology and level of education. Our hypotheses are tested using data from eleven surveys of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) 1971-2006 supplemented by data from the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch political parties.

4.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the class structure of the Netherlands

4.2.1 The rise of a 'new' social class within the service class


The occupational structure of the Netherlands has changed considerably in the past four decades. We observe a contracting working class and an expanding service class. The manual class has shrunk from more than 40 % of the working electorate in 1970 to less than 30 % in 2004 (Güveli 2006). To understand class voting, the simple distinction between blue- and white-collar classes no longer suffices (cf. Nieuwbeerta 1995). In a large scale international comparison Nieuwbeerta distinguished the unskilled manual class, the skilled manual class, the petty bourgeoisie, the routine non-manual class, and the lower-, and upper service classes. His findings showed that the distinction between manual and non-manual work has become less relevant due to changing class structures. Indeed, more recent research shows that due to changes in employment patterns and class structure also this more elaborate class distinction is no longer optimal. In the Netherlands, the majority of the employed male population works in the high and low service classes. These are the high- and low-grade professionals and managers, known as classes I and II of the EGP class schema (Ganzeboom

and Luijkx 2004). When combined these two service classes increased in size from 31% in 1970 to more than 50% in 2004 (Güveli 2006). Güveli and De Graaf (2007) and Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a, 2007b) argue that in post-industrial societies, two extra sub-classes should be distinguished within the service class: i.e. the socio-cultural specialists (e.g. social workers, teachers, lawyers) and the technocrats (e.g. engineers, accountants, and office managers). Construct and criterion validation tests (Güveli 2006) support these new class distinctions. Even after taking level and field of education into account these distinctions help to account for political choices (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). We will therefore apply this adjusted class schema in this chapter. Figure 4.1 reports the percentage of social and cultural specialists and technocrats in the labor force. It confirms that the service class in the Netherlands expanded a great deal (De Graaf and Steijn 1997). The increase applies both to the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. Due to the increase of the population in higher class positions the relative size of the manual class has declined considerably.

4.2.2 Compositional changes and the blurring of class boundaries

The aforementioned changes in the size of class categories can be conceived of as compositional changes. When the class-vote association is measured in (log) odds ratio's (as in the present case) compositional changes not necessarily affect the strength of the association because the odds ratio is invariant to the marginal totals. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish compositional changes from the blurring of class boundaries. As said, the processes of blurring boundaries will result in less distinctive classes. Traditionally, class-based political conflict is related to economic divisions in society. The less privileged classes support leftist parties that stand for greater socio-economic equality. In opposition to the working class members from other classes have less interest in redistributionist policies, and are assumed to vote for economic conservative parties on the right. The decline of traditional class divisions is often attributed to the decrease of economic differences between classes or the increase of economic differences within classes. Growing economic homogeneity between classes involves that members of different classes increasingly have common living standards or income characteristics. The heterogenization of classes, on the other hand, resulted in growing economic and cultural differences within particular classes, reducing a sense of shared identity and interest. We expect that the blurring of class divisions are a continuing and relatively gradual processes which ultimately lead to a convergence in their political preferences. We therefore expect that: *The*

Figure 4.1 Trends in the percentage of social and cultural specialists and technocrats in the Dutch labor force between 1980 and 2004



Source: Güveli (2006: 52)

association between class and party choice becomes generally weaker. The odds ratios between class and vote would therefore be expected to decline. (H1).

The heterogenization of the service class, which led to the rise of a 'new' social class of social-cultural specialists, may have resulted in more differentiated patterns of voting behavior. The socio-cultural specialists and technocrats are especially different with respect two to characteristics. First, it is relatively more difficult for employers to monitor the work performance, both qualitatively and quantitatively, of socio-cultural specialists than the work performance of technocrats. Second, socio-cultural specialists have specific skills and knowledge involving social services and social-cultural issues, and they more often work in a public or non-profit field (e.g. health, education) that requires state support. Social-cultural specialists therefore have developed a distinct leftist political orientation (Güveli and De Graaf 2007; Güveli, Need and De Graaf 2007a, 2007b). Güveli *et al.* (2007b) found that over the last three decades the low-social cultural specialists had become the most leftist class in the Netherlands. We thus formulate the following hypothesis about class voting within the service class: *The decline of the association between class and vote weakened the odds of technocrats to vote left vs. right, relative to the manual class, but reversed the*

odds of social-cultural specialists to vote left vs. right relative to the manual class (H1b).

The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of voters in modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining economic security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, unemployment and inflation (Dalton 2008). We therefore assume that the blurring of class divisions should show up in the ideological differences between classes. The relevant ideological dimension in this respect is the left-right dimension related to *economic progressivism/conservatism*. We expect that due to rising living standards and income levels economic ideology has become less associated with class differences. As the ideological differences about redistribution between classes decrease, the class basis of voting should diminish. Hence, we formulate: *The decline of the association between class and party choice becomes less strong when we take voters' economic ideology into account (H2).*

Of course, Lipset already suggested that the working class is perhaps ideologically on left on the basis of socioeconomic issues but certainly not with regard to cultural issues (Lipset 1959). From this perspective, the association between class and vote is declining because working class conservatism is increasingly relevant to predict party choice (e.g. Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007). However, in this chapter we cannot test to what extent cultural conservative ideology accounts for the decline in class voting because we lack a direct comparable measure of individual cultural conservatism in our data. But we are able to indirectly test this claim in three ways. First, the use of manifesto data enables us to consider the impact of cultural conservatism at the party level. We can test if, and to what extent manual workers are less likely to vote for a party when it is more culturally progressive. Second, we may expect that when non-economic cleavages are increasingly relevant for political interests, the influence of peoples' economic ideology on voting has declined in the past decades. Third, a higher education is associated with cultural liberal attitudes and values (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). From a cultural perspective the lower educated will vote for right-wing parties cross-cutting traditional class-based voting (Van der Waal *et al.* 2007). We therefore may expect that as cultural issues are increasingly important to predict vote choice, the influence of education on voting has increased in recent decades. Hence, we formulate: *The association between voters' economic ideology and party choice becomes generally weaker (H3a), and the association between education and party choice becomes generally stronger (H3b).*

4.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands

4.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos

Instead of merely reflecting social changes, parties may contribute to yet more blurring of class boundaries. Facing the decline of the working class left-wing parties may adopt a more middle class orientated appeal (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). By abandoning class-relevant policy programs left-wing parties reduce the distinct political voice of the working class, which may decrease their distinct class identity, group solidarity and political awareness (De Graaf *et al.* 2001). In this sense, the political relevance of class is, at least in part, a product of the behavior of parties and politicians that choose to politicize it or not (Evans and Whitefield 2006). It is assumed that the strength of class voting is conditioned by the extent to which parties offer choices that are relevant to economic differences between classes. If left-wing parties take more centrist positions (e.g. appeal to the middle class, have weaker ties to unions and call for retrenchment of the welfare state), thus reducing the socio-economic differences relative to other parties, it may weaken working-class allegiance to left-wing parties. In appealing to, the growing number of, new middle class voters left-wing parties may also be expected to emphasize non-economic issues in their campaigns. Especially the new class of social-cultural specialists holds progressive attitudes favoring democratization, multiculturalism and environmental protection (Güveli *et al.* 2007). By appealing to the liberal values of this group left-wing parties may give them a distinct political voice and strengthen their sense of shared interest and identity. But in doing so, left-wing politicians will estrange themselves from their traditional social basis of manual workers that hold more cultural conservative attitudes.

Assuming interaction between party positions and class categories we expect that members from the working class generally favor parties that are economically progressive, and members from other classes generally prefer parties that are economically more conservative. With respect to non-economic issues (conservative vs. progressive) the opposite may be true. Members from the working are more likely to vote for a party that is culturally conservative, whereas other classes prefer parties that are culturally more progressive. Keman and Pennings (2006) have shown that there is a general tendency in European countries for major parties to *convergence* with respect to economic differences and *diverge* with respect to progressive/conservative issues. We expect that the relevance of economic differences between voters will decline as parties become less distinct in their economic policies, as happened in the Dutch case (Pennings

and Keman 2008). The depolarization of political parties with respect to their social-economic positions may have had an independent impact on the voting behavior of classes. Alternatively, polarization on non-economic differences, in which the voting preferences of classes are assumed to be reversed (Achterberg and Houtman 2006), may be responsible for the decline in class voting. We therefore formulate the hypothesis that: *The decline of the association between class and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and changes into account with respect to the ideological position of parties (H4).*

Second, it may be expected that as a result of the economic convergence of the political parties, the economic ideology of individuals will lose its power to predict party choice. Therefore the influence of economic conservatism on party choice should weaken as the differences on economic issues between parties become smaller. Hence we hypothesize: *The association between economic ideology and party choice becomes less strong when we take the differences and changes into account with respect to the economic position of parties (H5).*

4.3.2 The emergence of GreenLeft

The second test of the 'top-down' perspective is related to the restructuring of the Dutch party system. If the influence of class on party choice is assumed to be declining due to 'bottom-up' sociological processes, this decline is assumed to be relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Explanations for more time-specific and group-specific changes and possible reversals in the associations between class and vote must therefore be attributed to changes in the party system or the emergence of new parties, rather than to sociological developments. Like in many other European countries a Green party emerged in the Netherlands during the 1980s (Müller-Rommel 2002). This party, GreenLeft, came into existence after 1989 when four minor radical parties (CPN, PSP, PPR and EVP) contested the election with a joint party list. These four parties had rather diverse and distinct histories, the communist CPN dating from 1936, the left-pacifist PSP from 1959, the radical PPR from 1971 and the progressive Christian EVP from 1981. Although their electoral strength has always been weak De Graaf *et al.* (2001) argue that their merger may be important because:

"By appealing to environmentalists in a way that the old left parties did not, [the emergence of GreenLeft] may have well have attracted more middle-class, post-materialist voters than did left-wing parties in the past. By giving a distinctive voice to these postmaterialists it may also have led to a strengthening of their group

identity and thus have increased the political awareness of this group. Conversely, by fragmenting left-wing appeals and reducing the emphasis on specifically class issues, it may also have tended to undermine class identity yet further” (2001: 3).

De Graaf *et al.* claim that the emergence of new political options, or the disappearance of old options may have an immediate impact on the relationship between class and vote. To test this for the Dutch case they therefore look for sudden changes in the association between class and vote after the formation of the common Green Left party list in 1989. De Graaf *et al.* do not find evidence for an abrupt decline of class voting after 1989. We are however able to conduct a more group-specific test of their hypothesis that *‘The odds of middle-class voters supporting the old left, relative to working class voters, increases after the formation of the GreenLeft (De Graaf et al. 2001: 8).* Especially the new class of socio-cultural specialists benefits from the material advantages which allow the support for parties which hold more postmaterialist stances (e.g. Norton 2003; Inglehart 1979). The immediate consequences of environmental protection policies are far less severe for this new middle class compared to the manual class (Obach 2002). Socio-cultural specialists may therefore have been likely support to GreenLeft once the new party list was established. Consequently, this process would be expected to increase the level of class voting. This suggests the hypothesis: *The odds of the social-cultural specialists supporting new-left parties increases after the formation of Green Left (H6).*

4.4 Data and variable construction

To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. We use information on social class based on detailed occupational codings, economic ideology, party choice and some social background characteristics from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 [N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). We excluded the 2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational codings were available. In the multivariate analyses we control for *age* (17=0) and *gender* (male=0), *denomination* (in categories: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, no religion) and *church attendance* (0-4 interval scale).

To provide a parsimonious study that allows for an over-time comparison it is unavoidable to group relevant Dutch political parties into a limited number of party groups. We measure *party choice* in four categories¹¹ on the basis of the De Graaf *et al.* (2001) classification: the *old-left* (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), *new-left* (D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP), *liberal right* (VVD, BP, NMP) and *religious parties* (CDA, ARP, KVP, CHU, SGP, GPV, RPF, RKPN and CU). Consult appendix A.3 for party names. Respondents voting for another party are excluded from the analysis. We mainly examine the odds of voting old-left and new-left relative to the odds of voting liberal right¹². The old-left/liberal right contrast has also been used in earlier studies on class voting (De Graaf *et al.* 2001). The new-left/liberal right contrast is used to get more insight in the changing political alignment of the new service class (Güveli *et al.* 2007b).

For *social class* we want to take into account the evolution of the social classes and we therefore use the modified EGP class schema distinguishing the social and cultural specialists as a separate class from the technocrats (cf. Güveli, Need and De Graaf 2007b) for recoding ISCO-scores into the new classes). We distinguish the following classes: 1a. Higher technocrats; 1b. Higher social and cultural specialists; 2a. Lower technocrats; 2b. lower social and cultural specialists; 3. Routine non-manuals; 4. Self-employed; 5. Manual class. We collapsed the higher manual and lower manual class, since there is hardly any difference in their voting patterns, also not over time.

Economic conservatism: In all election surveys there is a question on income inequality. This is a question that starts as follows¹³: “Some people think that the difference in incomes in our country should be increased (at number 1). Others think that these differences should be decreased (at number 7). Of course, there are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between.” Then there are questions about where the respondent would place the major political parties on this line. Finally respondents were asked: “And where would you place yourself?” We coded economic ideology such that the metric is running from 0 (‘the differences in our country should be decreased’) to 6 (‘the differences in incomes in our country should be increased’).

We measure the respondent’s *level of education* as the number of years it normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational categories in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of Ganzeboom and Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 6 year for complete primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university level.


Party positions: To determine the ideological position of party groups we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties on 56 policy categories are measured as the percentages of sentences in a program devoted to these issues. First, we construct a left-right party position based on socio-economic issues. We use three policy categories from the CMP data files: *planned economy* (i.e. market regulation economic planning), *welfare* (social justice and welfare state expansion), and *market economy* (free enterprise and economic orthodoxy). Next, we add three policy categories on social groups: *labour groups* (positive mentioning of working class and trade unions), *middle class and professional groups* (positive mentioning) and '*labour groups: negative*' (negative mentioning of working class and unions). We create a social-economic Left-Right position by combining the categories as ((market economy + middle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned economy + welfare + labour groups)). Hence, a higher score on this scale (-33.9 – 18.1) corresponds to a more rightist party position. Because our dependent variable consists of party groups instead of individual parties we constructed a weighted mean of this scale by party group for each election year. The weight of a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages¹⁴.

In similar vein we constructed the policy positions of party groups associated with conservative-progressive ideology. For this purpose we employ a scale construction procedure used by Keman and Pennings (2006) who use the total of five policy categories to measure the emphasis on progressive issues, and five categories to measure conservative issues. The progressive issues are: *anti-growth economy*, *national way of life: negative* (i.e. appeals to patriotism/nationalism), *multiculturalism: positive*, *traditional morality: negative* (i.e. opposition to traditional moral values) and *environmentalism: positive*. The conservative issues are: *social harmony* (e.g. need for society to see itself as united), *national way of life: positive*, *multiculturalism: negative*, *traditional morality: positive* and *middle class groups: positive*. We create a progressive position (progressive issues – conservative issues) which runs from conservative (-1.2) to progressive (18.0).

4.5 Analysis

To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we examine the bivariate association between social class and economic conservatism. Second, we model over time changes in class voting by employing multinomial logistic (MNL) regression analysis. Using figures we will present the odds ratios for voting old-left vs. liberal right and new-left vs. liberal right for all class categories (working class is reference). Third, we present the parameter estimates of more elaborate MNL models to formally test to what extent trends in class voting can be explained by the blurring of class boundaries and/or the 1989-GreenLeft merger. Finally, we use conditional logistic (CL) regression models¹⁵ to test whether party positions account for changes in class voting.

Figure 4.2 Economic conservatism regressed on social class (manual class is reference group) and year of survey assuming linear trends for the effect of social class



sig = linear trend effect significant at the 5% level. Economic conservatism is measured using three point scale in order to make 2006 as comparable as possible with 1971. (source: DPES 1971-2006)

4.5.1 The blurring of class boundaries

First, we investigate to what extent the ideological boundaries between classes are blurring. For this purpose we regressed economic conservatism on social

class including dummy indicators for the surveys. We assumed linear trends for the change of the class effects. In figure 4.2 we report the regression coefficients for the reference year 1971 and the calculated class effect for 2006 based on the linear trend.

Figure 4.2 shows a decrease in the association between class position and economic conservatism for all classes when compared to the manual class. However, this linear decrease is only significant at the 5% level for the higher technocrats and the lower social cultural specialists. In 2006 the associations between ideology and the (higher and lower) social cultural specialists or the routine non-manual class are not much different from the association between ideology and the manual class. As expected, both the higher and lower technocrats and the self-employed are clearly the most economic conservative classes in 2006, which illustrates the political difference of the technocrats and the social cultural specialists. In earlier work Van Wijnen (2000) concluded for the 1971-1998 surveys that there is no systematic difference over time in the association between *subjective* class orientation and the left-right ideology. Our results are different, and this difference in conclusions may be explained by our use of a detailed objective class measure, our use of more recent elections or a different measure of ideology.

4.5.2 Over-time changes in class voting

To analyze the changing class-vote association we employ MNL regression models. We concentrate on the contrasts between old-left vs. liberal right and new-left vs. liberal right parties. In this *unconstrained model* we add dummy indicators for each year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions between year-dummies and the class-groups. In figure 4.3 we first look at the odds ratios to vote for old-left vs. liberal right parties over time. Six class categories are distinguished: Four in the service class (higher and lower technocrats, higher and lower social-cultural specialists) and routine non-manual workers and the self-employed. The reference group in the analysis are people in the manual class. An odds ratio above 1 (ranging to infinite) indicates that the odds to vote old-left vs. liberal right are higher compared to the manual class. Odds ratios ranging between 0-1 indicate negative associations. In order to make the scale in figure 4.3 comparable for positive and negative association we present negative associations as $-(1/\text{odds ratio})$. We start with a comparison of the lower and upper service class, routine non-manual class and the self-employed relative to the working class. Figure 4.3a shows that the high service class is least likely to vote

Figure 4.3a Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as reference group)




Figure 4.3b Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as reference group)




Figure 4.4a Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as reference group)





Figure 4.4b Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as reference group)



old-left followed by the self-employed and low service class/ routine non-manual class, and that until 2002 the differences compared to the manual class decline. This indicates a process of class dealignment.

To illustrate how important changes in the occupational structure are for understanding changes in the class-vote relationship we disentangle the classes within the service class. In figure 4.3b we report the odds ratios for the higher technocrats, the lower technocrats and the lower cultural specialists vote left wing compared to the manual class. Due to a lack of a substantive number of cases for each year we do not report the higher social specialists. Figure 3b shows that until 1981 there was not much difference between the low technocrats and the lower social-cultural specialists relative to the manual class and these difference increases over time. After 1994 the lower social and cultural specialists are even more likely to vote for left-wing than the manual class, suggesting a process of class realignment although the differences with the manual class are very small. This shows that it becomes increasingly important to disentangle the service class in order to understand the evolution of class voting. With respect to the higher technocrats we see that they are far less likely to vote old-left relative to the manual class than the other classes in the service class. The differences between the lower and higher technocrats seem to have weakened since the 1970s and from 1989 onwards there is hardly any difference.

Next, in figure 4.4 we investigate the odds ratios of voting new-left versus liberal right. Figure 4.4a shows that in general the self-employed the least likely to vote new-left vs. liberal right, followed by the high service class, routine non-manual class and low service class. We clearly observe a process of convergence: All classes, especially the high service class are increasingly likely to cast a new-left vote relative to voting liberal right. From the mid-1990s there is hardly any difference between the working class and the low service class/ routine non-manual class. In 2006 manual class voters were very unlikely to vote for a new-left party, and therefore also the odds for the high service class to vote new-left vs. liberal right were higher compared to the manual class.

With respect to the sub-classes within the service class figure 4.4b shows a process of class dealignment, i.e.: The new-left/liberal-right voting behavior of the (higher and lower) technocrats is converging towards the voting behavior of the manual class. For the low-grade social and cultural specialists we observe a process of realignment. This class initially voted not that different from the manual class, but members of this class are increasingly more likely to cast a vote for a new-left party relative to casting a liberal-right vote. The odds ratio to vote new-left

vs. liberal right has reversed between the 1980s and 1990s and this evolution shows once again how important it is to distinguish this class within the service class.

4.5.3 Interpreting the decline of class voting

Next we formally test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in table 4.1. We present the MNL parameter estimates (b and s.e.) of voting old-left and new-left vs. liberal right. In our first model we allow the class effect to change linearly over time. Compared to a base model where the class-effects are fixed over years this *linear change model* yields a better model fit (decrease in -2LL of 72 against 18 degrees of freedom) and at the same time it is far more parsimonious than the *unconstrained model* shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4.

With respect to voting old-left vs. liberal right model I shows gradual decreases in class differences for almost all classes relative to the manual class. The negative main-effects of the class-year interactions indicate that in 1971 the odds of voting old-left rather than liberal right are lower for other classes compared to the manual class. In support of hypothesis 1 the significant positive interactions imply that the distinction between the manual class and all other classes for voting old-left versus a free market liberal party become less important each year. In 1971 the parameter estimate is -3.23 for the higher technocrats and this is -1.13 ($-3.23 + (35 * .06)$) in 2006. These effects indicate that in 1971 the odds for higher technocrats to vote old-left were about $(1/e^{-3.23})$ 25 times lower than the odds for the manual class, compared to about 3 times lower in 2006. For low-grade technocrats the odds respectively are about 8 ($1/e^{-2.03}$) and 2 ($1/e^{(-2.03+35*0.04)}$) times lower compared to the manual class in 1971 and 2006. Most remarkable is that - based on a linear trend - the odds for low-grade social-cultural specialists are 6 times ($1/e^{-1.77}$) lower than the odds for the manual classes in 1971, and they are about the same ($e^{(-1.77+35*0.06)} = 1.3$) in 2006.

We also observe gradual changes in class differences with respect to voting new-left versus liberal right. The differences between manual workers and the class of social and cultural specialists were relatively small in 1971. In the reference year, we find no significant difference in the odds to vote new-left between the low social and cultural specialists and manual class voters. With respect to the odds for high-grade social and cultural specialists we find that they were only about 2.5 times lower than the odds for manual class voters. Over time, social-cultural specialists become more likely to vote new-left rather than liberal right. Based on a linear trend we find support for hypothesis 1b - the odds for both high and low

Table 4.1 Multinomial logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference in the Netherlands, 1971-2006^(a)

	Model I				Model II			
	Old Left vs.		New Left vs.		Old Left vs.		New Left vs.	
	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.
Constant	2.57***	(0.17)	1.70***	(0.19)	3.45***	(0.20)	1.83***	(0.23)
Year (1971 = ref.)								
1972	-0.55***	(0.17)	-0.60***	(0.20)	-0.60***	(0.17)	-0.63***	(0.20)
1977	-0.43***	(0.16)	-0.96***	(0.19)	-0.59***	(0.17)	-1.03***	(0.20)
1981	-0.91***	(0.16)	-0.44**	(0.18)	-1.06***	(0.17)	-0.54***	(0.19)
1982	-1.27***	(0.16)	-1.57***	(0.19)	-1.43***	(0.17)	-1.69***	(0.20)
1986	-0.91***	(0.17)	-1.23***	(0.21)	-1.14***	(0.19)	-1.40***	(0.22)
1989	-0.79***	(0.18)	-0.64***	(0.21)	-1.09***	(0.20)	-0.84***	(0.23)
1994	-1.67***	(0.19)	-0.83***	(0.22)	-2.05***	(0.22)	-1.12***	(0.26)
1998	-1.60***	(0.21)	-1.21***	(0.24)	-2.11***	(0.25)	-1.56***	(0.29)
2002	-1.54***	(0.23)	-0.89***	(0.27)	-2.15***	(0.28)	-1.26***	(0.33)
2006	-1.18***	(0.25)	-2.12***	(0.31)	-1.89***	(0.34)	-2.69***	(0.40)
Age	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	0.003*	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
Gender (male=ref.)	0.17***	(0.06)	0.20***	(0.07)	0.08	(0.06)	0.19***	(0.07)
Social class (manual class = ref.)								
High technocrats	-3.23***	(0.21)	-2.21***	(0.26)	-2.55***	(0.23)	-2.08***	(0.27)
High social/cultural specialists	-2.16***	(0.46)	-0.90*	(0.48)	-0.91*	(0.48)	-0.74	(0.50)
Low technocrats	-2.03***	(0.19)	-1.13***	(0.22)	-1.64***	(0.19)	-1.05***	(0.23)
Low social/cultural specialists	-1.77***	(0.21)	-0.37	(0.23)	-1.03***	(0.23)	-0.23	(0.25)
Routine non-manual	-1.60***	(0.16)	-0.99***	(0.19)	-1.35***	(0.16)	-0.93***	(0.19)
Self-employed	-2.51***	(0.20)	-1.89***	(0.27)	-2.45***	(0.20)	-1.87***	(0.27)

Trend									
Year*high technocrats	0.06***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.06***	(0.01)	
Year*high s/c specialists	0.03*	(0.02)	0.05***	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)	
Year*low technocrats	0.04***	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	
Year*low s/c specialists	0.06***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	
Year*routine non-manual	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	
Year*self-employed	0.02*	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	
Bottom-up									
Education in years					-0.16***	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.02)	
Year*education in years					0.004***	(0.00)	0.002**	(0.00)	
Df	87				93				
-2LL	25418.4				25263.6				

(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=11,832

Table 4.1 Continued

	Model III				Model IV			
	Old Left vs.		New Left vs.		Old Left vs.		New Left vs.	
	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.	Liberal Right	s.e.
Constant	3.90***	(0.22)	2.25***	(0.25)	3.91***	(0.22)	2.28***	(0.25)
Year (1971 = ref.)								
1972	-0.60***	(0.18)	-0.63***	(0.20)	-0.60***	(0.18)	-0.64***	(0.20)
1977	0.32*	(0.18)	-0.20	(0.21)	0.31*	(0.19)	-0.23	(0.22)
1981	-0.04	(0.18)	0.43**	(0.20)	-0.06	(0.20)	0.36	(0.23)
1982	-0.16	(0.18)	-0.54**	(0.21)	-0.19	(0.21)	-0.61**	(0.24)
1986	0.03	(0.20)	-0.32	(0.24)	0.00	(0.25)	-0.43	(0.29)
1989	0.16	(0.22)	0.32	(0.25)	0.19	(0.23)	0.38	(0.26)
1994	-0.41	(0.26)	0.39	(0.28)	-0.39	(0.26)	0.41	(0.28)
1998	-0.68**	(0.29)	-0.25	(0.32)	-0.67**	(0.29)	-0.28	(0.32)
2002	-0.59*	(0.32)	0.14	(0.36)	-0.61*	(0.33)	0.08	(0.37)
2006	-0.45	(0.39)	-1.33***	(0.44)	-0.50	(0.41)	-1.45***	(0.47)
Age	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
Gender (male=ref.)	-0.14*	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.07)	-0.14**	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.07)
Social class (manual class = ref.)								
High technocrats	-2.17***	(0.24)	-1.74***	(0.28)	-2.20***	(0.25)	-1.84***	(0.29)
High social/cultural specialists	-0.74	(0.52)	-0.58	(0.53)	-0.80	(0.53)	-0.62	(0.54)
Low technocrats	-1.41***	(0.20)	-0.87***	(0.24)	-1.46***	(0.21)	-0.87***	(0.25)
Low social/cultural specialists	-0.89***	(0.24)	-0.11	(0.26)	-0.83***	(0.27)	-0.12	(0.29)
Routine non-manual	-1.27***	(0.17)	-0.85***	(0.20)	-1.32***	(0.19)	-0.90***	(0.22)
Self-employed	-2.38***	(0.22)	-1.77***	(0.28)	-2.33***	(0.23)	-1.75***	(0.30)

Trend														
Year*high technocrats	0.03***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.04*	(0.02)	0.09***	(0.02)						
Year *high s/c specialists	-0.01	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.02)	0.02	(0.03)	0.05	(0.04)						
Year*low technocrats	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)						
Year*low s/c specialists	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	(0.03)						
Year*routine non-manual	0.02**	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.02)						
Year*self-employed	0.02*	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.01)	0.01	(0.02)	0.02	(0.03)						
Bottom-up														
Education in years	-0.17***	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.02)	-0.17***	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.02)						
Year*education in years	0.01***	(0.00)	0.003*	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.002**	(0.00)						
Economic conservatism	-0.44***	(0.03)	-0.40***	(0.04)	-0.44***	(0.03)	-0.41***	(0.04)						
Year*economic conservatism	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)						
Top-down														
GreenLeft merger since 1989														
1989*high technocrats					-0.05	(0.45)	-0.98*	(0.50)						
1989*high s/c specialists					-0.68	(0.80)	-0.25	(0.80)						
1989*low technocrats					-0.47	(0.44)	0.09	(0.51)						
1989*low s/c specialists					0.13	(0.44)	-0.19	(0.48)						
1989*routine non-manual					-0.25	(0.34)	-0.31	(0.40)						
1989*self-employed					0.24	(0.48)	0.10	(0.59)						
df	99				117									
-2LL	23646.1				23627.2									

(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.
*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N=11,832

social-cultural specialists to vote new-left increase to about 2.5 times the odds for manual workers in 2006. In other words: class differences between social-cultural specialists and manual workers have increased in the period 1971-2006. With respect to other classes we find that the differences relative to the manual class decline over the same period. Based on a linear trend the difference to vote new-left versus liberal right for high and low-grade technocrats and the routine non-manual nearly disappeared in 2006.

In model II we account for years of education, and allow the effect of education to change over time. With respect to voting old-left versus liberal right we find that in 1971 more years of education suggested a rightist party choice (-0.16). But based on linear change in the education-vote association (0.004) this negative effect has nearly disappeared in 2006. With respect to voting new-left versus liberal right we find that since 1986 – 15 year after the reference year - more education is increasingly associated ($-0.03 + 15 \cdot 0.002$) with casting a vote on a new-left party. The findings supports hypothesis 3b about 'cultural voting', a high education is decreasingly associated with voting right-wing, and is increasingly associated with voting new-left. Controlling for education has the largest impact on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus liberal right. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the main-effects as well as the linear trends are lower when we control for education: In other words: Class voting is partially due to educational differences, and the differences in voting between the 'new' service classes and the working class are in part declining because the effect of education changed over time.

Model III includes the voters' economic conservatism. We expected that we could interpret class voting trends by accounting for the decline of ideological differences between voters. We therefore allow the effect of economic conservatism to linearly change over time. The improvement in fit is considerable (-2LL reduction of 1617.5 against 6 df). We only find partial evidence for hypothesis 2. With respect to voting old-left we find that the main-effects for class voting are somewhat weaker compared to model II, but the interaction coefficients are not substantially different. This indicates that although economic conservatism accounts for part of the class-vote association, it does not explain the linear trend in class voting. With respect to voting new-left we find that the interaction coefficients of lower social-cultural specialists and technocrats are no longer significant. This suggests that the decline in class voting between low-grade technocrats and the manual class is accounted for by economic conservatism, and that the former are about 2.5 ($1/e^{-0.87}$) times less likely than the latter to vote new-left vs. liberal right

throughout the whole period. For low-grade social-cultural specialists we initially found that the differences with the manual class were increasing over time. But controlled for economic conservatism low-grade social cultural specialists and manual workers are equally likely to vote new-left versus liberal right over the whole period. We thus find modest support with respect to hypothesis 2. Interestingly, we notice an increase of the impact of economic conservatism. In 1971 the effect of economic conservatism on voting old-left is -0.44 and this amounts to -0.8 ($-0.44 + (35 * -0.01)$) in 2006: i.e. for each step up on the economic conservatism scale one is 1.5 ($1/e^{-0.44}$) less likely to vote old-left in 1971 and this is 2.7 ($1/e^{-0.99}$) in 2006. Also with respect to voting new-left versus liberal right we find that economic conservatism is increasingly relevant to predict party choice. Therefore we have to refute hypothesis 3a.

In model IV we test the 'top-down' interpretation using the merging of the minor left-wing parties into the Green Party in 1989. To test whether the association between class and vote for old and new-left versus liberal parties shows an abrupt change after the 1989-election when GreenLeft came into existence we include interactions between class categories and a dummy that indicates the 1989-merger. The estimates however reveal that in general this merging has no influence on the class effects whatsoever. We only find that from 1989 onwards the higher technocrats are less likely to vote for new-left parties compared to the working class. Hence, we have to refute hypothesis 6. We do not find that the odds for the social cultural specialists supporting left parties increase after the formation of GreenLeft.

4.5.4 Party positions and the decline of class voting

Next we test hypothesis 4 stating that the decline of the association between social class and party choice becomes less strong when we take the ideological positions of parties into account. First, we look at the changes in the positions of parties between 1971 and 2002 with respect to social-economic issues and conservative vs. progressive issues. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data available for the Dutch 2006-elections. In Figure 4.5 we present the positions for the four party groups; old-left, new-left, liberal right and religious parties. Figure 4.5a reveals a process of convergence between the major party groups in the Netherlands with respect to social-economic issues. In the early 1970s there was a clear difference between the liberals and left-wing parties with respect to social-economic policy positions. During the 1970s and 1980s the ideological gap between party groups has evidently narrowed. The differences between the

Figure 4.5a Social-economic Left-Right positions of party groups in the Netherlands (1971-2002)





Figure 4.5b Conservative versus Progressive positions of party groups in the Netherlands (1971-2002)



Source: Comparative Manifesto Data (2001, 2006), own calculations

old-left and right are especially small in 1994. Figure 4.5b clearly shows that the new-left parties are the most progressive in the Dutch party system, and that the liberals are the most conservative. The figure suggests ideological convergence between parties with respect to conservatism vs. progressivism until 1986, but later we observe divergence on conservative versus progressive policy issues.

To estimate how party choice is affected by the ideological positions of the political parties we apply conditional logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). Like the MNL model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds ratios for multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. CL models are sometimes used in electoral studies to estimate whether party choice is conditional on characteristics of parties that vary across individuals, e.g.: the voter-party distance on particular issues (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). But it is also possible to examine characteristics of choice options that are constant across individuals, like product price in consumer behavior research (Lammers, Pelzer, Hendrickx and Eisinga 2007). In our analysis the individual-specific variables are the same variables as we used in the MNL models. The choice-specific variables are the positions of each party group on social-economic issues and conservative-progressive issues at each election. This way the CL model enables us to examine what happens when parties change their position on two political dimensions. We are primarily interested in the extent to which changing party positions are responsible for the decline in the class-vote relationship.

In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the structure of our dataset by 'stacking' the data matrix into a person-choice file. In a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This binary variable is used as the dependent variable. The four party groups which were the dependent contrasts in the MNL models, are now included as an independent variables. As dummy variables these party group indicators correspond with the intercept term of the MNL model (Hendrickx 2000). In our analysis the liberal-right parties are the reference category. Choice-specific variables are included using one parameter for the effect of each variable. The effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are modeled as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the individual-specific variables (cf. Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006).

In model I of table 4.2 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice-specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to the MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them

Table 4.2 Conditional logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference in the Netherlands, 1971-2002^(a)

Choice-specific variables	Model I			Model II		
	b	s.e.		b	s.e.	
Liberal Right (= ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Old Left	3.71***	(0.20)	4.14***	4.14***	(0.23)	(0.23)
New Left	1.88***	(0.22)	2.26***	2.26***	(0.25)	(0.25)
Religious	0.28	(0.21)	0.58**	0.58**	(0.23)	(0.23)
Social-economic L-R position *10			0.11***	0.11***	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conservative-Progressive Position * 10			-0.01	-0.01	(0.06)	(0.06)
Individual-specific variables						
	Old Left vs. Liberal Right	s.e.	Old Left vs. Liberal Right	New Left vs. Liberal Right	s.e.	New Left vs. Liberal Right
Year (1971 = ref.)	0.008	(0.01)	0.03**	0.01	(0.01)	0.02
Age	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.02***	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02***
Gender (male=ref.)	-0.15**	(0.07)	-0.05	0.08	(0.07)	-0.04
Social class (manual class = ref.)						
High technocrats	-2.39***	(0.26)	-1.63***	0.29	(0.26)	-1.59***
High social/cultural specialists	-0.60	(0.60)	-0.61	0.61	(0.59)	-0.62
Low technocrats	-1.46***	(0.21)	-0.93***	0.24	(0.24)	-0.89***
Low social/cultural specialists	-0.84***	(0.25)	-0.08	0.27	(0.25)	-0.08
Routine non-manual	-1.26***	(0.18)	-0.87***	0.21	(0.18)	-0.88***
Self-employed	-2.54***	(0.23)	-1.79***	0.29	(0.23)	-1.81***

Trend									
Year*high technocrats	0.05***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.02)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.02)	
Year*high s/c specialists	-0.01	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)	-0.01	(0.03)	0.04	(0.03)	
Year*low technocrats	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	
Year low s/c specialists	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	
Year*routine non-manual	0.02**	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	
Year*self-employed	0.04***	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.02)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.02)	
Bottom-up									
Education in years	-0.16***	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.17***	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.02)	
Year*education in years	0.004***	(0.00)	0.002*	(0.00)	0.005***	(0.00)	0.002*	(0.00)	
Economic conservatism	-0.33***	(0.03)	-0.38***	(0.04)	-0.32***	(0.03)	-0.39***	(0.04)	
Year*economic conservatism	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	
df	75		77						
-2LL	21501.0		21488.0						

(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right / Old Left vs. Religious / New Left vs. Religious not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N = 10.669

Table 4.2 Continued

Choice-specific variables	Model III		Model IV	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Liberal Right (=ref.)	-	-	-	-
Old Left	4.32***	(0.29)	4.3***	(0.23)
New Left	2.41***	(0.29)	2.46***	(0.25)
Religious	0.71***	(0.26)	0.65***	(0.23)
Social-economic L-R position * 10	0.16***	(0.06)	0.12***	(0.03)
L-R*high technocrats	0.09	(0.11)		
L-R *high s/c specialists	0.15	(0.26)		
L-R *low technocrats	-0.04	(0.10)		
L-R *low s/c specialists	-0.19*	(0.11)		
L-R *routine non-manual	-0.07	(0.09)		
L-R *self-employed	-0.18	(0.11)		
Conservative-Prog position *10	-0.01	(0.06)	-0.36***	(0.10)
Con-Prog*high technocrats			0.62***	(0.2)
Con-Prog *high s/c specialists			0.42	(0.38)
Con-Prog *low technocrats			0.46***	(0.18)
Con-Prog *low s/c specialists			0.75***	(0.18)
Con-Prog *routine non-manual			0.38***	(0.15)
Con-Prog *self-employed			0.35*	(0.21)
Individual-specific variables				
	Old Left vs. Liberal Right		Old Left vs. Liberal Right	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Year (1971 =ref.)	-0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Age	0.004	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
			New Left vs. Liberal Right	New Left vs. Liberal Right
			b	s.e.
			-0.01	(0.01)
			0.003	(0.00)
			0.02	(0.01)
			-0.02***	(0.00)

Gender (male=ref)	-0.14**	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.08)	-0.14**	(0.07)	-0.04	(0.08)
Social class (manual class = ref.)								
High technocrats	-2.06***	(0.47)	-1.34***	(0.43)	-2.61***	(0.27)	-1.95***	(0.31)
High social/cultural specialists	-0.07	(1.05)	-0.27	(0.87)	-0.73	(0.6)	-0.85	(0.61)
Low technocrats	-1.59***	(0.41)	-1.01***	(0.39)	-1.65***	(0.23)	-1.18***	(0.27)
Low social/cultural specialists	-1.46***	(0.46)	-0.58	(0.41)	-1.06***	(0.26)	-0.46	(0.28)
Routine non-manual	-1.52***	(0.35)	-1.09***	(0.32)	-1.42***	(0.19)	-1.11***	(0.22)
Self-employed	-3.18***	(0.45)	-2.31***	(0.42)	-2.69***	(0.24)	-2.01***	(0.31)
Trend								
Year*high technocrats	0.04**	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.02)
Year*high s/c specialists	-0.02	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)	-0.01	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)
Year*low technocrats	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Year low s/c specialists	0.05***	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.02)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.02)
Year*routine non-manual	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)
Year*self-employed	0.06***	(0.02)	0.05**	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)
Bottom-up								
Education in years	-0.17***	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.02)	-0.17***	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.02)
Year*education in years	0.004***	(0.00)	0.002*	(0.00)	0.005***	(0.00)	0.002*	(0.00)
Economic conservatism	-0.32***	(0.03)	-0.39***	(0.04)	-0.32***	(0.03)	-0.39***	(0.04)
Year*economic conservatism	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
df	83				83			
-2LL	21480.5				21464.9			

(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right / Old Left vs. Religious / New Left vs. Religious not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.
*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N=10.669

in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. We include the same individual-specific variables as in model III of table 4.1. Again we only present the parameter estimates for voting old-left versus liberal right and new-left versus liberal right. There are however two differences with the MNL models that we presented in table 4.1. First, because there are no CMP data available for 2006, we excluded this year from the analysis. Second, given that we aim to include choice-specific variables that vary between elections we are unable to include year-dummy indicators for each election. The linear class voting trends in model I are therefore somewhat different from model III in table 4.1: With respect to voting old-left vs. liberal right model I shows linear declines in class differences for almost all classes relative to the manual class. With respect to voting new-left versus liberal right we only find decline for the high-grade technocrats, routine non-manual class and self-employed.

In model II we include the choice-specific variables social-economic position and conservative-progressive position. The estimate for social-economic position is positive (0.11). This indicates that the more economically right-wing the position of a party group, the more likely that party group is to be chosen. Interestingly, the effect of the conservative-progressive position is not significant. This implies that *after accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model*, the traditional L-R position of parties – and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a significant impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. The relevance of the L-R party positions is supported by the fact that these results are controlled for economic conservatism of voters. Even though such a control is lacking for cultural conservatism there is no effect of conservative-progressive party position. Accounting for fact that people are inclined to vote for parties that are economically more right-wing has not reduced the effect of individual economic conservatism on voting old-left/liberal right or new-left/liberal right. Hence, we refute hypothesis 5.

Because party groups became closer towards each over time on social-economic issues this could have narrowed the differences between voting old/new-left versus liberal right. To test whether the inclusion of L-R party positions is capable of explaining the class voting trends we model interactions between the class dummy variables and the social-economic position of party groups. This way we test whether the effect of parties' L-R position varies between social classes, with the manual class as the reference. The results are reported in model III. We find that compared to the manual class, other classes are not more likely to vote for a party as it is economically more right-wing. With one exception we

find that voters from all social classes – including the manual class - prefer parties with a more rightist position. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists are more likely to vote for a party group with a more leftist position. By including these interactions we expected to explain the decline in class voting. Both old- and new-left parties largely moved to the centre of the Dutch party system since the 1970s. However, we still see strong trend effects for all classes in model III.

Next, we examine whether voters from different classes are more or less likely to vote for parties that are more progressive. In model IV we include interactions between social class and the conservative-progressive position of party groups. The main-effect is negative (-0.36). Keeping in mind that the manual class is the reference category, this indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by manual workers as it is more culturally progressive. The positive coefficients for the interaction estimates imply that the more progressive the position of a party group the more likely people in these classes will vote for that party group compared to the manual class. Differences in the effect of conservative-progressive party position are the largest between the manual class and the low-grade social cultural specialists. Although this clearly implies a top-down effect – i.e. political choice matters, we do not find strong evidence that changes in cultural positions of parties are able to account for the decline in class voting. As we observed in figure 4.5 especially new-left parties became much more culturally progressive after 1986. But, in contrast to hypothesis 4, both the old-left/liberal and new-left/liberal class voting trends are not explained any further by accounting for conservative-progressive party positions.

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter discussed changes in the class basis of voting in the Netherlands. It would be misleading if one assumes that only political parties change over time and that the cleavage structure remains fixed, or vice versa. There are strong indications that the class structure is changing in the Netherlands. We find that the rise of the 'new' class of social-cultural specialists is important in accounting for changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are clearly not only more right-wing, but the higher and lower social cultural specialists also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties, suggesting a process of realignment. Overall, the distinction between the manual class and other more traditional classes becomes less relevant over time for left-wing voting, i.e. a process of class dealignment.

We tried to interpret the decline of class voting by accounting for the blurring of the ideological boundaries between classes. We found that the differences between classes with respect to their economic ideology weakened over the last decades. But holding constant for voters' economic ideology could only partially interpret class voting differences and changes therein. Surprisingly, we find that the association between economic conservatism and voting has increased, although slightly, over time. This is surprising if one considers that an increasing number of non-economic, for example cultural, topics are included in the political discussion, and this would make economic ideology less relevant¹⁶. On the other hand, a low education is decreasingly associated with voting left-wing. Especially new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters with a high education. A cultural or cognitive explanation for the decline in class voting seems to apply: Education has the largest impact on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus liberal right. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the *level* and *decline* of the class effects are somewhat lower when we control for education. But after accounting for changes in the effect of educational differences and the blurring of ideological boundaries, the decline of class voting largely persists. We however cannot test whether the inclusion of a 'left-libertarian' or cultural progressive ideology would interpret class differences in voting new-left.

We tested whether, after accounting for social changes, political choices offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote relationship. Despite the fact we covered more elections after 1989 and used a more differentiated class schema than De Graaf *et al.*, we reached similar conclusions about the 'top-down' effect of the GreenLeft merger: There is no evidence that the downward trends in class voting were influenced by this political merger. Using conditional logistic regression we can conclude that after accounting for trends in class differences, economic ideology and level of education, the economic L-R position of parties – and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a significant impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. It is rather surprising that the extent to which voters favor parties with economically right-wing policies does not seem to vary between the manual class and other classes. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists tend to vote for parties that are economically left-wing. This seems to rule out the possibility that changing party positions on the economic dimension are responsible for the decline in class voting in the Netherlands. Regarding the cultural dimension however, we find that manual workers tend to favor conservative parties, whereas other classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural

specialists – prefer progressive parties. But strong evidence that changes in cultural positions of parties are able to account for the decline in class voting is however not found. Even though political parties seem to converge on the traditional left-right dimension, and diverge on 'new' political issues we were not able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for these political developments. Moreover, considering that changing class composition probably affects party strategy, one could raise the question on the causality of influence between social and political factors. We have demonstrated that there is a lot to gain by directly measuring political factors, and by investigating them simultaneously with individual factors. We found significant 'top-down' effects of party positions after accounting for the heterogenization of the service class and the blurring of economic class boundaries. Inquiries on the causal relationship between societal developments and party strategy are however beyond this study.

In this chapter we made progress by employing conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis. Conditional logistic models accommodate scientific improvement in the field of class voting research because the model allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. The CL model therefore has a crucial advantage over the multinomial logistic (MNL) model. In our analysis the individual-specific variables were used to test to what extent changes in the social background of the electorate were responsible for the decline in class voting. Simultaneously, we used information on party positions as choice-specific variables. This way we were able to examine what happens when parties change their position on various political dimensions. We showed that the CL model is suitable to determine which 'bottom-up' as well as 'top-down' factors influence the level of class-based voting. The conditional logistic model therefore not enables more stringent tests of 'top-down' theories, but it also facilitates the solution to an empirical problem in comparative research, i.e.: how to deal with the fact that party categories are not fixed over time. In the next chapter we explore possibilities of this model yet further in examining to what extent over-time variation in religious voting in the Netherlands is explained by both social changes and political choices.

Notes

- 11 Although we are aware that the LPF attracted 17% of the voters in the 2002 election, we do not include the LPF for two reasons. First, it is hard to determine to which of the political groups they belong. A separate category of far- and new right parties in order to examine whether the working class has abandoned the left to the advantage of the 'new right' does also not yield to a comparable category suitable for over-time analyses. Second, in this chapter we are especially interested in long term trends. Before the rise and fall of the LPF new- and far-right voting was a relatively minor phenomenon in Dutch politics; the extreme-right Centre Democrats (CD) only gained 0,9% and 2,4% of the votes in the 1989 and 1994 elections. In 2006 the PVV managed to draw support (5,9%) on an anti-establishment agenda against immigration and 'islamization'. Although the success of the PVV was accompanied by heavy losses for the PvdA and of course the idea of cultural voters pops up immediately, it is too early to examine whether the emergence of the PVV has a long-standing impact on the relationship between the working class and the classical left and in this study the 2006 election is the latest one


- 12 We do not present the estimates with religious parties as the reference category for reasons of parsimony. Results indicate that voters from all social classes are more likely to vote religious versus old-left relative to the manual class. But only for the low-social cultural specialists we find that this association is declining. Results for voting new-left versus religious parties indicate that – except for the self-employed and low-grade social-cultural specialists – class differences do not play a significant role in determining party choice.

- 13 Before 1989 the exact formulation of this question is slightly different. Especially, for the 1971 and 1972 surveys. In these surveys three answer categories were being used. We tried several recoding procedures to make the items comparable and all resulted in similar results. We recoded the 1971 and 1972 version into the seven point version by giving the lowest category a score of 0, the middle category a score of 3 and the highest category a score of 6.

- 14 Because the CMP data only includes so-called 'significant' parties not all parties in Dutch post-war electoral history are covered in the CMP dataset. Therefore, it must be noted that the Dutch Communist Party, Pacifist Socialist Party and Evangelical People's Party are not covered in the CMP data thus not included in calculating the old-left or new-left mean scores. On the liberal right-wing side this also applies to the Farmers Party and Middle Class Party.

- 15 We are aware that both MNL and CL models make the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), i.e.: adding or omitting a category of the dependent variable does not affect the odds of the initial or remaining alternatives. The IIA assumption can be relaxed using computationally more complex multinomial probit models (MNP) instead of MNL (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998; Long & Freese 2006). We decided not to use MNP models for three reasons. First, the tests commonly used to detect whether the IIA assumption is violated – the Hausman Test and the Small-Hsiao Test – both indicated that there is more evidence that IIA is not violated in our models than evidence for the opposite (see Appendix D). Second, the results of MNP models were are not substantially different from our MNL estimations. We used the stata program `ASMPROBIT` - alternative-specific multinomial probit (ASMP) – as an alternative for the CL model (Long & Freese, 2006). The CL models presented in this chapter were however too demanding to converge with ASMP estimation. Third, MNL models are often used to study electoral behavior and research has shown that for most applications the IIA assumption is neither relevant nor particularly restrictive (Dow & Endersby 2004). By applying CL models we follow a recent innovation in cleavage voting research (Elff 2009).


16 This finding might be influenced by differences in the way the question about 'income differences' that we used to measure economic ideology was phrased in the pre-1989-surveys, and in particular in 1971 and 1972. We have however no reasons to assume these differences are responsible for the increasing effect of economic ideology on voting. Also when we investigate shorter time trends (i.e. from 1981 or 1982 onwards) we find similar results with respect to the over-time effect of economic conservatism. However, when we investigate the 5 surveys from 1989 and later, which is only half of the original time period, we find no over-time change in the effect of economic conservatism on voting (neither linear nor year-specific changes).



Chapter 5 |

Religious Voting, Social Changes and Political Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006 *

* A shorter version of chapters 4 and 5 is forthcoming under the title 'The political evolution of class and religion: An interpretation for the Netherlands 1971-2006' in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.), *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Nan Dirk De Graaf and Ariana Need.



5.1 Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, religion has been one of the most dominant political divisions in the Netherlands. Dutch society was more segregated by religion than by class. In chapter 2 we established that religion strongly outweighed social class as a determinant of voting behavior in the Netherlands. The religious cleavage in the Netherlands involves not only the contrast between the religious and non-religious population, but predominantly divided Protestants and Catholics. Protestants affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church and Protestant Church can be distinguished from those who belong to more orthodox Calvinist churches (Janse 1985). A well-known outcome of the Dutch religious segmentation was the ‘pillarized’ political system. From the historical denominational fragmentation, the Dutch party system inherited separate political parties linked with different denominational groups. Religious-based voting has traditionally been high in the Netherlands because denominational parties largely draw support from specific religious groups. Consequently, religious people have always been more likely to cast a vote for a religious party than those without a religion.

Research shows that religious-based voting has declined in the Netherlands over the past decades (Eisinga, Felling and Franses 1997; Need 1997; Van der Kolk 2000; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; and chapter 2 of this thesis). This process matches the alleged ‘conventional wisdom’ (Dalton 2002) that traditional social divisions such as religion and social class are increasingly incapable to explain voting behavior in modern democracies. However, contrary to the widespread decline of the association between class and vote (Clark and Lipset 1991; Nieuwbeerta 1995), a universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically less obvious. Comparative studies have demonstrated evidence for relatively stable associations between religious divisions and party choice in Western European countries (Knutsen 2004; Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight increase of the effect of religion on voting in European Parliament elections (Van der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009). These findings may raise questions about recent changes in the course of the trend in religious voting in the Netherlands, they especially raise questions about the causes of this trend. The question that we aim to answer in this chapter is: *To what extent can changes in religious voting in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?*

If the influence of religion on political behavior of individuals is assumed to be declining due to sociological processes such as secularization and the growth of

individualism, this decline is assumed to be relatively gradual and unidirectional. Explanations for time-specific changes or potential (temporary) reversals in the associations between religion and vote must therefore be attributed to changes other than sociological developments. De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have examined the interaction between the available political options and the religious affiliation of voters. They demonstrated that there was an abrupt decline in religious-based voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). This finding supports the idea that political changes affect the religion-vote association. To understand over time variation in religious voting in the Netherlands we therefore derive explanations from two theoretical approaches borrowed from the class voting literature. In the introductory chapter of this thesis and in chapters 3 and 4, we have grouped perspectives on explanations in variations in class voting into two categories: Approaches that emphasize sociological factors related to the composition of classes and the relevance of class divisions in society, and approaches that mainly use political factors related to the extent to which parties appeal to voters on the basis of class differences (Evans 2000; Evans and Whitefield 2006).

The former, so-called 'bottom-up' approach uses social changes as a source of changes in political choices. Hypotheses about secularization often lay at the core of arguments predicting a decline of the religion-vote relationship (Broughton and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Knutsen 2004). Secularization, Manza and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of religion in the lives of individuals is declining, that the social and political influence of religious organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life by religious organizations is declining (2003: 300-301). On the one hand, secularization theory suggest a decline in the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of education and affluence causing voters to become less reliant on '*simple religious heuristics to govern all aspects of their lives, including how they vote*' (Manza and Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, declining levels of church attendance are assumed to weaken the capacity of churches to influence the voting behavior of their members. The traditional boundaries between different denominations and between those who are religious and those who are not have, is often assumed, become blurred. Consequently, not only the cultural, but also the political distinctiveness of religious groups has declined.

The implication of the secularization process is that changes in the social structure of societies produce changes in political choices, therefore shaping the

religion-vote relationship 'bottom-up'. Parties are considered to respond to changes in societal circumstances. In class voting research it is commonly held that due to the shrinking size of the working class politicians, socialists in particular, are more likely to seek support from the middle class, which in turn leads them to alienate themselves from the working class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In this view, the outcomes of party behavior are contributions to, and not mere reflections of, the evolution of political cleavages. From this 'top-down' perspective, Evans Heath and Payne (1999) for example explained that class voting in Britain declined between 1964 and 1997 as a result of the Labour Party's move to the centre of the party system. Kalyvas (1996) has translated this 'Dilemma of Electoral Socialism' to the consequences of the electoral strategy of confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, confessional parties gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature hindered Christian Democrats in successfully mobilizing non-religious voters. In order to maximize the numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize religion without destroying the confessional character of the party. This '*Confessional Dilemma*' induced Christian parties to redefine the position of religion in politics. In the late nineteenth century Christian Democrats broke their organizational dependence on the Church, and they reinterpreted their religious identity by replacing specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and abstract moral values (Kalyvas 1996: 242-244). Therefore, Kalyvas states that "*Confessional parties (...) contributed making religion less relevant for politics*" (Kalyvas 1996: 245). This contests a simple 'bottom-up' process. Paradoxically, Kalyvas remarks that by eroding their members' link to the church religious parties – once formed to bring religion back in society and politics – instead reinforced general secularization (1996: 256). A similar argument for the Dutch case is made by De Graaf *et al.* (2001) who argue that the merging of the major Catholic, Protestant and Calvinist parties in 1977 into a single Christian Democratic party has '*replaced specific linkages between denomination and party with a more diffuse relation*' (2001: 3). Rather than simply reflecting social changes, a 'top-down' perspective on cleavage voting suggests that changes in political choices may reinforce the blurring of religious boundaries.

In this chapter we simultaneously investigate two types of changes in political choices in the Netherlands. First, we re-address De Graaf *et al.*'s question about the extent to which the formation of the CDA led to sudden religious dealignment. Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the consequences of a more recent political merger in 2002; that of two minor

Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examine time-specific changes in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the party system (De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003; Hill and Leighley 1996). Second, following recent innovations in cleavage voting research (Oskarson 2005; Elff 2009), we include direct measures of party positions. We account for parties' moral traditionalism using the Comparative Manifesto Data (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). In doing so, we examine the interaction between denominational membership/church attendance and differences and changes in party positions.


We examine the effect of two forms of political change on the religious voting after accounting for the 'bottom-up' process of blurring religious boundaries. De Graaf *et al.* (2001) simply assume a process of blurring boundaries. In this research, instead of inferring societal homogenization between religious and irreligious voters based on gradual decline of religious voting, we formally tests to what extent trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church attendance and growing effects of education. Our hypotheses are tested using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006.

5.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the religious structure of the Netherlands

The considerable change in the Dutch religious structure in the past decades has already been mentioned. Figure 5.1 shows that the proportion of church members has fallen noticeably. It also reveals a more or less linear downward trend of both church attendance and church membership over a 35-year period. Total church membership dropped from 70% to 45% and regular church attendance (i.e. at least once a month) dropped from 39% to 18%. Using different data De Graaf and Te Grotenhuis (2008) showed that religious belief and belief in the supernatural declined as well. Figure 5.1 also shows that the decline in church membership runs more or less parallel for Catholics and Protestants, dropping from 37% and 23% in 1971 to 24% and 12% in 2006. The total membership of Calvinist groups constituted about 10% over the whole period.

Yet, the observed changes in the religious structures and secularization processes do not necessarily produce a decline religion-vote relationship. Manza and Wright (2003; 313) note that while church membership or church attendance may decline, levels of religious voting can remain stable among those who remain

Figure 5.1 Trend in church membership, church attendance and denomination in percentages between 1971 and 2006



Source: DPES 1971-2006

in church. The changes in the sizes of the different religious categories can be defined as compositional changes. We therefore need to distinguish compositional changes from the blurring of religious boundaries. Knutsen (2004: 99) writes that: "Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent-child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes toward authority, and acceptance of the state". Or, in other words, the ideology that connects religion and vote is cultural conservatism (Middendorp 1991). As said, the process of blurring boundaries will result in less distinctive denominational groups, culturally and socially. The decline of religious divisions is often attributed to the decrease of religious values and religious integration. Growing homogeneity between those who are religious and those who are not may have reduced a sense of shared identity and interest among members of religious denominations. We expect that the process of blurring religious divisions is unidirectional and relatively gradual leading to converging political behavior. We therefore expect that: *The association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes generally weaker (H1).*

Secularization involves that religious identity, beliefs and values may be reduced because church attendance is declining. Church attendance is important because, as integration theory (Durkheim 1879 [1967]) suggests, during religious rituals the norms of religious groups are not only transmitted but also confirmed. The more often people attend church the more their social, cultural and political values reflect the religious norms that are transmitted during religious services. Therefore, people who attend church frequently hold a more conservative ideology than infrequent attendees (Felling and Peters 1986; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Bosch 1999). We may expect that conservative religious values cause church attendees to vote for parties that stand for traditional moral values, which in the Netherlands are usually the confessional parties. But the cultural and normative boundaries between religious and irreligious voters may blur as the level of church attendance declines. Moreover, compared to earlier decades clergymen today may not only be less successful in enforcing religious norms but may also put emphasis on different values during religious services. A decline in the religion-vote relationship should therefore also show up in weaker religious integration, as indicated by less church attendance. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: *The association between church attendance and religious party choice becomes generally weaker (H2).*

A decline in the impact of church attendance on voting could explain why the association between denomination and religious party choice is weakening. We would assume that church members are attending church less frequently over time. Next to religious attendance we would also expect that conservative religious values, which are confirmed and transmitted during religious services, are of decreasing relevance for party choice. Aarts and Thomassen (2008), for example, have shown that value orientations over euthanasia was strongly associated with voting for the CDA in 1989, but that this association virtually disappeared in 2006. Questions on euthanasia and abortion are, unfortunately, not consistently available in the DPES surveys for the whole 1971-2006 period. We therefore cannot test to what extent changes in the impact of religious beliefs interpret the decline of the denomination-vote relationship. Hence, we only formulate a hypothesis about the extent to which changes in the impact of religious behavior affect the denomination-vote relationship: *The decline of the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes less strong when we take church attendance into account (H3)*

Another implication of the secularization process is associated with the rising levels of education in post-industrial societies. Because higher educated people

generally adhere to more individualistic and liberal norms than less educated they are less often religiously affiliated and more often leave their church (Need and De Graaf 1996). Higher educated church members are expected to have a less traditional world view than church members with a lower education. An increasing level of education may therefore blur the cultural boundaries between religious and irreligious voters. Our expectation is: *The decline of the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes less strong when we take education into account (H4).*

5.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands

5.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos

From the political perspective the religion-vote association is dependent on the nature of political appeals to the electorate (Evans and Whitefield 2006). In appealing to the growing number of secular voters, confessional parties may have deemphasized religious issues in their campaigns. By calling less attention to morality policies religious parties decrease the distinct political voice of particular religious groups. Studying election surveys from Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway Oskarson (2005) demonstrates that the levels of religious voting correlate with polarization regarding traditional values at the party level. She argues that: *“the impact of social cleavages on party choice will not only depend on how pronounced or widely spread the cleavages are, but also on how the parties relate to the cleavages present in the electorate”* (2005: 103). Other research on Western Europe (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) shows that regular church attendees favor parties with relative traditionalist positions, whereas non-churchgoers prefer parties with relative modern positions (Elff 2009). Assuming interactions between religious categories and the extent to which political parties are culturally conservative, we formulate: *Church members are more likely to vote for a party relative to non-church members as a party holds a more traditional moral position (H5a).* And: *The more individuals attend church the more likely they vote for a party as it holds a more traditional moral position (H5b).*

Following this line of reasoning, over time changes in the ideological position of parties may result in a decline or increase in the association between religion and vote. We expect that religious parties in the Netherlands will become less traditionalist over time. Keman and Pennings (2006) showed that political choices

with respect to economic dimension converge. This is due to many Social Democratic as well as Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, including those in the Netherlands, who have moved to the centre of party systems during the 1990s. Analogous to the move of Labor parties towards the centre due to the shrinking size of the manual class, we expect that religious parties have become less traditionalist because of the decline of church members. Discussing the position of Christian Democratic parties Keman and Pennings (2006: 110) write that: “[I]n trying to keep the median voter they apparently felt compelled in view of secularization and economic constraints to moderate their moral views and traditional values”. We thus expect that: *The decline of the association between denomination and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and changes into account with respect the positions of parties regarding traditional moral values (H6).*

5.3.2 Religious parties in the Netherlands.

After World War II there were three major religious parties in Dutch politics. The oldest one, the ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party) was founded in 1879. The ARP received strong support from Calvinists and other orthodox Protestants. A second political party for Protestants was founded in 1908 when the CHU (Christian Historical Union) split from the ARP. The CHU was orientated toward the Dutch Reformed Church and primarily received support from liberal Protestants (Van Holsteyn, Galen and Irwin 2000). The dominant religious party in the post-war period was the KVP (Catholic People’s Party) usually attracting around 30 percent of the votes. The KVP drew nearly all its support from Catholics. In the 1960s the votes for religious parties began to decline, and especially the CHU and KVP lost much support. Eventually, the KVP, CHU and ARP participated with a common list in the 1977 election and officially merged in a single party (CDA, Christian Democratic Appeal) in 1980 (cf. Ten Napel 1990; Pijnenburg 1994).

After the formation of the CDA other confessional parties, mainly appealing to orthodox Protestants, remained to exist in the Dutch party system. Although these minor ‘Re-reformed’ (*Gereformeerde*) parties (SGP, GPV, RPF) did not join the CDA, two of these parties (GPV and RPF) merged into the ChristianUnion in 2002. Both the SGP and ChristianUnion draw much less support than the CDA and especially with respect to cultural issues these parties are much more conservative. On economic issues the ChristianUnion takes a more leftist position than the CDA, and the label ‘minor right’ (*klein rechts*) that was used to summarize the CU-predecessors suffices no longer (Pellikaan 2002).

Our hypothesis about the effect of political restructuring takes a different form than does the 'bottom-up' hypothesis of general and gradual class and religious dealignment. We expect to find that, if political options have had any autonomous effect, the changes in the relationship between religion and vote will be more time-specific and more group-specific. First, following the study by De Graaf *et al.* (2001) we look for changes in the association between religion and vote after the formation of the common Christian Democrat party list in 1977. We assume that the links between specific denominations and the new CDA are less strong than the links with individual parties had been before. At the same time, we postulate that the CDA would be more successful in attracting non-religious people than before since it was less strongly associated with specific denominational connotations. As a result we expect the association between religion and vote to go down. Second, we look for changes in the religion-vote association after the formation of the ChristianUnion. Although we have less clear expectations about the merger of the two minor Protestant parties, we may expect that the new CU would appeal less to some orthodox Protestants partly because the party name no longer contains an explicit reference to either Protestantism or the Reformation. A denomination-neutral name and more left-leaning profile may also have made the party more attractive to non-Calvinists. Although the vote share of the CU and its predecessors has always been small we expect the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties to go down as a result of the party merger. Our hypothesis is: *The association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties shows an abrupt decline after the 1977 election when the CDA came into existence (H7a) and after the 2002 election when the CU came into existence (H7b).*

5.4 Data and measurements

To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. We use information on church membership, church attendance, party choice and some social background characteristics from the same 11 election surveys exploited in the previous chapter: (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 [N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). The combined dataset, after selection on valid information on the relevant variables,

contains respondents 16.129 respondents. Below we discuss the operationalization of our dependent and independent variables.

Party choice: In all election surveys respondents were asked “Did you vote in the parliamentary elections on [date]?”. Provided that the respondent answered ‘yes’ the subsequent question was asked “Which party did you vote for?”. In the larger part of the analysis we use a dichotomous dependent variable to estimate binary logistic regression of voting for a religious party (CDA, KVP, ARP, CHU, RKNP, RPF, GVP, CU, SGP) versus all other parties (1/0). In the final part of the analysis we employ conditional logistic regression, here we distinguish between four major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf *et al.* (2001) classification. Next to a category for religious parties we combine parties of the *old-left* (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), *new-left* (D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) and *liberal right* (VVD, BP, NMP). Consult appendix A.3 for party names. The rearrangement of the data, required to fit the conditional logistic model, together with the model specification and estimation procedure, are discussed later.

Religion: Religious denomination of the respondent is measured using a question whether respondents consider themselves a member of a particular church or religious community: We distinguish between respondents without a religious affiliation, Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists and those with another religion. In our analyses the ‘non-members’, those without a religious affiliation, are the reference category.

Education: We measure the educational level of the respondent as the number of years it normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational categories in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of Ganzeboom and Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 6 year for complete primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university education.

Church attendance: Respondents were asked how often they attended religious services: (1) at least once a week; (2) 2 or 3 times a month; (3) once a month; (4) several times a year; (5) Never. We coded church attendance such that a high score refers to more attendance (0-4).

Party positions: To determine the position of religious parties we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in (‘quasi-’) sentences in a program, are classified in 56 policy categories. With regard to the position of parties regarding

cultural conservatism we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on positive statements about 'traditional morality'. This item was measured as the number of 'quasi-sentences' as a percentage of the total manifesto text dedicated to '*favourable mention of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability of family, and religion*'. Because our dependent variable consists of party groups instead of individual parties we constructed a weighted mean of this scale by party group for each election year. The weight of a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages. Because the CMP data only includes 'significant' parties not all parties in Dutch post-war history are covered. Therefore, the positions of minor religious parties (RPF, GVP, SGP)¹⁷ are not included in calculating the position of the religious party group on the traditional morality scale.

5.5 Analysis

To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we examine the association between denominational membership and church attendance. Second, we show the over time results of the denomination-vote relationship. For this purpose we employ logistic regression with a binary dependent variable contrasting religious parties versus other parties. The results of this model will be presented in figures as odds ratios for religious groups to cast a religious vote relative to the unaffiliated. Third, we present the parameter estimates of multivariate logistic regression models to formally test to what extent declining trends in religious voting are accounted for by 'bottom-up' changes (declining effect of church attendance, increasing effect of education) and/or 'top-down' changes in the party structure (CDA merger in 1977, CU merger in 2002). Finally, we use conditional logistic regression models to test to what extent changes in traditionalist party positions account for changes in religious voting.

5.5.1 Denomination and church attendance

First, we investigate part of the 'bottom-up' explanation for the decline of religious voting which assumes that the association between denomination and church attendance has declined. In table 5.1 we present the mean levels of church attendance broken down by denomination for 1971 and 2006. Table 5.1 suggests a clear pattern of convergence between the non-members and other denominations

in the mean level of church attendance. For all denominations church attendance is lower in 2006 compared to 1971. For Catholics the average church attendance even becomes about half the size, dropping from 3.1 in 1971 to 1.5 in 2006. Also the mean attendance of Protestants, Calvinists and those with another religion is significantly lower in 2006 compared to 1971. The differences between religious groups decrease as well: as indicated by the F-statistics (between-group variance / within group variance) differences between religious groups are lower in 2006 compared to 1971. In general the association between church attendance and denomination becomes weaker. This supports the idea that the association between church membership and the church attendance declines.

Table 5.1 Mean church attendance (0-4) by religious group in 1971 and 2006

Religious group	1971			2006			1971 vs. 2006
	N (%)	Mean	s.d.	N (%)	Mean	s.d.	Compare means ^(a)
Non-members	743 (29.8)	0.00	0.00	1424 (54.3)	0.00	0.00	n/a
Catholic	886 (35.5)	3.14	1.16	629 (24.0)	1.51	1.14	-1.63***
Protestant	528 (21.2)	2.36	1.27	316 (12.1)	1.90	1.70	-0.46***
Calvinist	226 (9.1)	3.51	1.03	100 (3.8)	2.55	1.88	-0.96***
Other religion	112 (4.5)	2.55	1.27	153 (5.8)	2.22	1.83	-0.33*
Total	2495 (100)	2.05	1.70	2622 (100)	0.82	1.41	-0.64***
F-test (all religious groups)		1193 ***		557 ***			
F-test (excl. non-religious)		71.1 ***		18 ***			

Source: DPES 1971 and 2006 ; *p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01

(a) T-test for equality of means


5.5.2 Denominational groups, church attendance and voting confessional

Next we show the overtime results of the denomination-vote relationship. We present the results of logistic regression analyses regressing religious voting on dummy-variables for Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, and those having another religion. The reference group in the analysis consists of those without a denomination. To allow over time changes we add dummy indicators for each year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions between year-dummies and the religious groups. In figure 5.2a we present for each denomination for each year the odds ratio of voting for a religious party versus any other party as opposed to the non-members.

It is clear that the odds of casting a religious vote are highest for Calvinists followed by Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion. In 1972, the odds of Calvinists voting for a religious party versus any other party were 172 times the odds of the non-members voting for a religious. For Catholics and Protestant and those with another religion the 1972-odds of voting religious were respectively 30, 15 and 11 times higher compared to the non-members. There has been a strong decline of the denomination-vote relationship after the 1970s. The odds that Calvinists will vote for a religious party, although peaking again in 1998, eventually dropped to 30 times higher as opposed the odds of non-members in 2006. The odds of Catholics and Protestants casting a religious vote relative to the non-members dropped from respectively 30 and 15 in 1972 to 8 in 1986. From 1986 onwards there is hardly any difference left relative to the non-members between Protestants and Catholics. Together with the other religious people their odds to cast a religious vote are about 4 to 10 times higher compared to the non-members throughout the 1986-2006 period.


Figure 5.2b shows that almost the whole trend can be interpreted by taking church attendance into account (note that we reduced the y-axis by a factor 5). Since the association of church attendance with religious voting declined over time (see table 5.2) we allowed church attendance to change linearly over time. The results indicate that, accounting for a declining effect of church attendance, the odds of Catholics to vote for a religious party are about the same in 1971 and 2006 (about 2 times higher compared to the non-members). The odds of Protestants are even about two times higher in 2006 than in 1971. In 1972 the odds of Calvinists to cast a religious vote are about 16 times higher compared to the non-members. In 1986 this odds ratio drops to about 3, but again rises to 25 in 1998 and 12 times in 2006. We conclude that the decline of church attendance and therefore religious disintegration among church members is almost fully

Figure 5.2a Uncontrolled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as reference group)



Source: DPES 1971-2006

Figure 5.2b Controlled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as reference group)



Source: DPES 1971-2006

responsible for the decline in and for the convergence of religious-based voting. However, religious disintegration is not able to interpret the alleged increase in religious voting between 1986 and 1998.

To get more insight in the changes and to test our hypotheses formally we present several logistic regression models. In our first model in table 5.2 we tested for over time changes in the association between denomination and party choice. To get a parsimonious model we allow each denomination parameter to vary linearly over time. With 1971 as a baseline all religious groups are significantly and substantially more likely to cast a confessional vote than those without a denomination. The odds to vote for a confessional party in contrast to the non-members are ($e^{3.28}$) 26 times higher for Catholics, 9 times higher for Protestants, 97 times higher for Calvinists and 5 times higher for other religious groups. However, there are clearly time-interaction effects for all denominations, with the strongest linear decline for the Catholics and the Calvinists. Between 1971 and 2006 the odds that Catholics will vote for religious parties relative to the non-members fell from 26 to about 5 ($e^{3.28 - (35 * .05)}$). There is an even stronger decline for Calvinists. In 1971 the odds for Calvinists to vote for a confessional party were 97 times higher than for unaffiliated voters, but this becomes ($e^{4.58 - (35 * .04)}$) 24 times in 2006. These results support hypothesis 1. Compared to earlier research of De Graaf *et al.* (2001), that covered fewer elections and did not find any linear trend for Protestants, we now find a linear decline in religious voting for all major denominational groups.

In model II we add the 'bottom-up' changes to the model. We expected that social changes would be able to interpret the decline of the association between denomination and vote. We include variables for education in years and church attendance, and allow these effects to vary linearly over time. With respect to church attendance model II demonstrates two things: First, the effect of church attendance gradually declines (-0.01), supporting hypothesis 2. Second, the decline of the church attendance-vote association largely interprets the decline of the denomination-vote association, which supports hypothesis 3. Accounting for church attendance model II shows that the odds for all religious groups to cast a vote on a religious party relative to unaffiliated voters have fallen. With 1971 as a baseline the odds for Catholics fall to 2 ($e^{0.72}$), for Protestants to nearly 1, and for Calvinists to 5.5. Voters having another religion are even less likely to vote for a confessional party. Moreover, the decline for the effects of being Catholic and being Calvinist, relative to the non-members are also not significant anymore. Interestingly, when controlling for the effect of church attendance we find that, for

Table 5.2 Logistic regression for voting religious parties versus all other parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2006

	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Constant	-3.29***	(0.12)	-2.86***	(0.15)	-3.45***	(0.16)	-2.98***	(0.18)
Year (1971 = ref.)								
1972	-0.18**	(0.09)	-0.05	(0.10)	-0.22**	(0.09)	-0.09	(0.11)
1977	0.03	(0.10)	0.10	(0.11)	0.43**	(0.19)	0.45**	(0.20)
1981	0.15	(0.10)	0.23**	(0.11)	0.45**	(0.18)	0.48**	(0.19)
1982	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.05	(0.12)	0.16	(0.18)	0.18	(0.19)
1986	0.52***	(0.11)	0.56***	(0.13)	0.70***	(0.17)	0.68***	(0.19)
1989	0.65***	(0.12)	0.76***	(0.14)	0.78***	(0.17)	0.83***	(0.19)
1994	-0.01	(0.13)	-0.17	(0.16)	0.02	(0.19)	-0.23	(0.21)
1998	0.04	(0.14)	-0.21	(0.17)	-0.01	(0.20)	-0.36	(0.22)
2002	0.73***	(0.15)	0.52***	(0.18)	0.96***	(0.18)	0.72***	(0.21)
2006	1.12***	(0.15)	1.01***	(0.21)	1.30***	(0.18)	1.13***	(0.23)
Age	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Gender (male=ref.)	0.06	(0.04)	-0.02	(0.04)	0.06	(0.04)	-0.02	(0.04)
Denomination (non-members=ref.)								
Catholic	3.28***	(0.11)	0.72***	(0.15)	3.42***	(0.17)	0.73***	(0.21)
Protestant	2.24***	(0.12)	0.18	(0.15)	2.44***	(0.18)	0.34*	(0.21)
Calvinist	4.58***	(0.16)	1.72***	(0.20)	5.02***	(0.23)	2.19***	(0.27)
Other religion	1.70***	(0.20)	-0.60**	(0.24)	1.74***	(0.20)	-0.61**	(0.24)

Trend									
Year*Catholic	-0.05***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	
Year*Protestant	-0.01*	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	
Year*Calvinist	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.06***	(0.02)	
Year*Other religion	-0.01	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	
Bottom-up									
Education in years			-0.07***	(0.01)			-0.07***	(0.01)	
Year*education in years			0.00***	(0.00)			0.00***	(0.00)	
Church attendance			0.84***	(0.03)			0.85***	(0.03)	
Year*church attendance			-0.01***	(0.00)			-0.01***	(0.00)	
Top-down									
CDA merger since 1977									
1977*Catholic					-0.46**	(0.23)	-0.35	(0.24)	
1977*Protestant					-0.73***	(0.25)	-0.80***	(0.27)	
1977*Calvinist					-1.11***	(0.33)	-1.42***	(0.35)	
CU merger since 2002									
2002*Catholic					-0.43**	(0.21)	-0.54**	(0.22)	
2002*Protestant					-0.67***	(0.24)	-0.80***	(0.26)	
2002*Calvinist					-0.32	(0.32)	-0.62**	(0.34)	
Df	20	24	26	30					
-2LL	15699.2	14159.4	15680.8	14131.6					

*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=16,129

Protestants, their denomination becomes now increasingly important, i.e.: up to an odds ratio of $(e^{0.18 + (35 * 0.03)})$ about 3.5 in 2006. Model II therefore suggests that the extent to which church members attend religious services is of decreasing importance for voting confessional. This largely interprets the decline in religious voting for Catholics, Protestants and Calvinists. Being a Protestant relative to having no religious affiliation becomes more important for casting a vote on a religious party between 1971 and 2006.

The negative main-effect of education indicates that the odds that one votes for a religious party in 1971 are about 7 percent $(1/(e^{-0.07}))$ lower after each year of education. The positive year*education interaction suggests that the effect of education becomes less strong over time. The positive main-effect of church attendance shows that in 1971 the odds of voting for a religious party are higher as one attends church more often. The negative year*church attendance-interaction implies that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. Although both the effects of education and church attendance are significant it is largely church attendance that accounts for the decline in religious voting. When we estimate model II without church attendance the effects of the year*denomination interactions are the same as in model I. Hypothesis 4, stating that the decline of the association between denomination and party choice becomes less strong when we take education into account, is refuted.

In model III we test the political change hypotheses 7a and 7b. To test whether the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties shows an abrupt decline after the 1977-election when the CDA came into existence we include an interaction between denomination and a dummy that indicates the 1977-merger of the three main religious parties. This way we test whether there was an abrupt decline in confessional voting which coincides with formation of the CDA (cf. De Graaf *et al.* 2001). We also included an interaction between denomination and a dummy indicating the 2002-election when the ChristianUnion was formed of out the merger of two minor Protestant parties. In support of hypothesis 7a the estimates indeed show that compared to non-members the 1977 CDA-merger seems to be responsible for a decline in confessional voting for the Catholics $(e^{-0.464})$, Protestants $(e^{-0.732})$ and Calvinists $(e^{-1.108})$. That is, after the CDA-merger the odds for Catholics voting for a religious party fell to sixty percent of their pre-1977 level, whereas the odds for Protestants fell to about a half and the odds for Calvinists to a third of their original level. The 2002-interactions suggest that there was also an abrupt decline in religious voting for Catholics and Protestants after the 2002-election. Also after 2002 the odds to

vote for a religious party fell to about sixty percent ($e^{-0.432}$) of their level before 2002 for Catholics, and to about a half for Protestants ($e^{-0.674}$). The 2002-elections did not affect the odds of voting confessional for Calvinists.

In model IV we include the 'bottom-up' changes (i.e. education, church attendance) and 'top-down' changes (i.e. party mergers) simultaneously. The results indicate that accounting for both types of changes the gradual decline of the association between denomination and vote is accounted for, but abrupt decreases associated with political changes remain. We find that the odds to vote confessional for all major denominations even gradually increase in the period 1971-2006, but show sudden decreases after 1977 (for Protestants and Calvinists) and 2002 (for all denominations). It is however unlikely that the full decline of religious voting in 2002 can be attributed to the CU-merger. Votes for the ChristianUnion (and its predecessors) only cover a small share of the total votes for religious parties. And given the Protestant identity of the party we would not expect that the merger affected the odds of casting a religious vote for Catholics. Moreover, the 2002-elections were heavily influenced by the parliamentary entrance of another newcomer, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). But although the rise of the LPF caused massive shifts among the electorate, it is also unlikely to be primarily responsible for the abrupt decline in religious voting in 2002. There is no obvious relationship between specific denominations and voting LPF¹⁸. Moreover, research on the Dutch 2002 elections has shown that people who frequently attend church were even less likely to vote for the LPF than those never attend church (Van der Brug 2003; Lubbers 2007). It is therefore not plausible that the decline in the religion-vote association was caused by religious voters that moved away from confessional parties to the LPF. This model supports the idea that after accounting for social changes and party mergers, there may be other political factors that affect religious voting despite the weakening of religious integration and the '*depillarization*' of the party system. In other words: Accounting for church attendance perhaps interprets much of the decline in religious voting, and party mergers may explain sudden decreases in religious voting. But these factors leave unexplained why the odds to vote for a religious party for all denominational groups now increase over time.

5.5.3 Religious voting and party positions

Next, we test another version of the 'top-down' approach by including the changes and differences in positions of political parties. First we look at the changes in the emphasis on traditional values in the manifestos of political parties between 1971

Figure 5.3a Emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos by political party groups in the Netherlands





Figure 5.3b Controlled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as reference group) and the emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos of religious parties



Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (2001, 2006)

and 2002. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data available for the Dutch 2006-elections. In Figure 5.3a we not only present the positions regarding traditional morality for religious parties, but we also show the positions of the Dutch liberals, left-wing parties, and new-left parties. Figure 5.3a shows that religious parties decreasingly mention issues on traditional morality in their manifestos since the 1970s, but only until 1982. There is hardly any variation among the other political parties over time¹⁹. After 1982 the traditional values become more salient again in the party programs of religious parties. The common perception that the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands adjusted their party program to the changing religious structure of society by de-emphasizing traditionalist issues is therefore not supported by the pattern in figure 5.3. It seems that the traditionalist position of the religious party group in 2002 is at about the same level as in 1972.

In figure 5.3b we overlay the manifesto-pattern for religious parties with the patterns in religious-based voting as reported in figure 5.2b (viz., controlled for the linearly declining effect of church attendance). We clearly observe that for Calvinists variation in the odds ratios to vote for a religious party relative to unaffiliated voters follows a very similar pattern as the emphasis on traditional values in the manifestos of religious parties. Also the increase of religious voting from 1986 onwards for Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion seems to coincide with an increase of the salience of traditionalist issues in religious party programs. Because we are analyzing the odds to cast a religious vote relative to the non-members this figure suggests that the manifesto positions may especially influence those without a denomination. The more religious parties emphasize issues related to traditional moral values the less non-members may be inclined to vote for these parties relative to votes with a religious affiliation, causing the odds ratios to increase. These results seem to confirm the 'Confessional Dilemma' of Christian Democratic parties.

To formally test hypotheses 5(a and b) and 6 about the differences and changes in party positions regarding traditional values we apply conditional logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). In order to employ CL estimation it is required to use a multi category dependent variable, similar to multinomial logistic (MNL) regression. Next to religious parties we therefore distinguish between three other major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf *et al.* (2001) classification: the *old-left* (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), *new-left* (D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) and *liberal right* (VVD, BP, NMP). Respondents voting for another party are now excluded from the analysis (N=13.569). Like a MNL model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds ratios for

Table 5.3 Conditional logistic regression for voting religious vs. old left, new left and liberal right parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2002

Party-specific variables	Model I					
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Old Left	ref.		2.26***	(0.15)	2.51***	(0.14)
New Left	-2.26***	(0.15)	ref.		0.25	(0.17)
Liberal	-2.51***	(0.14)	-0.25	(0.17)	ref.	
Religious	-2.97***	(0.16)	-0.71***	(0.18)	-0.46***	(0.17)
Emphasis on traditional morality						
Individual-specific variables	Religious vs.					
	Old-Left		New Left		Liberal	
Year (1971 =ref.)	0.04***	(0.01)	-0.02***	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)
Age	0.01***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Gender (male=ref.)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.21***	(0.06)	0.04	(0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)						
Catholic	0.78***	(0.19)	-0.05	(0.23)	0.00	(0.21)
Protestant	0.16	(0.18)	0.28	(0.24)	-0.50**	(0.21)
Calvinist	2.49***	(0.33)	1.15***	(0.34)	1.65***	(0.39)
Other religion	-0.63**	(0.28)	-0.76***	(0.34)	-1.48***	(0.30)
Trend						
Year*Catholic	0.01	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)
Year*Protestant	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)
Year*Calvinist	0.03	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)
Year*Other religion	0.03**	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)
Bottom-up						
Education in years	0.07***	(0.02)	-0.13***	(0.02)	-0.14***	(0.02)
Year*education in years	-0.003***	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002***	(0.00)
Church attendance	0.90***	(0.04)	0.77***	(0.05)	0.83***	(0.05)
Year*church attendance	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
Top-down						
CDA merger since 1977						
1977*Catholic	0.01	(0.14)	0.87***	(0.18)	0.08	(0.17)
1977*Protestant	0.08	(0.18)	0.07	(0.27)	-0.09	(0.20)
1977*Calvinist	-0.62	(0.43)	-0.58	(0.41)	-0.85*	(0.47)
df	57					
-2LL	29456.4					

*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659

RELIGIOUS VOTING, SOCIAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006

Model II					
b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
ref.		2.25***	(0.15)	2.49***	(0.14)
-2.25***	(0.15)	ref.		0.24	(0.17)
-2.49***	(0.14)	-0.24	(0.17)	ref.	
-2.84***	(0.16)	-0.59***	(0.19)	-0.34*	(0.18)
-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)

Religious vs.					
Old-Left		New-Left		Liberal	
0.04***	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
0.01***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
-0.02	(0.05)	-0.20***	(0.06)	0.05	(0.06)
0.89***	(0.19)	0.08	(0.23)	-0.11	(0.22)
0.29	(0.19)	0.41	(0.25)	-0.37*	(0.21)
2.61***	(0.33)	1.26***	(0.35)	1.78***	(0.40)
-0.63**	(0.28)	-0.77**	(0.34)	-1.48***	(0.30)
0.02*	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)
0.03***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)
0.03	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.04*	(0.02)
0.03**	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)
0.07***	(0.02)	-0.14***	(0.02)	-0.15***	(0.02)
-0.002***	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002***	(0.00)
0.90***	(0.04)	0.77***	(0.05)	0.83***	(0.05)
-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
-0.23	(0.16)	0.61***	(0.20)	-0.16	(0.18)
-0.16	(0.19)	-0.19	(0.27)	-0.33	(0.22)
-0.87**	(0.43)	-0.3**	(0.41)	-1.11**	(0.47)

58
29438.7

Table 5.3 Continued

Party-specific variables	Model III					
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Old Left	-		2.24***	(0.15)	2.47***	(0.14)
New Left	-2.24***	(0.15)	-		0.23	(0.17)
Liberal	-2.47***	(0.14)	-0.23	(0.17)	-	
Religious	-2.72***	(0.17)	-0.48**	(0.19)	-0.25	(0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality	-0.19***	(0.04)	-0.19***	(0.04)	-0.19***	(0.04)
Traditional morality* Catholic	0.11***	(0.05)	0.11***	(0.05)	0.11***	(0.05)
Traditional morality * Protestant	0.19**	(0.06)	0.19**	(0.06)	0.19**	(0.06)
Traditional morality * Calvinist	0.18***	(0.08)	0.18***	(0.08)	0.18***	(0.08)
Traditional morality * Other	0.19***	(0.08)	0.19***	(0.08)	0.19***	(0.08)
Traditional morality * Church att.						
Individual-specific variables	Religious vs.					
	Old-Left		New Left		Liberal	
Year (1971 = ref.)	0.05***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Age	0.01***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Gender (male = ref.)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.21***	(0.06)	0.04	(0.06)
Denomination (non-members = ref.)						
Catholic	0.81***	(0.21)	0.00	(0.24)	0.05	(0.23)
Protestant	-0.06	(0.23)	0.08	(0.28)	-0.68***	(0.24)
Calvinist	2.30***	(0.39)	0.99**	(0.41)	1.51***	(0.44)
Other religion	0.81***	(0.21)	-0.95***	(0.35)	-1.65***	(0.32)
Trend						
Year*Catholic	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)
Year*Protestant	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.03**	(0.01)
Year*Calvinist	0.01	(0.02)	0.05**	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)
Year*Other religion	0.02	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.02)	0.05***	(0.02)
Bottom-up						
Education in years	0.07***	(0.02)	-0.14***	(0.02)	-0.15***	(0.02)
Year*education in years	-0.003***	(0.00)	0.001*	(0.00)	0.003***	(0.00)
Church attendance	0.90***	(0.04)	0.77***	(0.05)	0.83***	(0.05)
Year*church attendance	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
Top-down						
CDA merger since 1977						
1977*Catholic	-0.25	(0.17)	0.60***	(0.21)	-0.18	(0.19)
1977*Protestant	0.09	(0.22)	0.07	(0.3)	-0.08	(0.24)
1977*Calvinist	-0.65	(0.48)	-0.61	(0.47)	-0.89*	(0.52)
df	62					
-2LL	29424.3					

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N=13.659

RELIGIOUS VOTING, SOCIAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006

Model IV					
b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
-		2.25***	(0.15)	2.49***	(0.14)
-2.25***	(0.15)	-		0.24	(0.17)
-2.49***	(0.14)	-0.24	(0.17)	-	
-2.81***	(0.16)	-0.56***	(0.19)	-0.32*	(0.18)
-0.10***	(0.03)	-0.10***	(0.03)	-0.10***	(0.03)
0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Religious vs.					
Old-Left		New-Left		Liberal	
0.04***	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
0.01***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
-0.02	(0.05)	-0.20***	(0.06)	0.05	(0.06)
0.90***	(0.19)	0.08	(0.23)	0.12	(0.22)
0.29	(0.19)	0.42*	(0.25)	-0.36*	(0.21)
2.61***	(0.33)	1.29***	(0.35)	1.78***	(0.4)
-0.62**	(0.28)	-0.75**	(0.34)	-1.47***	(0.30)
0.02*)	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)
0.03***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)
0.03	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)
0.03**	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)
0.07***	(0.02)	-0.14***	(0.02)	-0.15***	(0.02)
-0.003***	(0.00)	0.001*	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)
0.88***	(0.05)	0.75***	(0.06)	0.81***	(0.05)
-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
-0.21	(0.15)	0.63***	(0.19)	-0.15	(0.18)
-0.15	(0.19)	-0.18	(0.27)	-0.32	(0.21)
-0.84*	(0.43)	-0.80*	(0.41)	-1.07*	(0.47)
59					
29437.8					

multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. In our analysis the individual-specific variables are the same variables that we used in the binomial logistic models. The choice-specific variable is the emphasis of each party group on traditional moral issues at each election. This way the CL model enables us to examine what happens as parties take a more traditionalist position. We are primarily interested in whether changing party positions are responsible for changes in the religion-vote relationship.

In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the structure of our dataset by 'stacking' the data matrix into a person-choice file. In a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This binary variable is used as the dependent variable in the CL model. The four-category party group variable, usually the dependent variable in the MNL models, is now included as an independent variable (Hendrickx 2000). As dummy variables these party group indicators correspond with the intercept term of the MNL model. The emphasis on traditional morality is included using one parameter. The effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are modeled as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the individual-specific variables (Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006).

In model I of table 5.3 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice-specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to a MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. In model I we present the individual-specific estimates for voting for a religious party using different reference categories for party choice. We include the same individual-specific variables as in model IV of table 5.2, with two exceptions: First, because there are no CMP data available for 2006, the election of 2002 is the latest one in this analysis. We therefore cannot include the 2002 CU-merger in this model. Second, given that we aim to include choice-specific variables that vary between elections we are unable to include year-dummy indicators for each election. With respect to voting religious versus old-left we find an increase in the effect of being a Protestant, but no overtime change for Catholics or Calvinists. With respect to voting religious versus new-left model I shows linear increases in denomination effects for almost

all religious groups relative to the unaffiliated. With respect to voting religious versus liberal right we find that the differences relative to the non-religious become larger for Catholics and Calvinists. We find that in the reference year, holding constant for education and church attendance, Protestants were even slightly more likely to vote for a liberal party than for a religious party ($1/e^{-0.50}$). Based on a linear trend we find that in 2002 Protestants were about ($1/e^{-0.50+31*0.04}$) 2 times more likely to vote for a religious party relative to a liberal party.

In model II we include the choice-specific variable 'emphasis on traditional morality'. The estimate of this effect is negative (-0.08). This implies that *after accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model*, a party group is less likely to be chosen when it has a more traditionalist position. To test whether the inclusion traditionalist party positions is capable of explaining the linear trends in denomination-effects we model interactions between denominational groups and the emphasis on traditional morality in party manifestos. This way we test whether the effect of parties' traditionalist position varies between religious groups, with the non-religious as the reference. The results are reported in model III. The main-effect is negative (-0.19). Keeping in mind that the non-members are the reference category, this indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by secular voters as it is morally more traditionalist. And supporting hypothesis 5a, the positive coefficients for the interaction estimates imply that the more traditional the position of a party group the more likely people of this religious category will vote for that party group compared to the non-religious. For most denominations the interaction-effect largely compensates the negative main-effect, which indicates that parties with more traditional moral positions deter secular voters rather than attract religious voters. On the whole, model III shows weaker linear trends in religious voting than model II. With respect to voting religious versus old-left the initial linear trends are fully accounted for. We also find no linear trends in the voting behavior of Protestants and Catholics with respect to the religious versus new-left party contrast. Only for the religious versus liberal right party contrast we could not interpret the linear trends by accounting for denominational differences in the effect of traditional party positions. By and large, we find support for hypothesis 6, although we interpreted linear increase rather than linear decrease.

In model IV we test hypothesis 5b by investigating whether the traditional position of parties affects the association between church attendance and vote. The interaction effect between the manifesto scale and church attendance is however not significant. This indicates that there is no evidence that the effect of

church attendance is influenced by the emphasis on traditional values in manifestos of political parties. Moreover, in model IV we notice no substantial change in the trend of church attendance. We do find no support for hypothesis 5b.

5.6 Conclusions

There is clearly a decline in the association between church membership and vote in the period 1971-2006. For the most part this decline seems to have taken place before 1986. Especially for Catholics and Calvinists we observe convergence in voting behavior compared to non-affiliated voters. The decline of the political boundaries between religious groups is largely explained by declining church attendance. Declining church attendance, as an indicator of religious disintegration, suggests that church members are less adhered to the conservative religious norms and values preached in churches. The difference in voting between liberal Protestants and the non-members was already relatively small in the 1970s. Therefore, the initial decline of the association between being a Protestant and voting confessional is only weak. However, accounting for religious disintegration even produces an increase of religious voting for Protestants and people with 'other' religious affiliations.

We find that in addition to the linear trends the merging of religious parties into the CDA reduced the level of religious voting (see also De Graaf *et al.* 2001). The CDA-merger seems to be particularly responsible for a decline in confessional voting among the Calvinists and the Protestants. Covering more elections than De Graaf *et al.* we also found that the level of religious voting dropped after the 2002-elections, coinciding with the political merger of two minor Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. Interestingly, the party mergers not only had effects in reducing the religion-vote association, we also find that the mergers mattered even after the linear trend is fully accounted for by the changing church attendance-vote relationship. We conclude that apart from social changes the political interruptions are important in the processes of religious dealignment, supporting the political choice argument.

We have shown that traditionalist party positions increase religious voting despite the weakening of religious integration and the restructuring of the party system. We found interactions between religious categories and the ideological positions of parties. Especially non-affiliated voters are generally less likely to

vote for parties that hold traditional moral positions. In this sense we may conclude that parties with more traditional moral positions deter secular voters rather than attract religious voters. We aimed to investigate whether the traditionalist positions of parties could interpret the decline in religious-based voting after accounting for social changes that reduce religious boundaries. But because the decline of church attendance is almost fully responsible for the decline in religious-based voting, party positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends. After accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U-curve for religious voting remained, that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious parties on traditional moral issues. Modeled as a linear increase in religious-based voting this trend is to some extent explained by the traditional moral positions of parties.

For future research it may be useful to include a variable measuring individual conservative ideology. Now we use church attendance as an indicator of religious integration to derive expectations about the transmission of religious beliefs. Although we know that frequency of church attendance is correlated with ideology, a direct over time comparable measure of cultural conservatism, would allow a more sophisticated interpretation of religious voting by linking the effect of party ideology directly to individual ideology.

Deciding whether the 'bottom-up' or 'top-down' approach is more successful in explaining the religion-vote association is difficult. Both are relevant and they are of course related. In this chapter we find that the 'bottom-up' explanation is successful since accounting for religious integration resulted in a powerful interpretation of the decline in religious-based voting. Social changes are not only likely to affect the religion-vote association but also strategy of political parties. On the other hand, it would be misleading if one assumes that only political parties change over time and that the cleavage structure remains fixed. This can be illustrated by the CDA-merger. The merger itself was a reaction to secularization and the waning electoral power of the major denominational parties. It shows that the 'bottom-up' approach can be seen apart from the 'top-down' approach, but not the other way around. Social changes may be gradual in nature, but can provoke sudden political changes, leading to abrupt changes in political alignment.

We showed that political parties may draw some support from religious voters by stressing traditionalist issues. But we also showed that the religious structure of the Netherlands has changed considerably in the past four decades. The proportion of church members among the electorate has become smaller. If a


religious party wants to maximize its vote share in secularized Dutch society it should deemphasize traditional moral values. In this sense the nineteenth century 'Confessional Dilemma' Kalyvas (1996) referred to still exists. The implications of this trade-off between morals and votes may be problematic to the CDA because the meaning of the "C" already gave rise to debates about the Christian identity of the party. Our results suggest that also a "Conservative Democratic Appeal" may be prone to the effects of secularization. Moreover, the ChristianUnion may challenge the CDA more strongly in the future. In the long run the CU may be more successful to attract CDA-voters, including Catholics and non-affiliated voters. The period studied here may therefore be too short to assess the full extent of the ChristianUnion merger after 2002 for long-term changes in the religion-vote relationship in the Netherlands.

Notes

17 For the 2002-elections the ChristianUnion is included in calculating the mean value of the religious party group. The CU only modestly affects the weighted value of the combined scores, because it attracted 2.54% of the votes compared to 27.93% that went to the CDA.


18 A logistic regression of voting LPF in 2002 controlled for age, gender, education and church attendance (N=1556) shows no significant ($p < 0.1$) differences between denominations. With the non-religious as the reference group the parameter estimates (b, se) are: Catholics (0.25, 0.23), Protestants (-0.22, 0.33) Calvinists (-0.37, 0.48), other religion (0.05, 0.46). Church attendance has a significant negative effect (-0.345, 0.08). People who attend church more often were less likely to cast a vote for the LPF in 2002.

19 When we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on negative statements about 'traditional morality' there is only a slight variation among the other political party groups, and only in the first elections. The overall variation among all party groups is much less pronounced than reported in Figure 4a.



Chapter 6 |

Conclusion and Discussion



6.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis was to describe and explain cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting in Western democracies. We have tested hypotheses based on the assumption that political factors may have an additional influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting next to the effect of social changes. To test our hypotheses we relied on different strategies of data collection and analysis. In the first part of this book we used 196 surveys from the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV) to present large-scale comparative investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 Western democracies. In the second part of the book we focused on trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands using eleven surveys of the *Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies*. In this final chapter we answer our research questions by summarizing the findings of the four empirical chapters. Next, we reflect on our research strategy and analyses. Finally, we discuss the theoretical contributions of this thesis and the implications for future research.

6.2 Summary: Research questions and findings

6.2.1 Chapter 2: The Relative Influence of Class and Religion on Party Choice in comparative perspective

In chapter 2 we investigated the *level* of and *change* in class and religious voting in 13 countries in the period 1960-2008. We made use of 125 surveys in the CDCV-file which include sufficient information on both class and religion. The first central research problem of this thesis is answered in this chapter by investigating to what extent there are cross-national and over-time differences in the influence of social class and religion on voting. We divided this research problem into two sub-questions about the strength of the class cleavage *relative* to that of the religious cleavage, and the changes therein: (a) To what extent is a strong class-vote relationship in a country accompanied by a weak religion-vote relationship? (b) To what extent are the differences between the strength of the religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries declining, increasing or stable?

With respect to the first question our results indicate *positive correlations between a country's degree of class voting and degree of religious voting. These findings contest Lijphart's claim that class may have a strong influence on voting*

only if there the influence of religion on voting is weak. Nevertheless, in five countries we find that social class is generally more important than religion, i.e.: Australia, Austria, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In six countries, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, the religious basis of voting is stronger than the class basis. With respect to Germany and the US our results are less conclusive.

The second question in chapter 2 examined over time changes in the relative influence of social class and religion on party choice. *We found that in most countries the association between party choice and both class and denomination and/or church attendance is weakening. Despite the decline of the magnitude of cleavage voting in most countries, the hierarchy between class and religion as social bases of voting for the most part endures. Religion nowadays is more important than social class in the largely same countries as in the 1970s. However, we find that the relative effect of religion over class is waning in Belgium and Italy and is even reversing in Germany and the US. In the other countries, the dominance of religion over class generally persists. Class continues to be more influential relative to religion in Australia and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect of class over religion decreased considerably.* In the last decade under study (1997-2007) we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In Sweden the kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of explained variance is found to be twice as strong when compared to the effect of religion. In the same period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the Netherlands, where the effect of religious voting compared to that of social class is about two times stronger, and nearly 15 times in terms of explained variance.

6.2.2 Chapter 3: The effect of Left-Right party positions on class voting in comparative perspective

After that we established the trends in class and religious-based voting in Western democracies in chapter 2, the remaining chapters sought to explain variation in cleavage-based voting. The central problem was: To what extent are social and political changes able to explain (a) the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies and (b) trends in class and religious voting in the Netherlands?

In chapter 3 we address the first, cross-national part of this research problem by answering the question: To what extent are the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies explained by social changes and the positions of political parties? To answer this question we estimated the impact of the Left-Right

positions of parties on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis of integrated data from 15 countries (1960-2005) in our *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006).

We tested three 'top-down' hypotheses: (1) the levels of class voting are weaker as the Left-Right position of left-wing parties is more centrist. And (2) the levels of class voting are weaker in less polarized party systems. A final expectation was that (3) movement to the ideological centre by left-wing parties or de-polarization of a party system would explain decline in class voting. Before testing these political hypotheses we assessed to what extent 'bottom-up' social changes account for the decline in class voting. *Our results support the idea that compositional changes lead to changes in class voting because changes in background characteristics (age, gender, and education) are partly responsible for the decline in political divisions between classes. Especially the changes in the relationship between education and vote seem to account for the decline in class voting.* As educational levels are generally rising in post-industrial societies this development offers a 'bottom-up' explanation for changes in levels of class voting. Class voting is declining as the effect of education on vote changes. On average for all the whole 1960-2005 period we find that the more years of education the more likely a person is to vote right-wing, but in most countries this association is weakening over time. The higher educated service class, or more likely parts of it, transformed from being right-wing to left-wing. The Dutch analyses in chapter 4 give reason to assume that this holds for the social-cultural specialists in particular.

In the third chapter we did not find evidence that left-right positions of left-wing parties alone influence the class-vote relationship. We did find, however, that when ideological differences between political parties are smaller the association between class and vote is weaker. *We can therefore conclude that the levels of class voting are influenced by the extent of class-related political choices presented to voters. But in order to detect this 'top-down' direction of influence it is important to investigate party polarization rather than the absolute position of left parties on the ideological continuum.* What variation in both party polarization and left-wing party positions fail to do, however, is to explain the over time trends in class voting. The reason for this can be seen from the lack of consistent correlations between left-party moves to the centre, or party ideological convergence, and time itself.

6.2.3 Chapter 4: The effect of social changes and political changes on class voting in the Netherlands

In the second part of this book we examined trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands. Using more detailed measures and more sophisticated analyses techniques than in the cross-national part of this book we further investigate whether changes in cleavage voting can be explained by 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' changes. In chapter 4 we examined trends in class voting in the Netherlands using 11 surveys from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies in the period 1971-2006. The main question in this chapter was to what extent the decline of class voting can be explained by social and political changes. With respect to 'bottom-up' social changes we formulated hypotheses about the heterogenization of the service class, the blurring of ideological boundaries between classes and the effect of education. From a 'top-down' perspective we formulated hypotheses about the restructuring of the Dutch party system after the formation of the GreenLeft party, and the changes in party's social-economic positions and conservative-progressive positions.

Using a series of multinomial logistic regression models we found that *the rise of the 'new' class of social-cultural specialists is important in accounting for changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are clearly not only more right-wing, but the higher and lower social cultural specialists also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties.* Overall, the distinction between the manual class and other classes becomes less relevant over time for left-wing voting. *We also found that the differences between classes with respect to their economic ideology weakened over the last decades. But holding constant for voters' economic ideology could only partially interpret class voting differences and changes therein. Moreover, we found that the association between economic conservatism and voting has increased, although slightly, over time.* With respect to education we found that a low education is decreasingly associated with voting left-wing. Moreover, new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters with a high education. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the *level and decline* of the class effects are partially explained by education. *With respect to 'top-down' changes we found no evidence that the downward trend in class voting was influenced by the political merger of four minor left-wing parties into GreenLeft.* Using conditional logistic regression we tested whether the party positions affect the class-vote relationship. *We conclude that after accounting 'bottom-up' social changes, the economic L-R position of parties – and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a significant impact on vote choice*

between the four major party groups in the Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. However, the extent to which voters favor parties with economically right-wing policies generally does not vary between the manual class and other classes. Yet, there is a top-down effect: With respect to the cultural dimension, we found that manual workers tend to favor parties with conservative positions, whereas other classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural specialists – prefer parties that are more progressive. But, although there seems to be a clear relation between party positions and the strength class-vote relationship, the party positions hardly explain the decline in class-based voting.

6.2.4 Chapter 5: The effect of social changes and political changes on religious voting in the Netherlands

Chapter 5 aimed to answer the question to what extent changes in religious voting can be explained by social factors and political changes. Similar to chapter 4 this chapter first tested a set of 'bottom-up' explanations for over-time variation in religious-based voting before testing two types of changes in political choices. We found clear evidence for the decline in the association between church membership and vote in the period 1971-2006. For the most part this decline seems to have taken place before 1986. Especially for Catholics and Calvinists we observe convergence in voting behavior compared to non-affiliated voters. *The decline of the political boundaries between religious groups is largely explained by declining church attendance, as an indicator of religious disintegration.* The decline of the association between being a Protestant and voting confessional is only weak. This is understandable given the fact that the difference in voting between liberal Protestants and the non-members was already small in the 1970s. However, we found that accounting for religious disintegration even produced an *increase* of religious voting for Protestants.

In chapter 5 we tested two 'top-down' hypotheses. First, we found that the CDA-merger in 1977 was responsible for a decline in religious voting. We also showed that the level of religious voting dropped after the 2002-elections, coinciding with the political merger of two minor Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. These party mergers not only had effects in reducing the religion-vote association, we also found that the mergers mattered after the linear trend is fully accounted for by religious disintegration. *We therefore conclude that apart from social changes the political interruptions are important contributions in the processes of religious dealignment in the Netherlands.* Finally, we have shown that traditionalist party positions increase religious voting. Especially non-affiliated

voters are generally less likely to vote for parties that hold traditional moral positions. *We therefore conclude that parties with more traditional moral positions deter secular voters rather than attract religious voters. But because the decline of church attendance is almost fully responsible for the decline in religious-based voting, party positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends.* After accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U-curve for religious voting remained, that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious parties on traditional moral issues. Modeled as a linear increase in religious-based voting this trend is only to a very modest extent explained by the traditional moral positions of parties.

6.3 Reflections on research strategy and analyses

In this thesis we combined large-scale cross-national research with the examination of trends in the Netherlands. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this research strategy. One of the merits is that the two parts in this book are complementary. The comparative studies in part I allow general conclusions about the levels of cleavage voting between and within countries. In this part we were able to test explanatory hypotheses about the effect of party positions on class voting based on large-scale cross-national analyses. Drawbacks of these pooled analyses were the low level of detail in measuring cleavages and cleavage strength, and the lack of testing for alternative explanations for variation in cleavage voting. In part II therefore, the nation-specific analysis of cleavage voting in the Netherlands not only enabled us to measure cleavages and party choice with a greater level of detail, but also allowed us to more exhaustively test explanations for the trends in cleavage voting. In turn, the cross-national analyses allow us to see to what extent trends in the Netherlands are part of larger societal developments, and to what extent explanations for these trends are mainly Dutch particularities or are universal in nature. Nevertheless, both the cross-national analyses in the first part of this book and the Dutch analyses in the second part face some limitations. Below we reflect on the measures, methods and models used in this book.

6.3.1 Measurement

Voting behavior: Electoral research gained considerably by the introduction of surveys in the 1960s because it furthered the shift from macro to micro data. An alleged drawback however, also faced here, is that instead of measuring the actual voting behavior of voters at the ballot-box we have to rely on self-reported party choice in surveys. In the CDCV-file (used in chapters 2 and 3) we use different variables to measure party choice. In most surveys respondents were asked to name to the party they voted for in the most recent election or vote intention for the upcoming election. When available, one of these variables is used. In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is measured as voting intention “what would you vote if election were today/ next Sunday?” or party identification. We recognize that such differences between pre-, post- and non-election surveys may have implications for the reported party choice of respondents. But we are not interested in the univariate frequency distribution of single parties. In this book we study the relationship between cleavage groups and political choices. Nieuwbeerta (1995) has argued that the relationship between class and political preference is not fundamentally different from that between class and voting behavior, and that when analyzing only surveys containing ‘voting behavior’ does not result in different outcomes than analyzing only surveys containing ‘party preference’. Moreover, we use classified variables of party choice into two or three categories. By grouping political parties, differences in reported party choice due to type of survey will be reduced.

A second point of consideration is concerned with the classification of party choice. In all chapters we grouped political parties into a limited number (2, 3 or 4) of categories. In Chapter 3 we used a two-category (left vs. right) categorization of respondents’ party choice to examine variation in class voting. Cross-national comparisons unavoidably come at the cost of nation-specific details, and this dichotomous classification is no exception. In the British case for example we lumped together the Liberal Democrats with the Conservative party in opposition to the Labour Party. Although this logically follows from collapsing non-left party categories, in this case ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, it may affect the patterns of class voting. Merging the Liberal Democrats with Labour instead would reveal that the level of class voting in Britain dropped in the 1997-elections (Evans and Tilley 2011). With our classification, unfortunately, we were unable to detect such change. Another limitation is that our dichotomous categorization disregards the multidimensionality of party space: In chapter 3 parties are only classified with respect to traditional left-right divisions in politics. Many parties that are classified

as 'right-wing' are in fact Christian Democratic parties that adopt a centre or centre-right position in the party system. The electoral appeal of Christian parties is not primarily targeted at particular social-economic groups in society. In Chapter 2, where we also examined cross-national variation in religious voting, Christian parties are therefore distinguished from other right-wing parties, and chapter 5 is fully dedicated to voting for a religious party in the Netherlands.

In some party systems the existence of a 'second' dimension (e.g. new-left and new-right) has led to the realignment of social groups. Studies on Nordic countries for example have often differentiated between social-democratic parties and the new or more radical leftist and rightist parties that challenge them (e.g. Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). In chapter 4 we explored the differences in class voting between the 'old-left' and 'new-left' in the Netherlands by applying a more detailed classification of parties. But also in this chapter we were forced to group relevant parties. In line with the 'New Politics Thesis' (see Chapter 1) we merged the parties on the materialist 'old-left' (PvdA, CPN, SP), as opposed to post-materialist 'new-left' parties (D66 and GreenLeft). This classification of course disregards the intergroup differences between parties in each group. And also new-right parties are not investigated in this chapter. To provide a more complete picture of class differences in vote choices future research may benefit from a separate category of 'new right' parties in order to examine whether the working class has abandoned the left to the advantage of the 'new right'. The period under study in chapter 4 does also not allow a comparable category for the 'new right' suitable for over-time analyses. Before the rise and fall of the LPF new- and far-right voting was a relatively minor phenomenon in Dutch politics; the extreme-right Centre Democrats (CD) only gained 0.9% and 2.4% of the votes in the 1989 and 1994 elections. In 2006 the PVV (Party for Freedom) managed to draw support (5.9%) on an anti-establishment agenda against immigration and 'islamization'. The success of the PVV was accompanied by losses for the PvdA and although the idea of cultural voters seems very plausible, it is too early to examine whether the emergence of the PVV has a long-standing impact on the relationship between the working class and the classical left. The large electoral gains of the PVV in the more recent elections in 2010, drawing 15.5% of the votes, also raise questions about the religion-vote relationship. During the 2010-elections the vote share of the CDA was virtually halved. And while the Liberal VVD won the general elections for the first time in history, CDA losses were the heaviest in the traditionally Catholic South of the Netherlands where the electoral success of the Freedom Party (PVV) was the largest. And although it may not have been Catholics

that voted for the PVV, it raises new questions about differences in the political re-alignment between former Catholics and former Protestants.

Social Class: In the cross-national part of this book we used a four-category classification of social class. In explaining over-time variation in class voting, this classification is sub-optimal because it is unable to account for all relevant compositional changes in the class structure of societies. In all countries, the service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly heterogeneous. Our four-category classification distinguishes sub-classes within the 'non-manual class' (service class, routine non-manual and self-employed), but neglects further differentiations within the service class. The decline in class voting that we found in chapter 3 between the manual class and the service class may partially be attributed to the heterogenization of the service class. In the second part of this book, examining class voting in the Netherlands, we therefore distinguished within the service class between high-grade and low-grade technocrats and social-cultural specialists. The advantage of using a four-category classification in the cross-national part of this book is that we were able to integrate much more surveys into our comparative dataset compared to previous studies. Because all countries in our file have at least five included surveys and cover at least a twenty-year period we could detect long-term changes in class voting for 15 modern democracies. In ten countries our class voting trend covers thirty years or more, and in two countries even forty years or more. We therefore not only can detect long-term decline in class voting, but also confidently generalize this finding to all countries in our study.

Religion: The degree of differentiation is not only an issue in measuring social class. Given the diversity of religious structures across countries the most appropriate classification of church membership may vary between countries. In chapter 2 we aimed to compare the influence of religion on voting cross-nationally by applying a uniform categorization of church membership across 13 countries. There are however some implications to our measure of denominational differences. First, in our survey data for Italy, Spain, Norway and Sweden information on denominational membership was not available. Despite the fact that also in these countries some people may not feel affiliated to the dominant Catholic Church or Protestant state churches survey data did not reveal such denominational differences. A second drawback is that some surveys included in the CDCV-file do not make sufficient distinction between 'other religion' and 'no

religion'. As a result we merged the two categories in chapter 2 for all countries in order to enable a cross-national comparison. Because this combined group functioned as the reference category we may have underestimated the strength of the religious cleavage somewhat in chapter 2. Given the conclusion of this chapter - in the majority of the countries religion is more important than social class - this does not seem to be a fundamental problem. A better estimation of the effect of religion would only have reinforced our conclusion that religion outweighs social class in determining party choice. As mentioned, in chapter 2 we may have underestimated the association between religion and party choice in the US, and over-estimated the decline in this association by merging all Protestant denominations into a single category.

Party Positions: In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we used the 'top-down' perspective to derive hypotheses about the effect of party positions on cleavage voting. Although there are different approaches to measuring policy positions of parties we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP datasets are the most conventional content analysis of election programs available. The most important alternative approaches in estimating positions of parties are expert surveys and computer-assisted content analysis of election programs. There is an extensive body of literature discussing and comparing the measurement quality, validity and reliability of the three approaches, see the overview by Volkens (2007). We do not repeat all arguments in favor of and against each approach because there is one simple but compelling reason to use the CMP data: At this moment the CMP data provides the only readily available source of party positions over a long time period in a large number of countries that can be compared to other comparative data. In this respect expert surveys have two major drawbacks. Expert surveys are conducted at fixed and limited numbers of moments in time (e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006), and are often ambiguous about the time period for which the estimates are valid. Volkens concludes that "*Experts (...) judge most parties to stick to the same positions over long periods of time. As compared to quickly changing programmatic positions, expert surveys seem to provide generalizations of party positions over time*" (2007: 109). Computer-assisted content analysis of election programs relies on computerized word-counts of the same election documents as the CMP data. This new technique seems promising but has not yet been able to create a time series dataset that can compete to the richness of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge and Pennings 2007).

The CMP data is not only rich, it also contains direct reflections of what parties state as their position at each election, and the reliability and validity of pre-constructed scales in the dataset are widely examined (Budge and Pennings 2007). But despite its strengths there are several shortcomings to the CMP dataset that should be mentioned here (cf. Benoit and Laver 2007). First, there is no indication of the uncertainty associated with the CMP estimates. Therefore, Benoit and Laver argue that “*we do not know, for any two adjacent points in a time series, whether the difference between them is due to measurement error or movement in the underlying variable*” (2007: 94). Second, because CMP measures consist of pre-defined and fixed scale components, they are unable to reflect local or temporal differences in the meaning of certain policy dimensions. Other drawbacks of the CMP data are that not every party publishes an election program, not all policy areas are mentioned in all of the programs, and some minor parties are not included in the data. A final drawback in this book is that we did not calculate the position of individual parties, but rather positions of party groups. This is a result of the way in which we coded the dependent variable throughout the chapters. The limitations of CMP data could in part be responsible for the fact that the erratic patterns of party polarization that we found in chapter 3 generally did not correlate with a linear measure of time. The more detected fluctuations in party positions are caused by measurement error, the less likely it is that such ‘movements’ are associated with changes in class voting. Yet, we found that although our measure of party polarization could not explain trends in class voting, it was associated with the level of class voting in our pooled analysis. Moreover, in part II, we showed that there is a relationship between cleavage voting and CMP-based party positions in the Netherlands. Future studies, investigating shorter or fixed time periods, could explore whether using different approaches in estimating party positions leads to different conclusions about the impact of party positions on cleavage voting.

6.3.2 Analyses

Models and methods: In chapter 1 we elaborated on the evolution of class voting research: From using cross-tabulations and the Alford-index in the 1960s to using multinomial logistic regression from the 1990s onwards. We build on this evolution by employing binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses. In most chapters we measured cleavage strength on the basis on odds ratios and log-odds ratios. Only in chapter 2 we summarized class and religious voting effects using the kappa-index. By employing a summary measure, we could have

used more refined measures of party choice, such as party families or even all parties as separate categories (see Knutsen 2007). We decided not to do so because with many, often small party categories, the limitations of the kappa-index (see Chapter 1) have greater implications. Not only all classes, but also all parties contribute equally in calculating the average class voting effect, regardless of their size. Strong class voting effects among major parties may therefore not be detected due to weak class voting effects among minor parties. It may therefore be worthwhile if future studies seek to construct cleavage voting measures that are not only a function of aggregate group-party associations, but also of group sizes, party popularity and group turn-out rates, see for example the work of Lachat (2006) and Best (2007).

We made methodological progress in chapters 4 and 5 by employing conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis. We argued that conditional logistic models accommodate scientific improvement in the field of cleavage voting research because the model allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. The CL model therefore has a crucial advantage over the multinomial logistic (MNL) model. In our analysis the individual-specific variables were used to test whether changes in the social background of the electorate were responsible for the decline in cleavage voting. Simultaneously, we used information on party positions as choice-specific variables. This way we were able to examine what happens when parties change their position on various political dimensions. In chapters 4 and 5 we showed that the CL model is suitable to determine which 'bottom-up' as well as 'top-down' factors influence the level of cleavage-based voting. The conditional logistic model therefore not enables more stringent tests of 'top-down' theories, but it also facilitates the solution to an empirical problem in comparative research, i.e.: how to deal with the fact that party categories are not fixed over time and space. The CL model is not a new analysis technique (cf. McFadden 1974). But, as Alvarez and Nagler (1998) have argued, the difference between the CL and the MNL model are not widely recognized in political science. The same, we could add, holds for political sociology. Only very recently the CL model was first adopted in cleavage voting research (Elff 2009). As far as we know chapters 4 and 5 are the first time that conditional logit models are employed to examine cleavage voting in a single country over time. We encourage other researchers to explore possibilities of this model yet further, to explain variation in cleavage voting both within and between countries.

Despite its merits, the CL model has certain weaknesses. The most important, and most frequently debated drawback, is that both CL models and standard MNL models make the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This assumption holds that adding or omitting a category of the dependent variable does not affect the odds of the initial or remaining alternatives. In terms of elections IIA implies that when a right-wing party is in competition with a left-wing party, the participation of a second left-wing party will not affect the odds that an individual voter chooses between the initial two parties. This assumption is likely to be violated as the two left-wing parties take similar positions on particular issues. In spite of IIA, the odds that a voter chooses the initial left-wing party may go down because he or she considers the two left-wing parties to be substitutes (cf. Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The violation of IIA may therefore be especially relevant in studies focusing on the entry of new political options, or the disappearance of old ones. One can test for violation of IIA by comparing the estimates from the full model to those of restricted models that exclude at least one of the alternatives (Long and Freese 2006). With respect to our analyses, the tests commonly used to detect whether the IIA assumption is violated – the Hausman Test and the Small-Hsiao Test – both indicated that there is more evidence that IIA is not violated in our models than evidence for the opposite (see appendix D).

If necessary, the IIA assumption can be relaxed using computationally more complex multinomial probit models (MNP) instead of MNL (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Long and Freese 2006). We decided not to use MNP models because the results of MNP models were not substantially different from our MNL estimations. We used the STATA program `ASMPROBIT` - alternative-specific multinomial probit (ASMP) – as an alternative for the CL model (Long and Freese 2006). The CL models presented in this book were however too demanding to converge with ASMP estimation.

Modeling changes: A large part of this study is aimed at explaining over-time variation in the effects of social cleavages on voting. We assumed linear changes because of the relatively gradual, slowly changing character of most social changes after the 1960s. Any observed changes consistent with 'bottom-up' processes are expected to take the form of a gradual decline. In most chapters changes in cleavage voting are therefore primarily modeled as linear changes. In chapter 2 we investigated the patterns of changes, but only in three forms, that is: stability, fully linear or completely unconstrained. Although this chapter showed

that linear changes often fit the data better than stability or trendless fluctuations, there are many different forms of non-linear changes that are unconsidered here but may be fit the data better.

In chapter 3 we adopted a Two-Step estimation procedure to model class voting trends. We first presented over-time and country-by-country graphs of the class-vote association in log-odd ratios. Next, we estimated a series of multilevel linear regression models with the value of the log-odds ratios as the dependent variable. To account for the fact that trends differ from country to country we modeled linear trends with both a random intercept and slope for each country. The advantage of using logit-coefficients instead of individuals as unit of analysis is that we can directly explain the association between social class and vote, estimate nation-specific class voting trends, and simply include additional macro level dependent variables. The problem that remains with our Two-Step approach is that it is possible to find significant linear trends even when there is only one sudden point of change in the range of observations. Another problem involves the degree of uncertainty associated with the dependent variables at the second stage of the Two-step Estimation. Recognizing these limitations we like to point out that in chapter 3 readers are able to judge for themselves the degree of uncertainty surrounding the estimates (see figure 2), and to what extent our estimated trends lines match the plotted log-odds ratios (see figure 2 and 3).

In the Dutch chapters we paid more attention to non-linear changes. Both chapters 4 and 5 first show the 'unconstrained' odds ratios of cleavage voting over time. And in both chapters we investigated discrete discontinuities in the linear trends based on the assumption that 'jumps' or 'drops' in over time patterns of cleavage voting are associated with political changes. Especially with respect to religious voting chapter 5 showed the importance of non-gradual changes additional to linear decline. We found a reversal in the trend between denomination and party choice after 1986, and sudden drops of religious voting after 1977 and 2002. We leave it to future research to more exhaustively investigate the country-specific scenarios of non-linear changes in cleavage voting for other countries.

6.4 Theoretical contributions

6.4.1 Social change explanations

We have shown that both social and political changes may contribute in explaining the level of cleavage-based voting. In chapter 1 we summarized most common hypotheses in the literature. Let us first discuss the theoretical implications of this book with respect to social change explanations. In the empirical chapters, both cross-nationally and over-time in the Netherlands, we did not test all specific hypotheses about social changes. In chapter 3 we tested a 'bottom-up' hypothesis pertaining to the rise of new social divisions and the changes in the effect of education. We expected that the decline in class voting is partially accounted for by changes in effects of gender and education on voting. The scope of analysis in chapter 3 surpasses all previous studies on class voting. We found that in particular changes in the effect of education partially accounted for the decline of class voting. Our results imply that the differences between the working class and the other classes are to some extent waning because of new conflicts between those who received a high education and those who have not. A high education is decreasingly associated with voting right-wing. This is in line with the idea of new cultural divisions between the higher educated holding more liberal views than the lower educated. In chapter 4 on the Netherlands we found that a high education is decreasingly associated with a rightist party preference, and is increasingly associated with voting new-left. Our results should however be considered with some caution. In chapter 3 we lacked consistent micro data across all 188 included surveys to test alternative 'bottom-up' hypotheses, see the overview in chapter 1: e.g. growing mobility, rising affluence, and changing socio-economic and cultural values. Nevertheless, the analyses in chapter 3 are among the few comparative studies that aim to explain changes in class voting over-time, especially with respect to both micro level explanations and political explanations.

In the second part of this book we further examined the influence of social changes for the patterns of cleavage voting in the Netherlands. In chapter 4 we looked at the rise of the 'new' class of social cultural specialists. In doing so, we improved on previous research on the trends in class voting in the Netherlands. Critics of 'new class' theories have argued that the political orientations of the new middle class predominantly reflects the more left-wing views among upwardly mobile voters due to their classes of origin (Goldthorpe 1982). But in spite of such accounts Güveli (2006, chapter 3 and 4) has shown that technocrats recruit more

from lower social classes than the social and cultural specialists, and that both inter and intragenerational mobility is greater for technocrats than for social cultural specialists. Güveli also showed that the political differences between the social and cultural specialists and technocrats persist when controlled for educational level, gender and employment sector. We are therefore confident that the adjusted class schema revealed a process of heterogenization of the service class in the Netherlands, which proved to be essential in understanding changes in the class-vote relationship. We therefore encourage other researcher to apply this schema in studying class voting.

In chapter 4 we also tested whether trends in class voting are interpreted by differences between voters in their economic ideology and level of education. In doing so we improved on De Graaf *et al.* (2001) who tested hypotheses on social changes by only inferring a process of blurring boundaries between classes. We actually accounted for the social distinctiveness of classes by looking at their economic ideology. We expected that due to rising living standards and income levels attitudes on income redistribution had become less associated with class differences. This is an indirect micro level hypothesis based the notion of 'growing affluence'. Contrary to our expectation we found that the association between economic ideology and voting has increased, although slightly, over time. This is unexpected: Assuming that class conflict increasingly has to compete with non-economic cleavages, the influence of peoples' economic ideology on voting was certainly not expected to increase. A reason for this rather surprising finding may be that the economic progressive views of social cultural specialists crystallized over the last decades. In this sense class-based voting among the new service class became stronger because the economic orientations of social and cultural specialists became more homogeneous over time.

With respect to religious voting, the 'bottom-up' hypotheses in chapter 5 are largely based on secularization theory. Our hypotheses suggested a decline in the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of education and declining church attendance. We expected that the cultural and normative boundaries between religious and irreligious voters are blurring as the level of church attendance declines. In formulating this expectation we need the assumption that people who attend church hold more cultural conservative views than infrequent attendees. This assumption about religious beliefs or social cultural values is not tested in chapter 5. Unfortunately, no direct comparable measures of cultural conservatism over time are available in the full range of the DPES surveys. But additional analyses on data from the "Social and Cultural Developments in the

Netherlands" (SOCON²⁰) surveys of 1979, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, which include a good set of items for constructing a scale for 'cultural conservatism', shows a correlation of 0.44 with church attendance. This suggests that church attendance is not an optimal but at best a reasonable proxy for cultural conservatism. Future research should therefore further disentangle changes in the effect of church attendance on voting from that of religious belief or social cultural values.

6.4.2 Political choice explanations

In this book we made an important step towards expanding the examination of cleavage change beyond 'bottom-up' processes to those involving the relevance of the choices that parties provide for voters. Our results suggest that 'top-down' effects in class voting relate to differences between parties presented to voters, rather than to economic appeals of left-wing parties alone. Based on large-scale data analyses in chapter 3, we found that when ideological differences between political parties are smaller the association between class and vote is weaker. According to the 'Electoral Dilemma' (Przeworski and Sprague 1986) class voting would decline because left-wing parties extend their appeal beyond their core constituency of working class voters. But we did not find that class voting is weaker as left-wing parties adopt more centrist positions. The emphasis is thus on the difference between the main party choices that voters face, and not necessarily with respect to economic differences only. For the Netherlands we could not find that party differences on the economic issues are responsible for the decline in class voting. The position of the social and cultural specialists is exceptional. More than any other class, low-grade social-cultural specialists tend to favor parties that are economically left-wing.

This shows that 'top-down' effects of party choices may interact with 'bottom-up' processes such as the heterogenization of the service class. We found substantial class differences with respect to the conservative/progressive position of political parties. Manual workers tend to favor conservative parties, whereas other classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural specialists – prefer progressive parties. In this sense, party polarization does seem to matter because parties in the Netherlands have diverged on 'new' political issues.

What the comparative chapter on class voting and the Dutch chapter have in common is that we were not able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for changes in political differences between parties. The falsification of the 'top-down' hypotheses predicting that class voting trends would be explained by accounting

for party positions, does not necessitate their immediate rejection. The fact that party changes could not explain linear trends, do not mean that they are incapable of explaining more time-specific changes and possible reversals in cleavage voting. For the Dutch case we found that the CDA and CU party mergers mattered after the downward trend in religious voting is fully accounted for by religious disintegration. This finding is important because the CDA-merger itself was a reaction to secularization and the waning electoral power of the major denominational parties. It shows that the 'bottom-up' approach can be seen apart from the 'top-down' approach, but not the other way around. Social changes may be gradual in nature, but can provoke sudden political changes, leading to abrupt changes in political alignment. By implication, future research could consider to what extent programmatic changes can explain time-specific 'jumps' or 'drops' in cleavage voting. This may be promising because after controlling for 'bottom-up' changes we found a U-curve for religious voting in the Netherlands that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious parties on traditional moral issues.

By measuring party positions on the basis of statements in election manifestos, we assume that voters make prospective calculations about what they may win or lose by voting for a particular party. But next to relying on the promises of politicians, voters will retrospectively judge what parties, especially the incumbent, have done for them during the last government term. Both policy positions and policy outcomes are related to the *substantive representation* of groups in society. Cutting welfare expanses, for example, may hit the working class more than the prosperous middle class. Class voting may drop as manual class voters punish incumbent left-wing parties for cutting welfare expenses. Investigating the impact of welfare state characteristics on electoral divisions in eleven countries in the early-1970s Henjak (2009, Chapter 5) finds that in countries where social-democratic parties implemented welfare state policies, the support for these parties among the working class increased. Future research could investigate to what extent such policy decisions by parties contribute to explain cross-national and over-time variation in cleavage voting over a longer period of time and in more countries.


Next to *substantive representation* we recommend future research to investigate cleavage voting through the lens of *descriptive representation*. Descriptive representation involves the social composition of parliament or parties. A member of parliament represents someone by matching him or her on relevant characteristics, such as gender, ethnic origin, religion or class. Although

research on descriptive representation has in recent years strongly focused on socially disadvantaged groups, the underrepresentation of the working class remains underexposed in the literature (Wauters 2010). Research on the parliamentary behavior of female and black representatives has shown that they are more likely to give priority to issues and policies that are important for women or black people respectively (Celis 2006; Owens 2005). Interestingly, politicians of Christian Democratic parties are often religiously affiliated. But politicians of labor parties are rarely of working class origin. Such differences in descriptive representation may offer an explanation for why religion is often more important in determining voting behavior than social class. This would be a 'bottom-up' explanation if the composition of parliaments would only be shaped by reflecting the structures of society. The under- or overrepresentation of particular social groups in parliament is however a consequence of electoral laws and of the political recruitment procedures and candidate selection within parties. A shift to the question 'who represents whom' would therefore mean a further investigation of the relationship between 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' changes.


This having said, we would welcome studies that aim to determine under what conditions religion outweighs social class, and vice versa. In chapter 2 we addressed questions on the relative influence of social cleavages on party choice. In line with a growing number of scholars, the results presented in the other chapters of this book suggest that it is important to consider the role of both social and political conditions of cleavage voting (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 1999; Evans 2000; De Graaf *et al.* 2001; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Elff 2009). The hierarchy between cleavages may change as the social circumstances force parties to adopt new strategies. Przeworski and Sprague have argued that the relative influence of class may weaken as the electoral strategy of left-wing parties is less worker-orientated: "*As socialists appeal to voters in supra-class terms, they weaken the salience of class and (...) leave room open for competing particularistic appeals of religion, ethnic or linguistic groups, regions, etc.*" (1986: 46). Heath *et al.* (1997) put forward that social cleavages need political vehicles to exert substantial influence on party choice. They attribute the relative unimportance of religion in British politics not to the absence of the social basis for a religious cleavage but to the fact that the cleavage has not been politicized. These arguments make clear that the politicization of cleavages may take different forms but that next to social factors political factors may be crucial to understand why the relative influence of social cleavages differs by electoral context.

Notes

20 For details about the SOCON surveys we refer to Eisinga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1992); Eisinga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1999); Eisinga, Coenders, Felling, Te Grotenhuis, Oomens, and Scheepers (2002); Eisinga, De Graaf, Levels, Need, and Scheepers (2008).



Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting)



Inleiding: sociale scheidslijnen en politieke tegenstellingen

Dit proefschrift richt zich op politieke tegenstellingen die voortkomen uit sociaal-structurele verschillen in de samenleving, de zogenoemde 'sociale scheidslijnen' waarlangs zich verschillen voordoen in politieke gedragingen en houdingen. In democratische samenlevingen functioneren verkiezingen als voornaamste mechanisme voor de collectieve uitdrukking van tegenstellingen en overeenkomsten. De samenhang tussen de sociale positie van mensen en hun stemgedrag is daarom een van de belangrijkste onderzoeksgebieden van de politiek sociologie. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik twee traditionele sociale scheidslijnen tussen kiezers in westerse democratieën; sociale klasse en godsdienst.

Tijdens de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw gingen wetenschappers er veelal vanuit dat er een sterke samenhang bestond tussen de sociale groep waar mensen bij horen en de politieke partij waarop zij stemmen. Politieke partijen werden gezien als de vertegenwoordigers van specifieke sociale belangengroepen, en leden van dergelijke groepen werden verondersteld op een bepaalde partij te stemmen vanuit groepsbelang en partijloyaliteit. Linkse partijen golden daarbij als de vertegenwoordigers van de arbeidende klasse. Vanuit het oogpunt van de klassenstrijd tussen arbeiders en kapitaalbezitters over de productiemiddelen in de samenleving, stemde de arbeidende klasse op partijen die herverdeling en opbouw van sociale zekerheden voorstonden, terwijl de burgerij, de zelfstandigen en de bezitters van het kapitaal op partijen stemden die overheidsbemoeienis in de vrije markt verwierpen. 'Klassengebonden stemgedrag' in traditionele zin gaat er dan ook vanuit dat arbeiders op linkse partijen stemmen en niet-arbeiders op rechtse partijen.

In vergelijking met sociale klasse is het verband tussen religieuze groepen en politieke partijen minder eenduidig. De grote diversiteit aan religieuze denominaties en aan partijen die hen vertegenwoordigen, zowel binnen als tussen landen, ligt hieraan ten grondslag. In het algemeen geldt echter dat wanneer wetenschappers de invloed van religie op stemgedrag onderzoeken, zij er vanuit gaan dat het electorale gedrag van religieuze kiezers afwijkt van het gedrag van seculiere kiezers. Historisch gezien stemmen religieuzen voor partijen die hun religieuze vrijheden verdedigden in conflicten over de afschaffing van staatskerken en de positie van godsdienst in het onderwijs. Later werden de tegenstellingen tussen religieuze en seculiere kiezers ook belangrijk met betrekking tot andere niet-materiële belangen. In tegenstelling tot seculiere kiezers stemmen religieuzen op partijen die liberale politieke opvattingen over abortus, euthanasie en rechten voor homoseksuelen verwerpen.

Het doel van dit onderzoek is om verschillen tussen en binnen landen te beschrijven en te verklaren in de mate waarin sociale klasse en godsdienst samenhangen met de keuze voor een politieke partij. Ik richt me op daarbij in het bijzonder op twee vragen: (1) In hoeverre bestaan er in westerse democratieën verschillen tussen landen en door de tijd heen in de relatieve invloed van sociale klasse op stemgedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van godsdienst? En (2) In hoeverre bieden sociale en politieke veranderingen verklaringen voor (a) het niveau van en veranderingen in klassengebonden stemgedrag in westerse democratieën en (b) trends in klassengebonden en godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland?

Hoofdstuk 1: Sociale klasse, godsdienst en stemgedrag in de literatuur

In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik aan de hand van een literatuuroverzicht zien dat er sprake is van evolutie in de onderzoeksliteratuur naar klassengebonden stemgedrag. Ik doe dit aan de hand van veranderingen in een viertal domeinen die eerder door Nieuwbeerta (1995) zijn gebruikt om het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag in drie generaties op te delen, te weten: de (1) formulering van de onderzoeksvragen, (2) de belangrijkste hypothesen, (3) meetprocedures en (4) de gehanteerde analyse technieken. In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik echter zien dat na de studie van Nieuwbeerta dergelijke veranderingen hebben doorgezet, en dat er in toenemende mate sprake is van een vierde generatie in het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag. De onderzoeksvragen van deze vierde generatie richten zich op de vraag *waarom* de invloed van sociale klasse op stemgedrag afneemt. De verklaringen die in de belangrijkste hypothesen worden aangedragen hebben in toenemende mate betrekking op politieke veranderingen. Naast de gebruikelijke gestandaardiseerde maten om sociale klassen te categoriseren, zoals het EGP-schema van Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (1979), worden er aangepaste 'postindustriële' schema's gebruikt. En ook de ontwikkelingen in de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden laten een toename zien in steeds geavanceerdere analysetechnieken.

Aan de hand van dezelfde criteria bespreek ik eveneens de onderzoeksliteratuur naar godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag. Hoewel er overlap bestaat tussen het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag en godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag, zijn beide onderzoekslijnen geworteld in verschillende tradities. De ontwikkelingen in het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag zijn sterk beïnvloed door het vergelijkende stratificatieonderzoek (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom,

Treiman and Ultee 1991). Onderzoek naar godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag is niet in deze traditie geworteld. De evolutie van onderzoeksvragen, hypothesen, meetprocedures, en analyse technieken is daarom minder duidelijk als bij het klassengebonden stemgedragonderzoek. Verschillende generaties laten zich moeilijker onderscheiden.

Vervolgens ga ik in hoofdstuk 1 dieper in op de hypothesen die in de literatuur worden aangedragen om variatie tussen en binnen landen in godsdienst-/ klassengebonden stemgedrag te verklaren. Ik laat daarbij zien dat er veelal dezelfde redeneringen worden gebruikt om verklaringen te formuleren voor de afname van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag als voor de afname van klassengebonden stemgedrag. In navolging van Evans (2000) groepeer ik de verklaringen in twee brede categorieën. 1) Verklaringen die er vanuit gaan dat de afname in klassen/godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag het gevolg is van sociale veranderingen, de zogenaamde 'bottom-up' (van-onder-naar-boven) benadering. 2) Verklaringen die politieke veranderingen als belangrijkste bron van verandering in klassen/godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag gebruiken, de zogenaamde 'top-down (van-boven-naar-onder) benadering.

In de vier volgende empirische hoofdstukken richt ik me op specifieke vragen over trends en landenverschillen in klasse- en religiegebonden stemgedrag. Dit boek kent daarbij twee delen. Het eerste deel bestaat uit grootschalige vergelijkende studies naar de invloed van klasse/godsdienst op stemgedrag 13 (hoofdstuk 2) en 15 (hoofdstuk 3) moderne democratieën in West-Europa, de Verenigde Staten en Australië in de periode 1960 tot 2008. Voor dit doel heb ik een nieuw grootschalig databestand samengesteld, de *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (CDCV). In dit bestand zijn de gegevens geïntegreerd van 196 afzonderlijke survey-onderzoeken in Australië, België, Denemarken, Duitsland, Engeland, Finland, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk, de Verenigde Staten, Spanje, Zweden en Zwitserland tussen 1960 en 2008. Dit databestand biedt daarmee de grootste verzameling aan gekoppelde (kiezers) onderzoeken met betrekking tot godsdienst- en klassengebonden stemgedrag voor Westerse landen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het grootschalige karakter van het eerste deel van dit proefschrift heeft als belangrijkste nadeel dat er alleen vergelijkingen in grove categorieën mogelijk zijn, en dat het aantal vergelijkbare variabelen per survey beperkt is. In het tweede deel van dit boek richt ik me daarom op trends in klasse- en godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in één land, te weten: Nederland. Voor dit doel gebruik ik data van de Nationale Kiezersonderzoeken (NKO) tussen 1971 en 2006.

Deel 1: sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag in vergelijkend perspectief

Hoofdstuk 2: Sociale klasse versus godsdienst als determinant van stemgedrag

In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de mate van en de verandering klassen-/godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in 13 westerse landen in de periode 1960 tot 2008. Voor dit hoofdstuk maak ik gebruik van de 125 surveys in het CDCV-bestand die voldoende informatie bevatten over zowel de sociale klasse van mensen als hun godsdienstige achtergrond. In dit hoofdstuk beantwoord ik de eerste centrale vraag van dit proefschrift over crossnationale verschillen en trends in de *relatieve invloed* van sociale klasse op stemgedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van godsdienst. Twee deelvragen staan centraal: (a) In hoeverre hangt een sterk verband tussen sociale klasse en stemgedrag samen met een zwak verband tussen godsdienst en stemgedrag? (b) In hoeverre zijn de verschillen tussen de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag en de mate van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in landen afgenomen, toegenomen of stabiel?

Ik begin hoofdstuk 2 met een uitgebreide bespreking van de literatuur omtrent de relatieve invloed van sociale klasse en godsdienst op stemgedrag. Ik laat daarbij zien dat het moeilijk is om resultaten van verschillende onderzoeken met elkaar te vergelijken. Er bestaan namelijk grote verschillen in de manier waarop sociale scheidslijnen gemeten worden, en hoe hun invloed op stemgedrag wordt geanalyseerd. Scheidslijnen op basis van sociale klasse en godsdienst worden veelal gemeten op basis van verschillende contrasten, classificaties en indicatoren. De afhankelijke variabelen zijn vaak te landenspecifiek om internationaal te kunnen vergelijken. En er bestaat een grote diversiteit aan criteria die worden gehanteerd om de sterkte van een scheidslijn te kunnen bepalen. In tegenstelling tot veel voorgaand onderzoek gebruik ik in dit hoofdstuk uniforme metingen van scheidslijnen in alle landen, gebaseerd op multicategoriale typologieën van zowel scheidslijnen als politieke partijen. Vooruitgang wordt ook gemaakt door de analyses te richten op de relatieve invloed van godsdienst versus sociale klasse, en door veranderingen in de effecten van sociale klasse en godsdienst simultaan te modelleren. Om de invloed van scheidslijnen te beoordelen hanteer ik twee criteria; de kappa-index en de toegevoegde verklaarde variantie.

Met betrekking tot de eerste deelvraag laten mijn analyses zien dat er een positieve samenhang bestaat tussen de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag

in een land en de mate van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag. Deze bevindingen weerspreken de bewering van Lijphart (1979) dat klasse alleen een sterke invloed kan hebben wanneer de invloed van godsdienst zwak is. Ik vind dat sociale klasse over het algemeen belangrijker is voor stemgedrag dan godsdienst in vijf landen, te weten: Australië, Engeland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk en Zweden. In zes landen vind ik dat godsdienst een sterkere basis voor stemgedrag vormt dan sociale klasse. Deze landen zijn België, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Spanje en Zwitserland. Met betrekking tot Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten bieden mijn resultaten een minder duidelijke conclusie.

De tweede vraag in hoofdstuk 2 richtte zich op veranderingen in de relatieve invloed van sociale klasse/godsdienst op stemgedrag. Ik vind dat in de meeste landen de samenhang tussen partijkeuze en zowel sociale klasse als godsdienst afneemt. Ondanks de afname in de sterkte van deze effecten blijft de hiërarchie tussen sociale klasse en godsdienst als voorspeller van stemgedrag in de meeste landen ongewijzigd. Tegenwoordig is godsdienst belangrijker dan sociale klasse in globaal dezelfde landen als in de jaren zeventig. Het relatieve belang van godsdienst ten opzichte van sociale klasse neemt echter af in België en Italië, en keert zelfs om in Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten. In Australië en Oostenrijk was, en blijft, sociale klasse een belangrijkere determinant van stemgedrag dan godsdienst. In Zweden en Engeland heeft het relatieve effect van sociale klasse ten opzichte van godsdienst flink aan kracht ingeboet. Tegenwoordig vinden we de sterkste relatieve effecten van sociale klasse versus godsdienst in Zweden, waar zowel de toegevoegde proportie verklaarde variantie als de kappa-index van sociale klasse twee maal zo groot zijn dan die van godsdienst. Religie is tegenwoordig het meest dominant ten opzichte van sociale klasse in Nederland. Het effect van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag gemeten in kappa-index is ongeveer tweemaal groter dan dat van klassengebonden stemgedrag. In termen van toegevoegde verklaarde variantie is dit zelfs vijftien keer.

Hoofdstuk 3: Klassengebonden stemgedrag en links-rechts posities van politieke partijen

Na het vaststellen van de trends in godsdienst-/ en klassengebonden stemgedrag in hoofdstuk 2, zijn de resterende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift erop gericht dergelijke veranderingen te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 3 richt ik mij op de vraag in hoeverre het de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag, en veranderingen daarin, verklaard kunnen worden door sociale veranderingen en de posities van

politieke partijen. Ik beantwoord deze vraag door het effect te schatten van links-rechts posities van partijen op de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag door middel van een hiërarchische twee-staps analyse. Ik maak in dit hoofdstuk gebruik van gegevens uit 15 landen in het CDCV-bestand aangevuld met informatie van het Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006).

In dit hoofdstuk toets ik drie 'top-down' hypothesen; (1) De mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag is lager naarmate de links-rechts posities van linkse partijen meer centristisch zijn. En (2) De mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag is lager in minder links-rechts gepolariseerde partij systemen. En (3) bewegingen naar het ideologische midden door linkse partijen of de-polarisatie van het partij system verklaren de afname in klassengebonden stemgedrag. De voorgaande hypothesen worden getoetst nadat vastgesteld is in welke mate 'bottom-up' veranderingen de daling in klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloeden. Mijn analyses laten zien dat compositionele veranderingen leiden tot veranderingen in klassengebonden stemgedrag omdat controle voor achtergrondkenmerken (leeftijd, geslacht en opleiding), deels verantwoordelijk zijn voor de afname van electorale verschillen tussen sociale klassen. Met name verandering in de samenhang tussen opleiding en stemgedrag lijkt een relevante verklaring voor de afname van klassengebonden stemgedrag.

In dit derde hoofdstuk vind ik geen aanwijzingen voor de stelling dat de links-rechts positie van enkel linkse partijen de samenhang tussen sociale klasse en partijkeuze beïnvloed. Wel vind ik dat wanneer de ideologische verschillen tussen partijen kleiner zijn, dat dan de samenhang tussen sociale klasse en stemgedrag zwakker is. Ik concludeer daarom dat de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloed wordt door de mate van politieke keuzes die het electoraat gepresenteerd krijgt. Om dit 'top-down' effect te vinden is het echter belangrijk om naar de polarisatie van partijen te kijken, in plaats van naar de absolute positie van linkse partijen. Verschillen in partij polarisatie noch in posities van linkse partijen kunnen echter trends in klassen gebonden stemgedrag verklaren. De reden hiervoor is wellicht gelegen is het gebrek aan stelselmatige samenhang tussen verschuivingen van linkse partijen, of ideologische convergentie van partijen, en tijd.

Deel 2: Trends in de samenhang tussen sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag in Nederland

Hoofdstuk 4: Klassengebonden in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2006

In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik trends in godsdienst en klassengebonden stemgedrag in Nederland. Door gebruik te maken van gedetailleerdere maten en geavanceerdere analyse technieken ten opzichte van het landenvergelijkende deel, kan ik me in dit deel van het proefschrift uitgebreider richten op de vraag in welke mate 'bottom-up' en 'top-down' veranderingen verantwoordelijk zijn voor veranderingen in godsdienst en klassengebonden stemgedrag. In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik trends in klassengebonden stemgedrag in Nederland aan de hand van surveydata afkomstig van 11 Nationale Kiezersonderzoeken in de periode 1971 tot 2006. De belangrijkste vraag in dit hoofdstuk is in hoeverre sociale en politieke veranderingen verklaringen bieden voor veranderingen in klassengebonden stemgedrag in Nederland? Met betrekking tot de sociale veranderingen formuleer ik hypothesen over de heterogenisering van de dienstenklasse, de vervaging van ideologische scheidslijnen tussen klassen, en de invloed van opleiding. Hypothesen over politieke veranderingen hebben betrekking op de herstructurering van het Nederlandse partijsysteem na de formatie van GroenLinks, en veranderingen in de posities van partijen op de sociaaleconomische links-rechts dimensie en conservatief-progressief dimensie.

Door middel van een reeks multinomiale logistische regressie analyses vind ik dat de opkomst van de 'nieuwe' klasse van sociaal-cultureel specialisten een belangrijke verklaring is voor de veranderende samenhang tussen sociale klasse en stemgedrag. Over het algemeen vinden we dat het verschil tussen de arbeidende klasse en andere sociale klassen kleiner wordt over de tijd, maar bij de sociaal-cultureel specialisten lijkt er ook sprake te zijn van hergroepering. Hogere en lagere technocraten zijn niet alleen rechtser in hun stemgedrag, maar de sociaal-cultureel specialisten hebben in het bijzonder een sterke voorkeur ontwikkeld voor nieuw-linkse partijen zoals D66 en GroenLinks. Verder vind ik in dit hoofdstuk dat de ideologische verschillen tussen sociale klasse wat betreft economische herverdeling de laatste decennia zijn afgenomen. Maar wanneer constant gehouden wordt voor de economische ideologie van kiezers biedt dit slechts een gedeeltelijke verklaring voor verandering in het verband tussen sociale klasse en partijkeuze. Sterker nog, ik vind dat de samenhang tussen economisch conservatisme en stemgedrag zelfs licht is toegenomen over de tijd.

Met betrekking tot opleiding vind ik dat een lage opleiding steeds minder samenhangt met stemmen op een linkse partij. Voornamelijk nieuw-linkse partijen worden in toenemende mate gekozen door mensen met een hoge opleiding. Met name voor de subklassen van de dienstenklasse geldt dat opleidingsniveau een verklaring biedt voor zowel de sterkte als de afname van de klasseneffecten op stemgedrag.

Met betrekking tot de zogenaamde 'top-down'-hypothesen over politieke veranderingen vind ik geen ondersteuning voor de verwachting dat de neerwaartse trend in klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloed zou zijn door de fusie van de PPR, PSP, CPN en EVP in GroenLinks. Of, en in welke mate partijposities de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloeden heb ik in dit hoofdstuk getoetst door gebruik te maken van conditionele logistische regressie modellen. Ik concludeer dat na rekening te houden met de bovenbeschreven sociale verklaringen, het vooral de economische links-rechts positie van partijen is, en niet hun conservatief-progressief positie, wat een significant effect heeft op de keuze tussen de vier grote partijgroepen in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2002. Echter, de mate waarin kiezers partijen stemmen met economische rechtse beleidsstandpunten verschilt niet tussen de arbeidende klasse en andere sociale klassen. Met betrekking tot de culturele posities van partijen vind ik dat arbeiders eerder op partijen stemmen naarmate deze conservatiever zijn, terwijl andere sociale klassen, en met name de sociaal-cultureel specialisten, vaker op partijen stemmen naarmate deze progressiever zijn. Maar hoewel ik in dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat er een duidelijke relatie bestaat tussen partijpositie en de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag, kunnen de veranderende partijposities niet verklaren waarom klassengebonden stemgedrag afneemt.

Hoofdstuk 5: Godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2006

In hoofdstuk 5 beantwoord ik de vraag in hoeverre veranderingen in godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland verklaard kunnen worden door sociale en politieke veranderingen. Net als in het vorige hoofdstuk toets ik in dit hoofdstuk eerst een reeks 'bottom-up'-hypothesen over sociale veranderingen alvorens twee typen 'top-down' hypothesen te toetsen over politieke veranderingen. Ik vind in dit hoofdstuk dat het verband tussen kerklidmaatschap en partijkeuze in Nederland sterk is afgenomen. Deze afname heeft voor het grootste deel plaatsgevonden voor 1986. Ik observeer dat met name de verschillen tussen

katholieken en gereformeerden enerzijds en niet-kerkleden anderzijds kleiner zijn geworden. De afname van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag wordt hoofdzakelijk verklaard door de terugloop in kerkgang, wat een indicatie is voor religieuze disintegratie. De samenhang tussen lid zijn van een protestantse kerk (Nederlands Hervormd of Protestantse Kerk Nederland) en het stemmen op een religieuze partij is slechts licht afgenomen. De verschillen in stemgedrag tussen protestanten en niet-kerkleden waren echter al klein in de jaren zeventig. Ik vind echter dat wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met de disintegratie van kerkleden, aan de hand van een veranderende invloed van kerkgang, protestanten zelfs steeds vaker op een religieuze partij stemmen ten opzichte van niet-kerkleden.

In hoofdstuk 5 toets ik twee hypothesen over politieke veranderingen. Ten eerste, vind ik dat de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU tot het CDA in 1977 heeft geleid tot een aanzienlijke daling van het godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland. Ik laat ook zien dat de invloed van godsdienst op stemgedrag is gedaald na de verkiezingen van 2002, het jaar waarin de GPV en RPF voor het eerst als de fusiepartij ChristenUnie aan de verkiezingen deelnamen. Beide partijfusies hebben niet alleen bijgedragen aan het verminderen van de samenhang tussen godsdienst en stemgedrag, ze zijn zelfs van belang wanneer de lineaire daling van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag al volledig wordt verklaard door religieuze disintegratie. Ik concludeer daarom dat naast sociale veranderingen partijpolitieke herstructureringen belangrijke bijdragen zijn aan het proces van religieuze “degroepering” in het Nederlandse electoraat.

Tot slot laat ik zien dat religieus stemgedrag wordt bevorderd wanneer partijen meer traditionele partijposities innemen. Met name niet-kerkleden zijn minder geneigd op partijen te stemmen naarmate deze meer nadruk leggen op traditioneel morele standpunten. Ik concludeer daarom dat partijen met traditioneel morele standpunten met name seculiere kiezers afstoten in plaats van religieuze kiezers aantrekken. Omdat de neerwaartse trend in godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag bijna volledig wordt verklaard door de afnemende invloed van kerkgang op partijkeuze, dragen de morele standpunten van partijen echter niet verder bij aan het verklaren van deze trend. Na rekening te houden met het afnemende effect van kerkgang blijft er een U-vormige curve over met betrekking tot de trend van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag sinds de jaren zeventig. Deze curve vertoont sterke gelijkenis met de nadruk die het religieuze partijen in Nederland (voornamelijk het CDA en haar voorlopers) door de tijd heen hebben gelegd op traditioneel morele beleidsstandpunten. Gemodelleerd als lineaire veranderingen in godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag wordt deze trend slechts heel beperkt

verklaard door rekening te houden met de traditioneel morele posities van partijen.

Slotbeschouwing

In het laatste hoofdstuk vat ik de bevindingen van dit proefschrift samen, en evalueer ik de gevoerde onderzoeksstrategie en gehanteerde analysetechnieken. Tot slot bespreek ik de wetenschappelijke bijdragen van dit proefschrift en de implicaties ervan voor toekomstig onderzoek. De onderzoeksstrategie in dit proefschrift is er één van grootschalig landenvergelijkend onderzoek gecombineerd met trendonderzoek in Nederland. In het slothoofdstuk stel ik vast dat er zowel voor- als nadelen aan deze aanpak zitten. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat de twee delen elkaar aanvullen. De landenvergelijkende hoofdstukken in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift stellen mij in staat algemene conclusies te trekken over de mate van samenhang tussen sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag binnen en tussen landen. De nadelen van deze vergelijkende analyses zijn gelegen in de beperkte mate van detail bij het meten van sociale klasse, godsdienst en stemgedrag, en het gebrek aan mogelijkheden om alternatieve verklaringen te toetsen voor variatie in klassengebonden stemgedrag. Maar de landenvergelijkende analyses laten daarentegen wel zien in hoeverre de trends in Nederland, zoals gevonden in het tweede deel van dit proefschrift, deel uit maken van bredere internationale ontwikkelingen.

Ik ga in dit slothoofdstuk uitgebreid in op de implicaties van gehanteerde operationalisering van stemgedrag, sociale klasse, godsdienst en partijposities zoals gehanteerd in de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. Deze bespreking richt zich vooral op de classificatie van variabelen in een beperkt aantal categorieën. Met betrekking tot stemgedrag bespreken we de implicaties van het indelen van Nederlandse politieke partijen in vier groepen, en het gebruik van slechts twee of drie categorieën voor stemgedrag in het landenvergelijkende onderzoek dit proefschrift. Met betrekking tot de operationalisering van sociale klasse bespreek ik met name de keuze om in het landenvergelijkende deel van dit proefschrift niet meer dan vier categorieën te hanteren, waarin verschillen tussen aparte segmenten van de dienstenklasse buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. De mate van differentiatie speelt ook een rol in de bespreking van de religieuze classificaties in dit proefschrift. Ik richt me daarbij vooral op verschillen tussen landen in mate waarin er informatie beschikbaar is over kerklidmaatschap van


respondenten. Met betrekking tot de operationalisering van partijposities ga ik zowel in op de voordelen en nadelen van de *Comparative Manifesto Project*-data, en de belangrijkste alternatieven voor deze data. In dit hoofdstuk besteed ik ook aandacht aan de analyse methoden en geschatte modellen. Ik bespreek daarbij in het bijzonder het gebruik van conditionele logistische (CL) regressie modellen in hoofdstukken 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift. Ik stel dat CL modellen voorzien in wetenschappelijke vooruitgang in het onderzoek naar sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag omdat in deze modellen zowel kenmerken van kiezers opgenomen kunnen worden als kenmerken van hun keuzealternatieven. CL modellen maken het daarom niet alleen mogelijk om 'top-down' theorieën strenger te toetsen, maar bieden ook een oplossing voor een empirisch probleem in vergelijkend onderzoek, namelijk: hoe om te gaan met het feit dat partij categorieën verschillen tussen tijdstippen en plekken. Ik beargumenteer dat CL modellen daarmee een voordeel hebben ten opzichte van de meer wijdverbreide multinomiale logistische (MNL) regressie modellen. Ook ga ik in dit hoofdstuk in op de zwakte van CL en MNL modellen, namelijk de assumptie van Onafhankelijkheid van Irrelevante Alternatieven (IIA, 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives'). Deze assumptie houdt in dat het toevoegen of verwijderen van een categorie van de afhankelijke variabele geen invloed heeft op de kansverhoudingen van de initiële of resterende alternatieven.

Ik besluit dit proefschrift met een beschouwing van wat dit proefschrift aan kennis heeft opgeleverd over de sociale en politieke verklaringen voor veranderingen in de samenhang van sociale scheidslijnen en politieke partijkeuze. Aan de hand van vragen, uitspraken en bevindingen in dit proefschrift geef ik daarbij suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. Met betrekking tot de 'bottop-up' verklaringen over sociale veranderingen laten de landenvergelijkende analyses in dit proefschrift onder andere zien dat de verschillen tussen de arbeidende klasse en andere sociale klassen deels tanende zijn vanwege de opkomst nieuwe scheidslijnen tussen kiezers die een hoge opleiding hebben genoten en kiezers die dat niet hebben. Deze bevinding strookt met het idee van nieuwe culturele scheidslijnen waarbij hoger opgeleiden er over het algemeen progressievere denkbeelden op nahouden dan lager opgeleiden. Immers, ook in Nederland vinden we dat een hoge opleiding in steeds mindere mate een rechtse politieke partijkeuze voorspelt, en juist in steeds grotere mate geassocieerd moet worden met een voorkeur voor nieuw-linkse partijen. Tevens laten de analyses voor Nederland zien dat de heterogenisering van de dienstenklasse een cruciale rol speelt in het veranderende karakter van klassengebonden stemgedrag. Ik moedig


daarom andere onderzoekers aan het onderscheid tussen technocraten en sociaal-cultureel specialisten mee te nemen in toekomstig onderzoek naar klassenverschillen in politieke gedragingen en opvattingen.

In dit proefschrift maak ik belangrijke stap vooruitgang in het onderzoek naar veranderende sociaal-politieke scheidslijnen door 'bottom-up' verklaringen uit te breiden met veranderingsprocessen die betrekking hebben op de rol van keuzealternatieven die partijen kiezers bieden. Mijn resultaten veronderstellen dat 'top-down' invloeden op klassengebonden stemgedrag vooral te maken hebben met verschillen tussen partijen, en niet zozeer met de economische positie van alleen linkse partijen. Deze bevinding weerspreekt de verwachting op basis van Przeworski and Sprague's (1985) 'Electorale Dilemma' dat klassengebonden stemgedrag afneemt als gevolg van het feit dat linkse partijen zich uit electorale noodzaak steeds sterker op de middenklasse richten om de afname van de arbeidende klassen in de samenleving te compenseren. Voor Nederland vind ik echter niet dat verschillen tussen partijen met betrekking tot economische standpunten verantwoordelijk zijn voor de afname van klassengebonden stemgedrag. Ik vind in Nederland echter wel substantiële klassenverschillen in de mate waarin progressieve of conservatieve partijstandpunten leiden tot een stem op een partij. Arbeiders stemmen eerder op partijen naarmate deze conservatiever zijn, terwijl andere sociale klasse vaker op partijen stemmen naarmate deze progressiever zijn. In dit opzicht lijkt het relevant dat partijen in Nederland divergerende posities innemen met betrekking tot 'nieuwe' politieke issues.

Hoewel ik vind dat partijposities niet in staat zijn de neerwaartse trends in klassengebonden stemgedrag te verklaren, betekent dit niet dat hypothesen over politieke veranderingen niet zinvol zijn. Het feit dat partijveranderingen geen lineaire trends verklaren, sluit niet uit dat ze wel in staat zijn meer tijdspecifieke veranderingen in sociaal-politieke scheidslijnen te verklaren. Voor Nederland heb ik laten zien dat de totstandkoming van het CDA en de ChristenUnie religieusgebonden stemgedrag heeft beïnvloed, zelfs wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met de desintegratie van religieuze groepen. Deze bevinding is belangrijk omdat de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU tot het CDA zelf een reactie was op de secularisering in Nederland en de teloorgang van de oude confessionele partijen. Het toont aan dat 'bottom-up'-verklaringen los gezien kunnen worden van 'top-down', maar niet andersom. Sociale veranderingen kunnen gradueel zijn van aard, maar ze kunnen plotselinge politieke reacties uitlokken die leiden tot abrupte verschuivingen van sociale groepen in het electoraat.



References



- Aarts, K. and Thomassen, J. (2008). Dutch Voters and the Changing Party Space 1989-2006. *Acta Politica*, 43: 203-234.
- Aarts, O. (2010). *Religious diversity and religious involvement. A study of religious markets in Western societies at the end of the twentieth century*. Nijmegen: ICS-Dissertation. Radboud University.
- Aarts, O., Need, A., Te Grotenhuis, M. and De Graaf, N.D. (2008). Does Belonging Accompany Believing? Correlations and Trends in Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000. *Review of Religious Research*, 50: 16-34.
- Achen, C.H. (2005). Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation: Beyond Regression Analysis. *Political Analysis*, 13: 447-56.
- Achterberg, P. (2006). Class Voting in the New Political Culture. Economic, Cultural and Environmental Voting in 20 Western Countries. *International Sociology*, 21: 237-261.
- Achterberg, P. and Houtman, D. (2006). Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behaviour. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 75-92.
- Agresti, A. (2002). *Categorical Data Analysis*. New York: Wiley.
- Alford, R. (1963). *Party and Society. The Anglo-American Democracies*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Alvarez, R. and Nagler, J. (1998). When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42: 55-96.
- Andersen, J.G. and Bjørklund, T. (1990). Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. *Acta Sociologica*, 33: 195-217.
- Andersen, R. and A. Heath (2003). Social Identities and Political Cleavages: The Role of Political Context. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society)*, 166: 301-327.
- Armington, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P., and Beyeler, M. (2008). *The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006*. Bern: Institut für Politikwissenschaft.
- Bakvis, H. (1981). Electoral Stability and Electoral Change - the Case of Dutch Catholics. *Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*, 14: 519-555.
- Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990). *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bean, C. (1999). The Forgotten Cleavage? Religion and Politics in Australia. *Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*, 22: 551-568.
- Belanger, P. and Eagles, M. (2006). The Geography of Class and Religion in Canadian Elections Revisited. *Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*, 39: 591-609.
- Bellucci, P. and Heath, O. (2007). The Political Salience of Social Cleavages in Italy, 1963 -2006". *Occasional Papers*, 18: Università di Siena. Dipartimento di scienze storiche, giuridiche, politiche e sociali.
- Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006). *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Berelson, B.R., Lazarsfeld, P. F. and McPhee, W. (1954). *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Best, R. (2007). *Disloyalty or Diminishing Numbers? Party System Fragmentation and the Decline of Traditional Social Cleavages*. Paper presented at the Nuffield College Political Science Seminar, October 23.
- Books, J.W. and Reynolds, J.B. (1975). A Note On Class Voting in Great Britain and the United States. *Comparative Political Studies*, 8: 360-376.
- Breen, R. and Hayes, B.C. (1997). Religious mobility and party support in Northern Ireland. *European Sociological Review*, 13: 225-239.
- Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (1997). Social Cleavages of Political Alignments in the United States, 1960-1992. *American Sociological Review*, 62(6): 937-946.
- Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P. and Manza, J. (2006). Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies. *Social Science Research*, 35: 88-128.
- Broughton, D. and Rudd, C. (1984). Secularization and Partisan Preferences - Definition and Operationalization. *European Journal of Political Research*, 12: 445-450.
- Broughton, D and Ten Napel, H.M. (2000). *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London: Routledge

REFERENCES

- Budge, I., Klingeman, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Budge, I. and Pennings, P. (2007). Do they work? Validating computerised word frequency estimates against policy series. *Electoral Studies*, 26: 121-129.
- Calvo, K. and Montero, J.R. (2002) Cuando ser conservador ya no es un problema: religiosidad, ideología y voto en las elecciones generales de 2000. *Revista española de ciencia política*, 6: 17-56.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E. and Stokes, D.E. (1960). *The American Voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Castles, F.G. and Mair, P. (1984). Left–right political scales: Some 'expert' judgements. *European Journal of Political Research*, 12: 73–88.
- Celis, K. (2006). Substantive representation of women and the impact of descriptive representation. case: the Belgian Lower House 1900–1979. *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy*, 28: 85–114.
- Chan, T.W. and Goldthorpe, J.H. (2007). Class and Status: The Conceptual Distinction and its Empirical Relevance. *American Sociological Review*, 72: 512-532.
- Charnock, D. (1997). Class and Voting in the 1996 Australian Federal Election. *Electoral Studies*, 16 (3): 281-300.
- Claassen, R.L. and Povtak, A. (2010). The Christian Right Thesis: Explaining Longitudinal Change in Participation among Evangelical Christians. *The Journal of Politics*, 72: 2-15.
- Clark, T.N. (2001). The Debate over "Are Social Classes Dying?". In: T.N. Clark and S.M. Lipset (Eds.) *The Breakdown of Class Politics. A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press: 273-320.
- Clark, T.N. and Lipset, S.M. (1991). Are Social Classes Dying?. *International Sociology*, 6: 397-410.
- Clark, T.N and Lipset, S.M. (2001). *The Breakdown of Class Politics. A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Converse, P.E. (1974). Some Priority Variables in Comparative Electoral Research. In Richard Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press.
- Dalton, R.J. (2002). Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change. In: L. Le Duc, R.G. Niemi, and P. Norris (Eds.), *Comparing Democracies 2. New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. Sage Publications Thousand Oaks, 189 - 209.
- Dalton, R.J. (2007). Partisan mobilization, cognitive mobilization and the changing American electorate. *Electoral Studies*, 26: 274-286.
- Dalton, R.J. (2008). Citizen Politics. *Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Fifth Edition*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without belonging*. Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
- De Graaf, N.D., (1996). Politieke voorkeur en politieke participatie. In: H. Ganzeboom and W. Ultee (Eds.). *Sociale Segmentatie in 2015*, Den Haag. WRR voorstudies en achtergronden V96.
- De Graaf, N.D., Heath, A. and Need, A. (2001). Declining cleavages and political choices: the interplay of social and political factors in the Netherlands. *Electoral Studies*, 20: 1- 15.
- De Graaf, N.D., Nieuwbeerta P. and Heath, A. (1995). Class mobility and political preferences: individual and contextual effects. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100: 97-127.
- De Graaf N.D. and Steijn, B. (1997). De 'service' klasse in Nederland: een voorstel tot aanpassing van de EGP- klassenindeling. *Tijdschrift voor sociologie*, 18: 131-154.
- De Graaf, N.D. and Te Grotenhuis, M. (2008). Traditional Christian Belief and Belief in the Supernatural: Diverging Trends in the Netherlands Between 1979 and 2005? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 47: 585-598.
- De Jong, J.J. (1954). *Overheid en Onderdaan*. Wageningen: Zomer & Keunings.
- Den Uyl, J. (1951). *Verkiezingen in Nederland: De Ontwikkelingen en Verspreiding van Politieke Voorkeuren en hun Betekenis voor de Partij van de Arbeid*. Amsterdam: Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- Dogan, M. (1995). Erosion of class voting and of the religious vote in Western Europe. *International social science journal*, 47: 525-538.

- Dogan, M. (2004). From Social Class and Religious Belief to Status Incongruence in Post-Industrial Societies. *Comparative Sociology*, 3: 163-198.
- Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 65: 135-150.
- Dunleavy, P. (1980). The political implications of sector cleavages and the growth of state employment: Part II, Cleavage structure and political alignment. *Political Studies*, 28: 524-549.
- Durkheim, É. (1967 [1897]). *Suicide; a study in sociology*. New York: Free Press.
- Eisinga, R., Coenders, M., Felling, A., Grotenhuis, M. te, Oomens, S. and Scheepers, P. (2002). *Religion in Dutch society 2000. Documentation of a national survey on religious and secular attitudes in 2000*. The Hague: DANS.
- Eisinga, R., De Graaf, N.D., Levels, M., Need, A. and Scheepers (2008). *Religion in Dutch Society 2005. Documentation of a National Survey on Religious and Secular Attitudes in 2005*, The Hague: DANS.
- Eisinga, R., Felling, A. and Lammers, J. (1994). Religious Affiliation, Income Stratification, and Political-Party Preference in the Netherlands, 1964 to 1992. *Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences*, 30: 107-127.
- Eisinga, R., Felling, A., and Franses, H. (1997). De afbrokkeling van het electoraat van (de voorlopers van) het CDA, 1965-1994. *Sociologische Gids*, 44: 77-99.
- Eisinga, R., Felling, A., Peters, J. and Scheepers, P. (1992). *Social and cultural trends in the Netherlands. Documentation of national surveys on religious and secular attitudes in 1979, 1985 and 1990*. The Hague: DANS.
- Eisinga, R., Felling, A., Peters, J. and Scheepers, P. (1999). *Religion in Dutch society 95. Documentation of a national survey on religious and secular attitudes in 1995*. Amsterdam: The Hague: DANS.
- Eiff, M. (2007). Social Structure and Electoral Behavior in Comparative Perspective: The Decline of Social Cleavages in Western Europe Revisited. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5: 277-294.
- Eiff, M. (2009). Social Divisions, Party Positions and Electoral Behaviour. *Electoral Studies*, 28: 297 - 308.
- Esmer, Y. and Pettersson, T. (2007). The effects of religion and religiosity on voting behavior. In: R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 481-503.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). Politics without Class. Postindustrial Cleavages in Europe and America. In: H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. Stephens (Eds.). *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 293-316.
- Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J.H. and Portocarrero, L. (1979). Intergenerational class mobility in three western European societies: England, France and Sweden. *British Journal of Sociology*, 30:415-441.
- Evans, G. (1999). *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, G. (1999b). Class Voting: From Premature Obituary to Reasoned Appraisal. In: G. Evans (Ed.). *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-20.
- Evans, G. (1999c). Class and Vote: Disrupting the Orthodoxy. In G. Evans (Ed.) *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 323-334.
- Evans, G. (2000). The Continued Significance of Class Voting. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 401-417.
- Evans, G., Heath A. and Payne C. (1991). Modelling trends in the Class/Party relationship 1964-87, *Electoral Studies*, 10: 99-117.
- Evans, G., Heath A. and Payne, C. (1999). Class: Labour as a Catch-All Party? in: G. Evans and P. Norris (Eds.) *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective*. London: Sage: 87-101.
- Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (2011). How Parties Shape Class Politics: The British Case. In: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.). *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming).
- Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. (2006). Explaining the Emergence and Persistence of Class Voting for Presidential Candidates in Post-Soviet Russia, 1993-2001. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59: 22-34.
- Felling, A. and Peters, J. (1986). Conservatism: a multidimensional concept. *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, 22: 36-60.

REFERENCES

- Franklin, M.N. (1985). *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-1983*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Franklin, M. N. (1992). The decline of cleavage politics. In: M.N. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen et al. (Eds.). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*: Cambridge University Press.
- Franklin, M.N., T. Mackie, H. Valen et al. (1992). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*: Cambridge University Press.
- Ganzeboom, H.B.G., Luijkx, R. (2004). More Recent Trends in Intergenerational Occupational Class Reproduction in the Netherlands 1970-2004. Evidence from an Expanded Database. *Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences*, 40: 114-142.
- Ganzeboom, H.B.G., Treiman, D.J. (2009). *International Stratification and Mobility File: Conversion Tools*. <http://home.fsw.vu.nl/hbg.ganzeboom/ismf>. [November 2009].
- Ganzeboom, H.B.G. Treiman, D.J. and Ultee, W.C. (1991). Comparative Integenerational Stratification Research: Three Generations and Beyond. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17: 227-302.
- Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechfofer, F. and Platt, J. (1968). *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldthorpe, J.H. (1982). On the service class, its formation and future. In: A. Giddens and G. Mackenzie (Eds.). *Social Class and the Division of Labour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 162-185.
- Goldthorpe, J.H. (1996). Class and Politics in advanced industrial societies. In: D.J. Lee and B.S. Turner (Eds.). *Conflicts about Class. Debating Inequality in Late Industrialism*. London: Longman.
- Goldthorpe J. H. (1999). Modelling the Pattern of Class Voting in British Elections, 1964-92. In: G. Evans (Ed.). *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 59-82.
- Güveli, A. (2006). *New social classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain. Adjusting the EGP class schema for the technocrats and the social cultural specialists*, Nijmegen: ICS-Dissertation. Radboud University.
- Güveli, A., De Graaf, N. D. (2007). Career Class (Im)mobility of the Social-Cultural Specialists and the Technocrats in the Netherlands. *European Sociological Review*, 23: 185-201.
- Güveli, A., Need, A., De Graaf, N.D. (2007a). Socio-Political, Cultural and Economic Preferences and Behaviour of the Social and Cultural Specialists and the Technocrats. Social Class or Education?. *Social Indicators Research*, 81: 597-631.
- Güveli, A., Need, A., De Graaf, N. D. (2007b). The rise of 'new' social classes within the service class in the Netherlands. Political orientation of social and cultural specialists and technocrats between 1970 and 2003. *Acta Sociologica*, 50: 129-146.
- Hazelrigg, L.E. (1970). *Religious and Class Bases for Political Conflict in Italy.* *The American Journal of Sociology*, 75: 496-511.
- Heath, A., Curtice, J., Jowell, R., Evans, G., Field, J. and Witherspoon, S. (1991). *Understanding Political Change: The British Voter, 1964-1987*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Heath, A., Evans, G. and Payne, C. (1995). Modelling the class-party relationship in Britain, 1964-92. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society)*, 158: 563-574.
- Heath, A., De Graaf, N. D. and Need, A. (1997). Class and nation in England and Scotland. *British elections and parties yearbook*, 7: 57-73.
- Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J. (1985). *How Britain Votes*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Heath, A., Jowell R. and Curtice, J. (1987). Trendless Fluctuation: A Reply to Crewe. *Political Studies*, 35: 256-277.
- Hendrickx, J. (2000). Special Restrictions in Multinomial Logistic Regression. *Stata Technical Bulletin*, 56:18-26.
- Henjak, A. (2009). *Socioeconomic Change, Changing Political Cleavages, and the Emergence of New Parties*. Budapest: Dissertation. Central European University.
- Hill, K. (1974). Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society. In: R. Rose (Ed.). *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press.

- Hout, M., Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (1995). The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948-1992. *American Sociological Review*, 60: 805-828.
- Houtman, D. (2003). *Class and politics in contemporary social science: "Marxism Lite" and its blind spot for culture*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Huber, J. and Inglehart, R. (1995). Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies. *Party Politics*, 1: 73-111.
- Hug, S. and Trechsel, A.H. (2002). Clivages et identification partisane In: S. Hug and P. Sciarini (Eds.). *Changements de valeurs et nouveaux clivages politiques en Suisse*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 207-235.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1988). The Renaissance of Political-Culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82: 1203-1230.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and post-modernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Irwin, G.A., Van Holsteyn, J.J.M. (2008). Scientific Progress, Educated Guesses or Speculation? On Some Old Predictions with Respect to Electoral Behaviour in the Netherlands. *Acta Politica*, 43: 180-202.
- Jagodzinski, W. and Dobbelaere, K. (1995). Secularization and Church Religiosity. In: J.W. van Deth and E. Scarborough (Eds.). *The Impact of Values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Janowitz, M and Segal, D.R. (1967). Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain and the United States. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 72: 601-618.
- Janse, C. S. L. 1985. Bevindelijk gereformeerden. In: C. S. L. Janse (Ed.), *Bewaar het pand. De spanning tussen assimilatie en persistentie bij de emancipatie van de bevindelijk gereformeerden* (62-90). Houten: Den Hertog B.V.
- Jennings, M. K. (1984). The Intergenerational Transfer of Political Ideologies in 8 Western Nations. *European Journal of Political Research*, 12: 261-276.
- Kalyvas, S.N. (1996). *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Western Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kelley, J. and Evans, M.D.R. (1995). Class and Class Conflict in Six Western Nations. *American Sociological Review*, 60: 157-178.
- Keman, H. and Pennings P. (2006). Competition and Coalescence in European Party Systems: Social Democracy and Christian Democracy Moving into the 21st Century. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 12: 95-126.
- Kim, J.O. and Ohn, M.G. (1992). A Theory of Minor-Party Persistence - Election Rules, Social Cleavage, and the Number of Political-Parties. *Social Forces*, 70: 575-599.
- Kitschelt, H. (1993). The Green phenomenon in western party systems. In: S. Kamieniecki (Ed.). *Environmental Politics in the International Arena. Movements, Parties, Organizations, and Policy*. Albany: Suny.
- Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The transformation of European social democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (1999). European Social Democracy. Between Political Economy and Electoral Competition. In: H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. Stephens (Eds.). *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. New York. Cambridge University Press.
- Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J., and Budge, I. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Knutsen, O. (1988). The Impact of Structural and Ideological Party Cleavages in Western European Democracies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 18: 323-52.
- Knutsen, O. (1998). Change in party policy positions: Comparing expert surveys. *West European Politics*, 21: 63-94.
- Knutsen, O. (2004). Religious Denomination and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study from Eight Countries, 1970-97. *International Political Science Review*, 25: 97-128.
- Knutsen, O. (2006). *Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Lanham : Lexington Books.

REFERENCES


- Knutsen, O. (2007). The Decline of Social Class. In: R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 457-480.
- Korpi, W. (1983). *The Democratic Class Struggle*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Krouwel, A. (1995). Partij Vorming in Nederland. De teloorgang van de traditionele politieke partij? *Jaarboek Documentatie Centrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen 1995*. Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: 168-191.
- Lachat, R. (2006). *Measuring Cleavage Strength*. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31 – September.
- Lammers, J., Pelzer, B., Hendrickx, J. and Eisinga, R. (2007). *Categorische Data Analyse met SPSS. Inleiding tot loglineaire analysetechnieken*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Lancaster, T. (1992). Spain. In: M.N. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen et al. (Eds.). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*: Cambridge University Press: 327-338.
- Lane, J.E. and Ersson, S.O. (1997). Parties and voters: What creates the ties? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 20: 179-96.
- Lane, J.E. and S.O. Ersson (1999). *Politics and Society in Western Europe*. London; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Laver, M. and Budge, I. (1992). *Party policy and government coalitions*. London: Macmillan
- Layman, G.C. (1998). Religion and Political Behavior in the United States. The Impact of beliefs, affiliations and commitment from 1980 to 1994. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61: 288-316.
- Leege, D.C., and Kellstedt, L.A. (1993). *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe.
- Lenski, G.E. (1970). *Human Societies: A Macrolevel Introduction to Sociology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1984) France: The Stalled Electorate. In: R.J. Dalton, C.S Flanagan and P.A. Beck (Eds.). *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 425-448.
- Lewis-Beck, M.S. and Skalaban, A. (1992). France. In: M.N. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen et al. (Eds.). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*: Cambridge University Press: 167-178.
- Liddle, R.W. and Mujani, S. (2007). Leadership, party, and religion - Explaining voting behavior in Indonesia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40: 832-857.
- Lijphart, A. (1979). Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting: The Crucial Experiment of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. *American Political Science Review*, 73: 442-458.
- Lipset, S.M. (1959). Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism. *American Sociological Review*, 24: 482-502.
- Lipset, S.M. (1960). *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*. London: Heinemann.
- Lipset, S.M. (1983). *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. Expanded and updated edition*. London: Heinemann.
- Lipset, S.M. (1991). No Third Way: A Comparative Perspective on the Left. In: D. Chirot (Ed.). *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left*. Seattle: University of Washington Press: 183-232.
- Lipset, S.M. and Bendix, R. (1959). *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. London. The Free Press.
- Long, J.S. and Freese J. (2006). *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
- Lubbers, M. and Güveli, A. (2007). Voting LPF: Stratification and the Varying Importance of Attitudes. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 17: 21-47.
- Mackie, T., Mannheimer, R. and Sani, G. (1992). Italy. In: M.N. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen et al. (Eds.). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*: Cambridge University Press: 238-254.
- Madeley, J. (2000). Reading the Runes: The Religious Factor in Scandinavian electoral politics. In: D. Broughton and H.M Ten Napel (Eds.). *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London: Routledge: 28-43.

- Mair (1999). Critical Commentary. Four Perspectives on the End of Class Politics? In: G. Evans (Ed.). *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 308-312.
- Mair, P. and Mudde, C. (1998). The party family and its study. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 211 – 229.
- Manza, J. and Brooks, C. (1997). The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960- 1992. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103:38-81.
- Manza, J. and Brooks, C. (1999). *Social cleavages and political change: Voter alignments and US party politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Manza, J., Hout, M. and Brooks, C. (1995). Class voting in capitalist democracies since world war two. Dealignment, Realignment, or trendless fluctuation? *Annual Review of Sociology*, 21: 137-162.
- Manza, J. and Wright, N. (2003). Religion and Political Behavior. In: M. Dillon (Ed.). *Handbook of Sociology and Religion*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 297-314.
- McAllister, I. (1992). *Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- McAllister, I. and White, S. (2007). Political parties and democratic consolidation in post-communist societies. *Party Politics* 13: 197-216.
- McDonough, P., Barnes, S.H. and Pina, A.L. (1988). Social Identity and Mass Politics in Spain. *Comparative Political Studies*, 21: 200-230.
- McDonough, P., Pina, A.L. and Barnes, S.H. (1981). The Spanish Public in Political Transition. *British Journal of Political Science*, 11: 49-79.
- McDonough, P., Shin, D.C and Moisés, J.A.(1998). Democratization and participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea. *Journal of Politics*, 60: 919-953.
- McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional Logit Analysis of qualitative Choice Behavior, in: P. Zarembka (Ed.) *Frontiers of Econometrics*. New York: Academic Press: 105-142.
- Middendorp, C.P. (1991). *Ideology in Dutch Politics: The Democratic System Reconsidered*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Minkenberg, M. (2010). Party politics, religion and elections in Western democracies. *Comparative European Politics*, 8: 385–414.
- Müller-Rommel, F. (2002). The Lifespan and Political Performance of Green Parties in Western Europe. *Environmental Politics*, 11: 1-16.
- Need, A.. (1997). *The Kindred Vote: Individual and Family Effects of Social Class and Religion on Electoral Change in the Netherlands*. Nijmegen: Thesis Publishers.
- Need, A. and De Graaf, N.D. (1996). 'Losing my Religion': a dynamic analysing of leaving the church in the Netherlands. *European Sociological Review*, 12: 87-99.
- Nicolet, S. and Tresch, A. (2009). Changing Religiosity, Changing Politics? The Influence of "Belonging" and "Believing" on Political Attitudes in Switzerland. *Religion and Politics*, 2: 76-99.
- Nieuwbeerta, P. (1995). *The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-1990*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- Nieuwbeerta P. and De Graaf, N.D. (1999). Traditional Class Voting in Twenty Postwar Societies. In: G. Evans (Ed.) *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 23-56.
- Nieuwbeerta, P., De Graaf, N.D. and Ultee, W. (2000). The effects of class voting in post-war Western industrialized countries. *European Sociological Review*, 16: 327–348.
- Nieuwbeerta, P and Ganzeboom, H.B. (1996). International Social Mobility and Politics File. *Steinmetz Archive Dataset P1145*. Amsterdam: DANS Archive.
- Nieuwbeerta, P. and Ultee W.C (1993). Review of: Electoral Change, Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. *Acta Politica*, 28: 88-91.
- Norris, P. and Inglehart, R (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Norton, P. (2003). A critique of generative class theories of environmentalism and of the labour-environmentalist relationship. *Environmental Politics*, 12: 96-119.


REFERENCES

- Obach, B.K. (2002). Labor-Environmental Relations: An Analysis of the Relationship between Labor Unions and Environmentalists. *Social Science Quarterly*, 83: 82-100.
- Oskarson, M. (2005). Social Structure and Party Choice. In: J. Thomassen (Ed.) *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Owens, C. (2005). Black substantive representation in state legislatures from 1971–1994. *Social Science Quarterly*, 86: 779–91.
- Pakulski, J. and Waters, M. (1996). *The Death of Class*. London: Sage.
- Parkin, F. (1968). *Middle Class Radicalism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Pellikaan, H. (2002). Partijen in een politieke ruimte. *Jaarboek 2002 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*, Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: 206-229.
- Pijnenburg, B. (1994). De "C" van CDA. In: Van Kergbergen, K, Lucardi, P., ten Napel, H. (Eds.) *Geloven in Macht. De Christen-democratie in Nederland*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis: 117-139.
- Przeworski, A. (1985). *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski A. and Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rabe-Hesketh, S. and Skrondal, A. (2008). *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata (Second Edition)*. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Ragsdale, L. (1983). Responsiveness and Legislative Elections - toward a Comparative-Study. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 8: 339-378.
- Raymond, C. (2010). The continued of religious voting in the United States, Germany and Great Britain. *Electoral Studies (in press)*, doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.10.001.
- Reed, S.R. (2007). Analyzing secularization and religiosity in Asia. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 8: 327-339.
- Rose, R. and Urwin, D. (1969). Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2: 7-69.
- Sainsbury, D. (1990). Party Strategies and the Electoral Trade-off of Class-Based Parties. *European Journal of Political Research*, 18: 29-50.
- Sartori, G. (1969). From the sociology of politics to political sociology. In: S.M. Lipset (Ed.) *Politics and the Social Sciences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*. New York: Cambridge.
- Särilvik, B. (1969). Socioeconomic position, religious behavior, and voting in the Swedish electorate. *Quantity and Quality*, 4: 95-116.
- Scoble, H.M and Epstein, L.D. (1964). Religion and Wisconsin Voting in 1960. *The Journal of Politics*, 26: 381-396.
- Segatti, P. and Vezzoni, C. (2008). Religion and Politics in Italian Electoral Choice. Which Comes First in the New Century Electoral Divisions. *Polena: POLITICAL and Electoral Navigations*, 2: 9-28.
- Scheepers P., Te Grotenhuis, M. and Bosch A. (1999). Trends in conservatism in the Netherlands 1970-1992. In: H. de Witte and P. Scheepers (Eds.). *Ideology in the Low Countries: trends, models, and lacunae*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Schubert, G. (1980). Subcultural Effects on Judicial Behavior - a Comparative-Analysis. *Journal of Politics*, 42: 951-992.
- Sigelman, L and Yough, S.M (1978). Left-Right Polarization in National Party Systems: A Cross-National Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 11: 355-379.
- Smits, J. and Park, H. (2009). Five Decades of educational assortative mating in ten East Asian Countries. *Social Forces*, 88: 227-255.
- Stark, R. and Iannaccone, L.R. (1994). A supply-side reinterpretation of the Secularization" of Europe. *Journal for the scientific study of religion*, 33: 230-252.
- Stephens, J.D (1981). The Changing Swedish Electorate. Class Voting, Contextual Effects and Voter Volatility. *Comparative Political Studies*, 14: 163-204.
- Svallfors, S. (2007). Introduction. In: S. Svallfors (Ed.). *The Political Sociology of the Welfare State*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Ten Napel, H.M (1990). De paradoxale revival van de christen-democratie. In: Voerman, G. (Eds) *Jaarboek 1990 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*. Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: 131-154.
- Tingsten, H. (1937). *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics*. London: King & Son.
- Trechsel, A.H. (1995). Clivages en Suisse. Analyse des impacts relatifs des clivages sur l'électorat suisse lors des elections federates. *Research Study 31*. Geneva: Department of Political Science.
- Ultee, W. (1989). Beyond stratification and mobility: Dutch questions about openness, inequality and cumulations. In: W. Jansen, J. Dronkers and K. Verrips (Eds.). *Similar or different? Continuities in Dutch research on social stratification and social mobility*. Amsterdam: SISWO: 161-91.
- Ultee, W., Flap, H. and Arts, W. (1992). *Sociologie - vragen, uitspraken, bevindingen*. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.
- Van der Brug, W. (2003). How the LPF Fuelled Discontent: Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support. *Acta Politica*, 38: 89-106.
- Van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S. and De Vreese, C.H. (2009). Religion and Party Choice in Europe. *West European Politics*, 32: 1266-1283.
- Van der Eijk, C. and Niemöller, B. (1983). Stemmen op Godsdienstige partijen sinds 1967. *Acta Politica*, 18:169-182.
- Van der Kolk, H. (2000). Het afnemende belang van godsdienst en sociale klasse. In J. Thomassen, K. Aarts, and H. Van der Kolk (Eds.). *Politieke vedranderingen in Nederland 1971-1998*. Den Haag: Sdu: 121-138.
- Van der Holsteyn, J.J.M., Irwin, G.A. and Den Ridder, J.M., (2003). In the Eye of the Beholder: The Perception of the List PimFortuyn and the Parliamentary Elections of May 2002. *Acta Politica*, 38: 68-87.
- Van der Waal, J., Achterberg, P. and Houtman, D. (2007) Class is not dead—it has been buried alive: class voting and cultural voting in postwar western societies (1956–1990), *Politics & Society*, 35: 403–426.
- Van Wijnen, P. (2000). Ideologische oriëntaties en stemgedrag. In: J. Thomassen, K. Aarts en H. Van der Kolk (Eds.) *Politieke vedranderingen in Nederland 1971-1998*. Den Haag: Sdu: 139-152.
- Ventura, R. (2001). Family political socialization in multiparty systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(6): 666-691.
- Voas, D. and Crockett, A. (2005). Religion in Britain: Neither believing nor belonging. *Sociology: The journal of the British sociological association*, 39: 11-28.
- Volkens, A. (2007). Strengths and weaknesses of approaches to measuring policy positions of parties. *Electoral Studies*, 26: 108-120.
- Wald, K. and Wilcox, C. (2006). Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor? *American Political Science Review*, 100: 523-529.
- Wauters, B. (2010). Bringing Class (Back) In. *Methodological Reflections on Social Class and Representation*. *Representation*, 46: 183-195.
- Weakliem, D.L. (1993) Class consciousness and political change: voting and political attitudes in the British working class 1964 to 1970. *American Sociological Review*, 58: 382-397.
- Weakliem, D.L. and Biggart, R. (1999). Region and Political Opinion in the Contemporary United States. *Social Forces*, 77: 863-886.
- Weakliem, D. L. and Heath, A. (1999). The secret life of class voting: Britain, France, and the United States since the 1930s In: G. Evans (Ed.). *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 97-136.
- Werfhorst, H.G. Van de, and De Graaf, N.D. (2004). The Sources of Political Orientations in Post-Industrial Society: Social Class and Education Revisited. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55: 211-235.
- Wessels B. and Schmitt, H. (2008). Meaningful choices, political supply, and institutional effectiveness. *Electoral Studies*, 27: 19 – 30.
- White, S. and McAllister, I. (2000). Orthodoxy and political behavior in postcommunist Russia. *Review of Religious Research*, 41: 359-372.
- Zuckerman, A.S. (1975). Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5: 231-248.
- Zuckerman, A.S. (1982). New Approaches to Political Cleavage - a Theoretical Introduction. *Comparative Political Studies*, 15: 131-144.



Appendix



A.1 Data Sources

A.1.1 Data Archives:

ANES	American National Election Studies: Center for Political Studies, Ann Arbor (MI), USA
ASSDA	Australian Social Science Data Archive: The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
CDSP	Centre de Données Socio-Politiques, Paris, France
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Ann Arbor (MI), USA
CIS	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid, Spain
DANS	Data Archiving and Networked Services, Den Haag, the Netherlands
DDA	Danish Data Archive, Odense, Denmark
ESRC	ESRC Data Archive, Essex, United Kingdom
FSD	Finnish Social Science Data Archive, Tampere, Finland
ITANES	Italian National Election Survey, Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna, Italy
ICPSR	Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor (MI), USA
NSD	Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Bergen, Norway
SIDOS	Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the Social Sciences, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
SSD	Swedish Social Science Data Service, Göteborg, Sweden
ZA	Zentral Archive, Köln, Germany

A.1.2 Data files by country

<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>
Australia			AUS85I	DANS:P1145	2,3
AUS65	DANS:P1145	2,3	AUS86I	DANS:P1145	2,3
AUS67	DANS:P1145	2,3	AUS87	DANS:P1145	2,3
AUS73	DANS:P1145	3	AUS87I	DANS:P1145	2,3
AUS79	DANS:P1145	2,3	AUS90E	DANS:P1145	2,3
AUS84	DANS:P1145	2,3	AUS93E	ASSDA:0763	2,3

<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>
AUS96E	ASSDA:0943	2,3	Finland		
AUS98E	ASSDA:1001	2,3	FIN72S	DANS:P1145	3
AUS01E	ASSDA:1048	2,3	FIN75P	DANS:P1145	3
AUS04E	ASSDA:1079	2	FIN91E	FSD:1018	3
Austria			FIN95E	FSD:1031	3
AUT74P	DANS:P1145	2,3	FIN99E	FSD:1042	3
AUT85I	DANS:P1145	2,3	FIN03E	FSD:1260	3
AUT88I	DANS:P1145	2,3	France		
AUT89I	DANS:P1145	2,3	FRA67E	ICPSR:2978	2,3
AUS95I	ZA:2280	2,3	FRA68E	ICPSR:7274	2,3
AUS99I	ZA:3430	2,3	FRA78E	DANS:P1145	3
AUS03I	ZA:3910	2,3	FRA88E	CDSP:PE88	2,3
Belgium			FRA95E	CDSP:PE95	2,3
BEL75	DANS:P1145	3	FRA97E	CDSP:PE97	2,3
BEL91	DANS:P1228	2,3	FRA02E	CDSP:PEFV	2,3
BEL95	DANS:P1422	2,3	FRA06	CDSP:PE06	2
BEL99	CSES:1	2,3	FRA07	CDSP:PE07	2
BEL03	CSES:2	2,3	Germany		
Denmark			GER69E	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN71E	DDA:0658	3	GER69F	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN72S	DDA:0658	3	GER75P	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN75E	DDA:0658	3	GER76Z	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN77E	DDA:0658	3	GER77Z	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN79E	DDA:0658	3	GER78C	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN81E	DDA:0658	3	GER78X	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN84E	DDA:0772	3	GER79Z	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN87E	DDA:1340	3	GER79X	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN88E	DDA:1432	3	GER80A	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN90E	DDA:1564	3	GER80C	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN94E	DDA:2210	3	GER80P	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN98E	DDA:4189	3	GER80Z	DANS:P1145	2,3
DEN01E	DDA:12516	3	GER82A	DANS:P1145	3
			GER84A	DANS:P1145	2,3

<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>
GER86A	DANS:P1145	2,3	NET89E	DANS:P1000	2,3,4,5
GER87I	DANS:P1145	2,3	NET90S	DANS:P1145	2,3
GER88A	DANS:P1145	2,3	NET94E	DANS:P1208	2,3,4,5
GER90A	DANS:P1145	2,3	NET98E	DANS:P1415	2,3,4,5
GER94E	ZA:3911	2,3	NET02E	DANS:P1628	2,3,4,5
GER98E	ZA:3911	2,3	NET06E	DANS:P1719	2,3,4,5
GER02E	CSES:2	2,3			
GER05E	CSES:3	2			
Italy			Norway		
ITA68E	DANS:P1145	2,3	NOR65E	DANS:P1145	3
ITA75P	DANS:P1145	2,3	NOR72S	DANS:P1145	3
ITA85	DANS:P1145	2,3	NOR77E	DANS:P1145	3
ITA90E	ITANES:1990	2,3	NOR81E	DANS:P1145	2,3
ITA92E	ITANES:1992	2,3	NOR85E	DANS:P1145	2,3
ITA94E	ITANES:1994	2,3	NOR89E	DANS:P1145	2,3
ITA96E	ITANES:1996	2,3	NOR90I	DANS:P1145	3
ITA01E	ITANES:2001	2,3	NOR93E	ZA:3911	2,3
ITA06E	ITANES:2006	2	NOR97E	ZA:3911	2,3
			NOR01E	CSES:2	3
Netherlands			Spain		
NET70	DANS:P1145	2,3	SPA79E	CIS:1192	2,3
NET71	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5	SPA82E	CIS:1327	3
NET72E	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5	SPA86E	CIS:1542	2,3
NET74P	DANS:P1145	2,3	SPA89E	CIS:1842	3
NET76	DANS:P1145	2,3	SPA93E	CIS:2061	3
NET77E	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5	SPA96E	CIS:2210	3
NET77L	DANS:P1145	2,3	SPA00E	CIS:2384	2,3
NET79P	DANS:P1145	2,3	SPA04E	CIS:2559	2,3
NET81E	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5	SPA08E	CIS:2757	2
NET82E	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5			
NET85S	DANS:P1145	2,3	Sweden		
NET86E	DANS:P1145	2,3,4,5	SWE72S	DANS:P1145	3
NET87	DANS:P1145	3	SWE76E	ZA:3911	3
NET89M	DANS:P1145	3	SWE79E	ZA:3911	3
			SWE82E	ZA:3911	3

<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Archive:#</i>	<i>Chapter</i>
SWE85E	ZA:3911	2,3	ENG01E	ZA:3911	3
SWE88E	ZA:3911	2,3	ENG05E	ESRC:BES05	2,3
SWE91	DANS:P1145	3			
SWE91E	ZA:3911	2,3	United States		
SWE94E	ZA:3911	2,3	USA60E	DANS:P1145	2,3
SWE98E	ZA:3911	2,3	USA64E	DANS:P1145	2,3
SWE02E	CSES:2	2,3	USA66E	DANS:P1145	2,3
Switzerland			USA68E	DANS:P1145	2,3
SWI71E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA70E	DANS:P1145	2,3
SWI72	DANS :P1145	3	USA72E	DANS:P1145	2,3
SWI75E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA72G	DANS:P1145	3
SWI76P	DANS:P1145	3	USA73G	DANS:P1145	3
SWI79E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA74G	DANS:P1145	3
SWI87E	SIDOS:8862	3	USA74P	DANS:P1145	3
SWI91E	SIDOS:8862	3	USA75G	DANS:P1145	3
SWI95E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA76E	ANES:48-04	2,3
SWI99E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA76G	DANS:P1145	3
SWI03E	SIDOS:8862	2,3	USA77G	DANS:P1145	3
United Kingdom			USA78G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG64E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA80E	ANES:48-04	2,3
ENG66E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA80G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG70E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA82G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG74O	DANS:P1145	3	USA83G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG79E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA84E	ANES:48-04	2,3
ENG83E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA84G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG85I	DANS:P1145	3	USA85G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG86I	DANS:P1145	3	USA86G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG87E	DANS:P1145	2,3	USA87G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG87I	DANS:P1145	3	USA88E	ANES:48-04	2,3
ENG88I	DANS:P1145	3	USA88G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG89I	DANS:P1145	3	USA89G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG90I	DANS:P1145	3	USA90G	DANS:P1145	3
ENG92E	ZA:3911	2,3	USA92E	ANES:48-04	2,3
ENG97E	ZA:3911	2,3	USA96E	ANES:48-04	2,3
			US00AE	ANES:48-04	2,3
			US04AE	ANES:48-04	2,3

A.1.3 Data references

- ANES:48-04 American National Election Studies. *The 1948-2004 release of the Time Series Cumulative Data File*.
- ASSDA:763. Jones, R., McAllister, I., Denmark, D. and Gow, D. *Australian Election Study*, 1993.
- ASSDA:0943. Jones, R., McAllister, I. and Gow, D. *Australian Election Study*, 1996.
- ASSDA:1001. Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. *Australian Election Study*, 1998.
- ASSDA:1048. Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. *Australian Election Study*, 2001.
- ASSDA:1079. Bean, C., McAllister, I., Gisbon, R and Gow, D. *Australian Election Study*, 2004.
- CDSP:PE88 Mayer, N. et al. *Enquête post-électorale française*, 1988.
- CDSP:PE95 Mayer, N., Boy, D., and Lewis-Bec, M. *Enquête post-électorale française*, 1995
- CDSP:PE97 CEVIPOF. *Enquête post-électorale française*, 1997.
- CDSP:PEFV CEVIPOF. *Panel Électoral Français*, 2002.
- CDSP:PE06 CEVIPOF. *The Baromètre Politique Français*, 2006-2007.
- CDSP:PE07 CEVIPOF. *Panel Électoral Français*, 2007.
- CIS:1192 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1979
- CIS:1321 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1982
- CIS:1542 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1986
- CIS:1842 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1989
- CIS:2061 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1993
- CIS:2210 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 1996
- CIS:2384 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 2000
- CIS:2559 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 2004
- CIS:2757 *Postelectoral Elecciones Generales*, 2008
- CSES:1 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. *CSES Module 1 Full Release*. August 4, 2003
- CSES:2 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. *CSES Module 2 Full Release*. June 27, 2007.
- CSES:3 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. *CSES Module 3 First Advance Release*. March 29, 2010.
- DANS:P1000 Anker, H. and Oppenheim, E.V. *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek*, 1989.
- DANS:P1145 Nieuwbeerta, P and Ganzeboom, H.B. *International Social Mobility and Politics File*.
- DANS:P1208 Anker, H. and Oppenheim, E.V. *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek*, 1994.
- DANS:P1415 Aarts, K., Kolk, H. van der, and Kamp, M. *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek*, 1998.
- DANS:P1628 Irwin, G.A., Holsteyn, J.J.M. and Ridder, J.M. den. *Nationaal Kiezers-*

- onderzoek, 2002/3.*
- DANS:P1719 Aarts, K., Kolk, H., van der, Rosema, M., and Schmeets, H. *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 2006.*
- DDA:0658 Borre, Ole, et al. *Danish Election Studies Continuity File, 1971-1981.*
- DDA:0772 Borre, O., G. A..J., et al. *Danish Election Survey, 1984.*
- DDA:1340 Borre, O., J. Goul A., et al. *Danish Election Survey, 1987.*
- DDA:1342 Nielsen, H.J., Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T. (1988). *Danish Election Survey, 1988.*
- DDA:1564 Andersen, J.G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H.J.S. Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T. *Danish Election Survey, 1990.*
- DDA:2210 Andersen, J. and Borre,O. *Danish elections study, 1994.*
- DDA:4189 Andersen, J. G., Andersen, J., Borre, O. and H. J. Nielsen. *Danish Election Survey, 1998.*
- DDA:12516 Andersen, J. G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H. J., Andersen J., Thomsen, S. R. and Elklit, J. *Danish Election Survey, 2001.*
- ESRC:BES05 Sanders, D., Whiteley, P., Clarke, H. and Stewart, M. *British National Election Study, 2005.*
- FSD:1018 *Finnish Voter Barometer, 1991.*
- FSD:1031 *Finnish Voter Barometer, 1995*
- FSD:1042 *Finnish Voter Barometer, 1999*
- FSD:1260 *Finnish Voter Barometer, 2003*
- ITANES:90 Parisi, A.M.L. and Schadee, H.M.A. *Italian National Election Studies, 1990.*
- ITANES:92 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. *Italian National Election Studies, 1992.*
- ITANES:94 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. *Italian National Election Studies, 1994.*
- ITANES:96 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. *Italian National Election Studies, 1996.*
- ITANES:01 Caciagli, M. and Corbetta, P. *Italian National Election Studies, 2001.*
- ITANES:06 Bellucci, P. and Segatti, P. *Italian National Election Studies, 2006.*
- SIDOS:8862 Selb. P., Fontana, M. and Lachat, R. *Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects). Cumulative file, 1971-2003.*
- ZA:2280 International Social Survey Programme, *National Identity, 1995.*
- ZA:3430 International Social Survey Programme, *Social Inequality III, 1999.*
- ZA:3910 International Social Survey Programme, *National Identity II, 2003.*
- ZA:3911 Thomassen, J. *The European Voter Database. Continuity Files of National Election studies in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.*

A.2 Party classifications in chapters 2 and 3

Country	Left-wing parties (<i>Socialist, Communist and Left-socialist parties</i>)
Australia	ALP Australian labor party; DLP Democratic labor party; QLP Queensland labor party
Austria	SPO Socialist Party; KPO Communist party
Belgium	BSP - PSB - POB Belgian socialist party; PS Socialist Party Wallonia; SP-SPa Socialist Party Flanders
Denmark	SD Social Democratic Party; DKP Danish Communist Party; RF Justice party; SF Socialist Peoples Party; VS Left Socialists FK Common Course; EL Unity List
Finland	SDP Social democrats; STP Socialist workers party; SKDL Finnish peoples democratic union; TPSL Social democratic league of workers & smallholders; VAS Left Alliance
France	SFIO-PS Socialist party; PCF Communist party; minor left; other extreme left
Germany	SPD Social democrats; KPD-DKP Communist party; PDS- The Left
Italy	PCI Communist party; PSI Socialist party; PSDI Social democrats; PDS Democratic Party of the Left; PSIUP Socialist party of proletarian unity; PDUP Manifesto-party proletarian communism; PSU United socialist party; DP Proletarian democracy; Progressives; RC Communist Refoundation Party; PdCI Party of Italian Communists; Centre left coalition (generic)
The Netherlands	PVDA Labor party; CPN Communist party; SP Socialist party; PSP Pacifist socialist party; PPR Radical political party; DS70 Democratic socialist 70
Norway	DNA Norwegian Labor Party; SV Socialist Left Party; RV Red Electoral alliance; NKP Communist Party
Spain	PSOE Socialist Labor Party; PCE-U Communist Party /United Left; Left-wing Nationalists
Sweden	SAP Social Democratic Labour Party; VKP Swedish Communist Party - V Left Party
Switzerland	SPS - PSS Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Pda - Pdt Labour Party; POCH Progressive organization of Switzerland; minor left
United Kingdom	LAB Labour party
United States	D Democratic Party

Source: primarily based upon the classification by Lane and Ersson (1997); other sources: Nieuwbeerta (1995); Knutsen (2004); and own additions

Right-wing parties (liberal, conservative, agrarian, and other right parties)	Religious parties (Christian Democratic, Catholic and other denominational parties)
LPA Liberal party; NP National party - country party; CLP Country-liberal party; AD Australian democrats; ON One Nation	
FPO Freedom party; LF Liberal Forum	OVP Austrian peoples party
PVV - Party of liberty and progress; PLDP Brussels liberal party; PRL- Walloon Liberals; VLD - Flemish Liberals; VB Flemish Interest- Flemish Bloc; FN National Front – Wallonia; MR Reform Movement - Walloon Liberals	PSC - CVP Catholic party; CVP - CD&V, Flemish Christian Democrats; PSC - CDH Walloon Christian Democrats
CD Centre Democrats; V Left – Liberals; RV Radical Left – Liberals; KF Conservative Peoples Party; FRP Progress Party; DF Danish Peoples Party	KD Christian Democrats - KrF Christian Peoples Party
KESK Finnish Centre party; KOK National coalition; LKP Liberal peoples party; SMP Finnish rural party; PS True Finns; NUORS Young Finns	SKD Christian league - KD Christian Democrats
RFP Rally for the French People; UNR Union for the New Republic; UDR Union for the Defense of the Republic; RPR Rally for the Republic; UMP Union for the Popular Movement; MRP Popular Republican Movement; CDS Democratic and Social Centre; UDF Union for French Democracy; NC New Centre	
FDP Free democrats	CDU Christian democratic union; CSU Christian social union
PLI Liberal Party; PRI; Republican Party; FI Forza Italia; AN National Alliance; LN Northern League; Radical party; centre right coalition (generic)	DC Christian democrats; CCD Christian Democratic Centre; PPI Italian Popular Party; CCD-CDU, Whiteflower-list
VVD Liberal party ; D66 Democrats 66; New Middle Party; BP Farmers party;; CP Centre party; CD Centre Democrats; LPF List Pim Fortuyn	ARP Anti-revolutionary party; KVP Catholic party; CHU Christian Historicals; SGP Political reformed party; GPV Reformed political union; RKP Roman catholic party; CDA Christian democratic appeal; RPF Reformed political federation; EVP Evangelical peoples party; CU Christian Union
V Left – Liberals; H Right – Conservatives; DFL Liberal Peoples Party; ALP Anders langes party – FrP; FrP Progress party; SP Center party	KrF Christian Peoples Party
PP Popular Party; Right-wing Nationalists; UCD-CDS, centrists	
M Moderate Free Traders; FP Peoples party – Liberals; Middle parties – CP Centre Party; ND New Democracy	Kd-former KDS, Christian Democracy
SVP- UDC Swiss Peoples Party; FDP - PRD Radical Democrats; LPS - PLS Liberal Party of Switzerland - Liberal conservatives; Independents; National action; SD - DS Swiss Democrats - former Nation Action; FPS - PSL Freedom Party of Switzerland	CVP - PDC Christian Democratic Peoples Party – Catholic; EVP - PEP Protestant Peoples Party; CSP -PCS Christian Social Party; EDU - UDF - Federal Democratic Union
CON Conservative party; LIB Liberal Party; LIBDEM Liberal Democrats – the alliance	
R Republican Party	

A.3 Party classifications in chapters 4 and 5

Party group	Party (Dutch abbreviation)	Party name (English translation)
Old Left	PvdA	Labor Party
	DS70	Democratic Socialists '70
	CPN	Communist Party of the Netherlands
	SP	Socialist Party
New Left	D66	Democrats '66
	PPR	Political Party Radicals
	PSP	Pacifist Socialist Party
	EVP	Evangelical People's Party
	GroenLinks	GreenLeft
Liberal Right	VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
	BP	Farmer's Party
	NMP	New Middle Party
Religious	ARP	Anti Revolutionary Party
	KVP	Catholic People's Party
	CHU	Christian Historical Union
	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
	SGP	Political Reformed Party
	GPV	Reformed Political Alliance
	RPF	Reformed Political Federation
	CU	ChristianUnion
	RKPN	Roman-Catholic Party of the Netherlands

Appendix B: Chapter 2

B.1 Model selection

Australia: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=20,645)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1		1926851.2	27040.0	5
2		2026843.6	27042.3	6
3		2126844.1	27052.8	8
4		3026832.5	27130.6	11
5		4326794.4	27221.6	16
6		3226821.8	27139.7	12
7		4426784.4	27221.6	15
8		2226832.6	27051.2	7
9		5426779.4	27315.9	22
10		2226805.0	27023.5	1
11		2326798.9	27027.4	2
12		2426798.7	27037.2	3
13		3326786.9	27114.7	9
14		4626748.2	27205.2	13
15		3526777.4	27125.1	10
16		4726740.2	27207.2	14
17		2526789.2	27037.6	4
18		5726734.0	27300.3	21
19		5226764.3	27280.9	17
20		5326757.3	27283.9	18
21		5426758.2	27294.7	20
22		6326745.9	27371.8	23
23		7626709.3	27464.4	25
24		6526736.7	27382.4	24
25		7726700.3	27465.3	26
26		5526747.7	27294.1	19
27		8726694.8	27559.1	27
Models		Decrease -2LL (df)		Sig.
10 vs. 11		6.1 (1)		p < 0.05
11 vs. 12		0.2 (1)		n.s.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

Austria: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=3,227)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	24	5014.9	5208.8	1	-	-	-	-	-
2	26	5012.2	5222.2	5	2b	25	5014.9	5216.9	3
3	26	5013.6	5223.6	6	3b	25	5014.0	5216.0	2
4	36	4988.9	5279.7	24	4b	30	5002.6	5245.0	13
5	36	4994.5	5285.4	26	5b	30	5003.7	5246.1	14
6	38	4986.6	5293.6	27	6b	31	5001.8	5252.2	15
7	38	4990.0	5297.0	29	7b	31	5003.5	5254.0	16
8	28	5009.6	5235.8	10	8b	26	5013.9	5224.0	7
9	48	4968.8	5356.6	42	9b	36	4993.6	5284.4	25
10	30	4999.4	5241.8	12	10b	27	5002.8	5220.9	4
11	32	4995.7	5254.2	17	11b	28	5002.8	5229.0	9
12	32	4998.4	5256.9	18	12b	28	5001.8	5228.0	8
13	42	4972.5	5311.8	31	13b	33	4990.6	5257.2	19
14	42	4980.1	5319.5	34	14b	33	4991.4	5258.1	20
15	44	4970.7	5326.2	36	15b	34	4989.7	5264.4	21
16	44	4975.0	5330.5	37	16b	34	4991.3	5266.0	22
17	34	4993.6	5268.3	23	17b	29	5001.7	5236.0	11
18	54	4953.7	5390.0	44	18b	39	4981.5	5296.5	28
19	58	4957.1	5425.7	45	19b	41	4977.9	5309.1	30
20	60	4953.3	5438.1	46	20b	42	4977.9	5317.2	33
21	60	4956.0	5440.8	47	21b	42	4977.0	5316.3	32
22	70	4931.5	5497.0	49	22b	46	4965.2	5336.9	38
23	70	4938.8	5504.4	50	23b	47	4966.6	5346.3	39
24	72	4929.7	5511.4	51	24b	48	4964.4	5352.2	40
25	72	4933.8	5515.5	52	25b	48	4966.5	5354.3	41
26	62	4951.3	5452.2	48	26b	43	4976.9	5324.3	35
27	82	4913.3	5575.8	53	27b	53	4956.1	5384.3	43
Models	Decrease -2LL (df)		Sig.						
1.vs. 3b	0.9(1)		n.s.						

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

Belgium: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=6,776)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	18	13300.3	13459.1	2	-	-	-	-	-
2	20	13294.9	13471.3	7	2b	19	13297.5	13465.1	3
3	20	13290.7	13467.1	5	3b	19	13291.5	13459.0	1
4	24	13276.5	13488.1	20	4b	21	13291.9	13477.1	10
5	24	13276.3	13488.0	19	5b	21	13284.1	13469.3	6
6	26	13269.8	13499.1	29	6b	22	13285.6	13479.6	12
7	26	13274.0	13503.3	32	7b	22	13283.6	13477.6	11
8	22	13287.8	13481.9	15	8b	20	13290.6	13467.0	4
9	30	13262.0	13526.6	41	9b	24	13280.8	13492.5	25
10	24	13285.3	13497.0	28	10b	21	13288.8	13474.0	9
11	26	13280.0	13509.3	36	11b	22	13286.0	13480.0	13
12	26	13275.4	13504.8	34	12b	22	13279.5	13473.6	8
13	30	13261.3	13525.9	40	13b	24	13280.1	13491.8	23
14	30	13260.8	13525.4	39	14b	24	13272.1	13483.8	18
15	32	13254.3	13536.5	42	15b	25	13273.4	13493.9	27
16	32	13258.4	13540.7	43	16b	25	13271.6	13492.1	24
17	28	13272.6	13519.5	38	17b	23	13278.8	13481.6	14
18	36	13246.4	13563.9	46	18b	27	13268.7	13506.9	35
19	36	13235.5	13553.0	44	19b	27	13245.6	13483.7	17
20	38	13230.1	13565.3	47	20b	28	13242.5	13489.4	21
21	38	13225.5	13560.6	45	21b	28	13236.0	13482.9	16
22	42	13212.3	13582.7	50	22b	30	13236.8	13501.4	31
23	42	13211.1	13581.5	49	23b	30	13228.2	13492.8	26
24	44	13205.4	13593.5	51	24b	31	13230.0	13503.5	33
25	44	13208.8	13596.9	52	25b	31	13227.7	13501.1	30
26	40	13222.7	13575.5	48	26b	29	13235.1	13490.8	22
27	48	13197.7	13621.0	53	27b	33	13225.1	13516.2	37

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
3b vs. 1	n.a.	n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

France: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=17,872)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	13	22651.3	22778.6	5
2	14	22621.1	22758.2	1
3	14	22640.8	22777.9	4
4	20	22613.5	22809.3	10
5	20	22617.4	22813.2	11
6	21	22608.9	22814.5	12
7	21	22593.3	22798.9	9
8	15	22616.5	22763.4	2
9	27	22579.7	22844.1	17
10	16	22638.4	22795.0	8
11	17	22610.1	22776.6	3
12	17	22627.4	22793.9	7
13	23	22602.3	22827.5	14
14	23	22603.8	22829.0	15
15	24	22597.3	22832.3	16
16	24	22581.6	22816.6	13
17	18	22605.1	22781.3	6
18	30	22567.8	22861.5	18
19	34	22559.0	22891.8	22
20	35	22531.8	22874.5	19
21	35	22548.3	22891.0	21
22	41	22523.2	22924.6	24
23	41	22528.3	22929.8	26
24	42	22518.3	22929.5	25
25	42	22506.9	22918.1	23
26	36	22526.9	22879.3	20
27	48	22492.4	22962.4	27

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
2 vs.8	4.6(1)	p<0.05
8 vs.11	6.4(2)	p<0.05
11 vs. 3	n.a.	n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

Germany: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N= 25,244)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	44	44476.2	44922.2	3	-	-	-	-	-
2	46	44455.9	44922.2	2	2b	45	44459.7	44915.8	1
3	48	44442.3	44928.8	6	3b	46	44458.0	44924.3	4
4	74	44415.6	45165.7	20	4b	59	44443.5	45041.5	16
5	103	44368.9	45413.0	34	5b	74	44429.7	45179.8	21
6	78	44392.3	45183.0	23	6b	61	44432.5	45050.8	17
7	105	44359.6	45423.9	35	7b	75	44420.7	45180.9	22
8	50	44432.7	44939.6	9	8b	47	44448.9	44925.3	5
9	133	44325.6	45673.8	42	9b	89	44402.7	45304.9	28
10	50	44452.5	44959.3	12	10b	47	44462.2	44938.6	8
11	52	44433.2	44960.3	13	11b	48	44445.9	44932.4	7
12	54	44418.3	44965.7	14	12b	49	44443.8	44940.5	10
13	80	44393.3	45204.2	26	13b	62	44429.6	45058.1	18
14	109	44344.2	45449.1	37	14b	77	44415.6	45196.1	24
15	84	44369.5	45221.0	27	15b	64	44418.4	45067.1	19
16	111	44335.6	45460.7	39	16b	78	44406.8	45197.4	25
17	56	44409.4	44977.0	15	17b	50	44434.8	44941.7	11
18	139	44302.1	45711.0	44	18b	92	44388.9	45321.4	30
19	134	44370.2	45728.5	45	19b	90	44413.9	45326.2	31
20	136	44351.5	45730.0	46	20b	91	44397.8	45320.2	29
21	138	44336.9	45735.7	47	21b	92	44395.8	45328.3	32
22	164	44311.6	45973.9	49	22b	105	44381.7	45446.0	36
23	193	44262.9	46219.3	51	23b	120	44367.7	45584.1	40
24	168	44288.2	45991.2	50	24b	107	44370.5	45455.1	38
25	195	44254.3	46230.9	52	25b	121	44358.8	45585.4	41
26	140	44328.0	45747.1	48	26b	93	44386.8	45329.5	33
27	223	44220.7	46481.2	53	27b	135	44341.0	45709.4	43

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
2b vs. 2a	3.8 (1)	n.s

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

Italy: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 17 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=9,989)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	26	16660.4	16899.9	7	-	-	-	-	-
2	28	16654.8	16912.6	9	2b	27	16655.9	16904.5	8
3	-	-	-	-	3b	-	-	-	-
4	41	16630.9	17008.5	14	4b	33	16637.6	16941.5	12
5	-	-	-	-	5b	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	6b	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	7b	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	8b	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	9b	-	-	-	-
10	32	16490.9	16785.6	3	10b	29	16495.0	16762.1	1
11	34	16484.3	16797.5	4	11b	30	16490.3	16766.6	2
12	-	-	-	-	12b	-	-	-	-
13	47	16461.2	16894.1	6	13b	36	16472.4	16803.9	5
14	-	-	-	-	14b	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	15b	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	16b	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	17b	-	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	18b	-	-	-	-
19	74	16407.2	17088.7	15	19b	50	16461.7	16922.2	10
20	76	16401.3	17101.2	16	20b	51	16457.0	16926.7	11
21	-	-	-	-	21b	-	-	-	-
22	89	16378.5	17198.1	17	22b	57	16439.0	16963.9	13
23	-	-	-	-	23b	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	24b	-	-	-	-
25	-	-	-	-	25b	-	-	-	-
26	-	-	-	-	26b	-	-	-	-
27	-	-	-	-	27b	-	-	-	-

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
10b vs. 11b	4.7(1)	p<0.05
11b vs. 10	n.a.	n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

* denominational cleavage not measured

Netherlands: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=18,049)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	46	32516.2	32967.1	15	-	-	-	-	-
2	48	32434.2	32904.6	6	2b	47	32460.2	32920.8	10
3	50	32442.4	32932.4	11	3b	48	32450.2	32920.6	9
4	78	32354.3	33118.7	23	4b	62	32411.7	33019.3	18
5	110	32312.5	33390.6	39	5b	78	32377.6	33142.0	27
6	82	32314.0	33117.7	22	6b	64	32371.5	32998.7	17
7	112	32269.2	33366.9	36	7b	79	32351.1	33125.3	26
8	52	32394.3	32904.0	5	8b	49	32420.6	32900.8	2
9	142	32218.8	33610.5	43	9b	94	32317.5	33238.8	30
10	52	32456.6	32966.3	14	10b	49	32460.0	32940.2	13
11	54	32375.5	32904.8	7	11b	50	32402.8	32892.8	3
12	56	32383.7	32932.5	12	12b	51	32395.2	32895.1	4
13	84	32295.6	33118.8	24	13b	81	32298.7	33092.6	19
14	116	32252.6	33389.5	38	14b	81	32322.1	33116.0	21
15	88	32256.5	33119.0	25	15b	70	32312.5	32998.6	16
16	118	32210.8	33367.3	37	16b	82	32294.3	33097.9	20
17	58	32336.8	32905.3	8	17b	52	32364.3	32873.9	1
18	148	32160.0	33610.6	44	18b	97	32260.8	33211.4	28
19	142	32313.2	33705.0	48	19b	94	32378.2	33299.5	33
20	144	32233.7	33645.1	45	20b	95	32320.9	33252.0	31
21	146	32241.9	33672.8	47	21b	96	32313.8	33254.7	32
22	174	32157.3	33862.7	49	22b	110	32273.4	33351.5	35
23	206	32122.8	34141.8	52	23b	126	32241.1	33476.0	41
24	178	32119.3	33863.8	50	24b	112	32234.4	33332.1	34
25	208	32081.3	34119.9	51	25b	127	32213.1	33457.8	40
26	148	32196.1	33646.6	46	26b	97	32282.6	33233.3	29
27	238	32031.1	34363.7	53	27b	142	32180.3	33572.0	42

Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.

17b vs. 8b. n.a. n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

Norway: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 17 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=7,563)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	18	13322.5	13483.3	4	-	-	-	-	-
2	20	13318.1	13496.7	8	2b	19	13318.3	13488.0	5
3	-	-	-	-	3b	-	-	-	-
4	26	13306.6	13538.8	13	4b	22	13312.6	13509.0	9
5	-	-	-	-	5b	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	6b	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	7b	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	8b	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	9b	-	-	-	-
10	24	13264.6	13479.0	3	10b	21	13281.3	13468.8	1
11	26	13261.0	13493.2	6	11b	22	13276.2	13472.7	2
12	-	-	-	-	12b	-	-	-	-
13	32	13249.9	13535.7	12	13b	25	13270.7	13494.0	7
14	-	-	-	-	14b	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	15b	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	16b	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	17b	-	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	18b	-	-	-	-
19	42	13235.7	13610.8	15	19b	30	13260.9	13528.9	10
20	44	13232.1	13625.0	16	20b	31	13256.0	13532.8	11
21	-	-	-	-	21b	-	-	-	-
22	50	13221.2	13667.8	17	22b	34	13250.4	13554.1	14
23	-	-	-	-	23b	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	24b	-	-	-	-
25	-	-	-	-	25b	-	-	-	-
26	-	-	-	-	26b	-	-	-	-
27	-	-	-	-	27b	-	-	-	-

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
10b vs. 11b	5.1(1)	p<0.05
11b vs. 10	n.a.	n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

* denominational cleavage not measured

Spain: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 9 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=12,725)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1*	9	15477.4	15562.5	1
2*	10	15474.2	15568.7	2
3	-	-	-	-
4*	13	15462.4	15585.3	5
5	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-
10*	12	15463.2	15576.7	3
11*	13	15459.2	15582.1	4
12	-	-	-	-
13*	16	15447.7	15598.9	6
14	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-
19*	21	15435.5	15634.0	7
20*	22	15430.6	15638.6	8
21	-	-	-	-
22*	25	15420.4	15656.7	9
23	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-
25	-	-	-	-
26	-	-	-	-
27	-	-	-	-
Models	Decrease -2LL (df)		Sig.	
1 vs. 2.	3.2 (1)		n.s	

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

* denominational cleavage not measured

Sweden: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 7 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=9,958)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	
1	20	14351.8	14536.0		2	-	-	-	-	
2	22	14334.1	14536.6		3	2b	21	14337.5	14530.8	1
3	-	-	-	-	3b	-	-	-	-	
4	-	-	-	-	4b	-	-	-	-	
5	-	-	-	-	5b	-	-	-	-	
6	-	-	-	-	6b	-	-	-	-	
7	-	-	-	-	7b	-	-	-	-	
8	-	-	-	-	8b	-	-	-	-	
9	-	-	-	-	9b	-	-	-	-	
10	26	14337.5	14576.9	6	10b	23	14347.3	14559.1	5	
11	28	14320.3	14578.0	7	11b	24	14333.0	14554.0	4	
12	-	-	-	-	12b	-	-	-	-	
13	-	-	-	-	13b	-	-	-	-	
14	-	-	-	-	14b	-	-	-	-	
15	-	-	-	-	15b	-	-	-	-	
16	-	-	-	-	16b	-	-	-	-	
17	-	-	-	-	17b	-	-	-	-	
18	-	-	-	-	18b	-	-	-	-	
19	-	-	-	-	19b	-	-	-	-	
20	-	-	-	-	20b	-	-	-	-	
21	-	-	-	-	21b	-	-	-	-	
22	-	-	-	-	22b	-	-	-	-	
23	-	-	-	-	23b	-	-	-	-	
24	-	-	-	-	24b	-	-	-	-	
25	-	-	-	-	25b	-	-	-	-	
26	-	-	-	-	26b	-	-	-	-	
27	-	-	-	-	27b	-	-	-	-	

Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.

2b vs. 1 n.a. n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)
 * denominational cleavage not measured

Switzerland: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=9,115)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)	model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	24	16755.8	16974.6	12	-	-	-	-	-
2	26	16755.7	16992.8	18	2b	25	16755.7	16983.7	16
3	28	16721.8	16977.1	14	3b	26	16732.2	16969.2	10
4	34	16748.5	17058.5	33	4b	29	16751.2	17015.6	23
5	43	16702.8	17094.9	40	5b	33	16716.7	17017.5	25
6	38	16714.5	17061.0	34	6b	31	16727.6	17010.3	22
7	45	16702.4	17112.7	41	7b	34	16716.5	17026.5	26
8	30	16721.2	16994.7	19	8b	27	16731.9	16978.1	15
9	53	16694.4	17177.7	48	9b	38	16711.9	17058.3	32
10	30	16648.6	16922.1	1	10b	27	16684.1	16930.3	4
11	32	16648.0	16939.8	7	11b	28	16684.1	16939.4	6
12	34	16615.8	16925.9	2	12b	29	16662.3	16926.7	3
13	40	16641.1	17005.8	20	13b	32	16679.7	16971.5	11
14	49	16597.6	17044.3	31	14b	36	16646.9	16975.2	13
15	44	16608.5	17009.6	21	15b	34	16657.8	16967.8	9
16	51	16596.7	17061.7	35	16b	37	16646.8	16984.1	17
17	36	16614.8	16943.1	8	17b	30	16662.0	16935.5	5
18	59	16588.8	17126.8	45	18b	41	16642.3	17016.1	24
19	54	16629.7	17122.0	43	19b	39	16676.1	17031.7	28
20	56	16629.0	17139.6	46	20b	40	16676.1	17040.8	30
21	58	16597.5	17126.3	44	21b	41	16654.3	17028.1	27
22	64	16621.6	17205.2	49	22b	44	16671.6	17072.8	37
23	73	16578.5	17244.1	51	23b	48	16638.7	17076.3	38
24	68	16589.5	17209.5	50	24b	46	16649.8	17069.2	36
25	75	16577.6	17261.4	52	25b	49	16638.5	17085.3	39
26	60	16596.4	17143.5	47	26b	42	16654.0	17036.9	29
27	83	16569.3	17326.1	53	27b	53	16634.0	17117.3	42

Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.

10 vs. 12 34.8(4) p<0.05

12 vs. 12b n.a. n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

United Kingdom: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=16,564)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	15	19906.6	20052.3	2
2	16	19899.1	20054.5	3
3	17	19896.1	20061.3	6
4	23	19892.1	20115.6	9
5	31	19866.6	20167.8	14
6	25	19887.0	20129.9	12
7	32	19863.5	20174.3	15
8	18	19892.7	20067.6	8
9	39	19858.0	20236.9	20
10	18	19876.6	20051.5	1
11	19	19871.6	20056.2	4
12	20	19864.5	20058.8	5
13	26	19864.4	20117.0	10
14	34	19836.4	20166.7	13
15	28	19857.1	20129.1	11
16	35	19835.0	20175.0	16
17	21	19863.0	20067.0	7
18	42	19829.3	20237.3	21
19	39	19843.9	20222.8	17
20	40	19838.9	20227.5	18
21	41	19831.7	20230.0	19
22	47	19833.0	20289.6	23
23	55	19802.2	20336.5	25
24	49	19825.5	20301.6	24
25	56	19800.8	20344.8	26
26	42	19830.2	20238.2	22
27	63	19796.7	20408.7	27
Models	Decrease -2LL (df)		Sig.	
10 vs. 1	n.a.		n.a.	

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

United States: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of cleavage change (N=10,585)

model	df.	-2LL	BIC	(rank)
1	18	13949.7	14116.5	6
2	19	13949.6	14125.7	8
3	20	13915.9	14101.3	2
4	29	13919.6	14188.3	12
5	40	13857.4	14228.1	14
6	31	13882.5	14169.8	10
7	41	13857.4	14237.4	16
8	21	13915.7	14110.4	4
9	51	13820.0	14292.6	18
10	21	13920.9	14115.5	5
11	22	13920.8	14124.6	7
12	23	13883.5	14096.6	1
13	32	13890.8	14187.3	11
14	43	13824.8	14223.2	13
15	34	13849.6	14164.7	9
16	44	13824.7	14232.5	15
17	24	13883.1	14105.5	3
18	54	13787.9	14288.4	17
19	51	13863.9	14336.5	21
20	52	13863.6	14345.5	22
21	53	13826.1	14317.2	19
22	62	13834.1	14408.6	24
23	73	13768.8	14445.3	25
24	64	13792.4	14385.5	23
25	74	13768.7	14454.5	26
26	54	13825.6	14326.0	20
27	84	13732.8	14511.2	27

Models	Decrease -2LL (df)	Sig.
10 vs. 1	n.a.	n.a.

Most optimal model in **bold** (cf. Table 2)

B.2 Preferred models of cleavage change

Australia: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right voting
(N=20,645)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties	
	b	s.e.
Intercept	-1.496	0.086
1965 (ref.)	-	-
1967	0.095	0.089
1979	0.445	0.085
1984	0.152	0.083
1985	0.306	0.097
1986	0.075	0.098
1987	0.380	0.086
1990	0.895	0.096
1993	0.649	0.097
1996	1.101	0.109
1998	1.021	0.110
2001	1.179	0.116
2004	1.115	0.125
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-
Catholic	-0.071	0.044
Protestant	0.482	0.039
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.626	0.072
Manual class (ref.)	-	-
Service class	1.348	0.089
Routine non-manual class	0.908	0.103
Self-employed	1.449	0.106
Year*Service class	-0.024	0.004
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.011	0.004
Year*Self-employed	-0.007	0.004
Year*Church attendance	-0.007	0.003

Austria: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right vs. religion voting (N=3,227)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious Parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-3.21	0.24	-3.24	0.18
1974 (ref.)	-	-	-	-
1985	-0.31	0.43	0.72	0.16
1988	0.59	0.28	0.41	0.14
1989	1.36	0.23	0.35	0.13
1995	2.49	0.24	0.43	0.18
1999	2.05	0.26	0.37	0.19
2003	1.56	0.24	0.73	0.14
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.01	0.16	1.07	0.15
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.14	0.14	1.35	0.10
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	0.19	0.17	1.05	0.11
Routine non-manual class	0.37	0.17	0.56	0.12
Self-employed	1.76	0.20	2.45	0.14

Belgium: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right vs. religion voting (N=6,776)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious Parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-0.60	0.08	-1.91	0.12
1991 (ref.)	-	-	-	-
1995	0.19	0.09	0.23	0.11
1999	0.64	0.08	0.56	0.14
2003	0.03	0.09	-0.01	0.19
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.45	0.07	1.51	0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.32	0.07	1.45	0.08
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	0.54	0.08	0.54	0.09
Routine non-manual class	0.14	0.08	0.22	0.09
Self-employed	1.59	0.15	1.14	0.16
Year*Catholic	-- ^a		-0.05	0.02

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

France: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right voting (N=17,872)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties	
	b	s.e.
Intercept	-1.60	0.10
1967	-	-
1968	0.66	0.10
1988	0.05	0.09
1995	0.66	0.10
1997	0.45	0.11
2002	0.57	0.11
2006	0.38	0.11
2007	0.64	0.11
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-
Catholic	0.84	0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-
Frequent church attendance	1.25	0.09
Manual class (ref.)	-	-
Service class	0.65	0.12
Routine non-manual class	0.44	0.11
Self-employed	1.18	0.12
Year*Service class	-0.01	0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.01	0.00
Year*Self-employed	-0.01	0.00
Year*Church attendance	-0.02	0.00

Germany: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. religious voting (N=25,244)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-3.18	0.18	-1.77	0.13
1969 (ref.)	-	-	-	-
1975	1.17	0.19	0.12	0.10
1976	1.45	0.18	0.22	0.10
1977	0.91	0.19	0.34	0.10
1978	1.10	0.18	0.28	0.10
1979	0.88	0.18	0.36	0.10
1980	1.20	0.17	0.22	0.10
1984	0.56	0.20	0.62	0.12
1986	1.10	0.19	0.48	0.13
1987	0.72	0.23	0.51	0.15
1988	0.84	0.19	0.39	0.14
1990	1.01	0.19	0.45	0.14
1994	-0.31	0.29	0.30	0.17
1998	-0.06	0.21	0.06	0.17
2002	0.67	0.21	0.44	0.20
2005	1.05	0.20	0.47	0.20
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	-0.01	0.08	1.29	0.11
Protestant	0.04	0.07	0.31	0.11
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.14	0.05	0.75	0.03
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	1.08	0.06	0.55	0.04
Routine non-manual class	0.74	0.06	0.46	0.04
Self-employed	1.38	0.09	1.45	0.06
Year*Catholic	-- ^a		-0.02	0.01
Year*Protestant	-- ^a		-0.01	0.01

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

Italy: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right voting
(N=9,989)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious parties	
	b	s.e.		
Intercept	-3.53	0.20	-2.15	0.16
1968 (ref.)	-	-		
1975	-0.35	0.19	-0.45	0.11
1985	0.83	0.17	0.02	0.17
1990	-0.56	0.35	-0.08	0.23
1992	1.80	0.22	0.10	0.24
1994	3.23	0.20	-1.51	0.28
1996	2.64	0.20	-2.39	0.29
2001	3.60	0.23	-2.00	0.37
2006	3.19	0.26	-1.43	0.38
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.79	0.08	2.24	0.16
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	2.77	0.23	0.47	0.09
Routine non-manual class	1.63	0.22	0.40	0.07
Self-employed	0.71	0.23	0.71	0.07
Year*Service class	-0.10	0.01	--- ^a	
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.06	0.01	--- ^a	
Year*Self-employed	0.00	0.01	--- ^a	
Year*Church attendance	--- ^a		-0.02	0.01

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

Netherlands: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. religious voting (N=18,049)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-2.04	0.14	-3.02	0.16
1970 (ref.)	-	-	-	-
1971	-0.01	0.18	0.13	0.18
1972	0.19	0.14	-0.32	0.15
1974	-0.08	0.15	-0.42	0.15
1976	0.57	0.16	-0.05	0.17
1977	0.33	0.13	0.09	0.13
1979	0.51	0.17	0.31	0.17
1981	0.90	0.15	0.57	0.15
1982	0.80	0.15	0.24	0.16
1985	0.72	0.14	0.21	0.16
1986	0.70	0.16	0.84	0.17
1989	0.73	0.16	1.00	0.17
1990	1.57	0.16	1.83	0.17
1994	1.88	0.17	0.91	0.20
1998	1.50	0.18	0.70	0.22
2002	1.83	0.20	1.44	0.23
2006	1.12	0.20	1.47	0.22
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.22	0.11	1.63	0.13
Protestant	0.21	0.11	1.46	0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.58	0.10	2.45	0.10
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	1.73	0.09	0.49	0.10
Routine non-manual class	1.38	0.10	0.43	0.10
Self-employed	2.07	0.14	1.50	0.14
Year*Catholic	-- ^a		-0.02	0.01
Year*Protestant	-- ^a		0.01	0.01
Year*Church attendance	-- ^a		-0.04	0.01
Year*Service class	-0.03	0.01	-- ^a	
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.03	0.01	-- ^a	
Year*Self-employed	-0.03	0.01	-- ^a	

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

Norway: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right vs. religion voting (N=7,563)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious Parties		
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	
Intercept		-0.68	0.09	-2.61	0.15
1981 (ref.)	-	-	-	-	
1985		-0.01	0.09	0.11	0.15
1989		-0.03	0.10	0.03	0.16
1993		0.04	0.12	-0.21	0.18
1997		0.24	0.14	0.78	0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-	
Frequent church attendance		0.11	0.08	2.35	0.16
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-	
Service class		1.50	0.11	0.39	0.11
Routine non-manual class		0.51	0.12	0.40	0.12
Self-employed		1.63	0.14	0.79	0.14
Year*Church attendance		--- ^a		-0.03	0.01
Year*Service class		-0.07	0.01	--- ^a	
Year*Routine non-manual class		-0.02	0.01	--- ^a	
Year*Self-employed		-0.03	0.01	--- ^a	

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

Spain: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. vs. right voting
(N=12,725)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties	
	b	s.e.
Intercept	-0.85	0.09
1979	-	-
1986	-1.02	0.10
2000	0.38	0.09
2004	-0.56	0.09
2008	-0.54	0.09
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-
Frequent church attendance	1.08	0.04
Manual class (ref.)	-	-
Service class	0.66	0.05
Routine non-manual class	0.43	0.06
Self-employed	0.83	0.06

Sweden: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. vs. right vs. religious voting (N=9,958)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-1.03	0.06	-6.44	0.43
1985	-	-	-	-
1988	-0.14	0.07	-0.04	0.29
1991	-0.16	0.07	0.73	0.31
1994	0.15	0.07	2.13	0.36
1998	-0.16	0.08	3.04	0.43
2002	-0.67	0.10	3.10	0.50
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.53	0.05	3.69	0.39
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	1.74	0.06	1.09	0.18
Routine non-manual class	0.85	0.05	0.80	0.15
Self-employed	2.19	0.08	1.65	0.20
Year*Church attendance	— ^a		-0.11	0.03

^a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.

Switzerland: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. religious voting (N=9,115)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties		Religious parties	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Intercept	-1.08	0.31	-3.56	0.56
1971	-	-	-	-
1975	-0.20	0.15	-0.06	0.21
1979	-0.07	0.19	0.47	0.26
1995	0.80	0.28	1.03	0.49
1999	1.19	0.32	1.71	0.56
2003	1.41	0.35	1.90	0.63
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.65	0.31	2.68	0.55
Protestant	0.98	0.30	0.48	0.56
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.28	0.05	1.69	0.08
Manual class (ref.)	-	-	-	-
Service class	1.51	0.16	1.13	0.22
Routine non-manual class	0.52	0.20	0.34	0.26
Self-employed	2.19	0.24	2.16	0.28
Year*Catholic	-0.01	0.01	-0.06	0.02
Year*Protestant	-0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.02
Year*Service class	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	0.01
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Year*Self-employed	-0.05	0.01	-0.06	0.01

United Kingdom: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right voting (N=16,564)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties	
	b	s.e.
Intercept	-0.92	0.09
1964 (ref.)	-	-
1966	-0.37	0.10
1970	0.03	0.10
1979	0.55	0.10
1983	0.95	0.09
1987	0.88	0.09
1992	0.55	0.09
1997	-0.13	0.10
2005	0.32	0.12
No/other religion (ref.)		
Catholic	-0.50	0.06
Protestant	0.37	0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)		
Frequent church attendance	0.24	0.04
Manual class (ref.)		
Service class	1.88	0.10
Routine non-manual class	1.24	0.10
Self-employed	1.82	0.15
Year*Service class	-0.02	0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class	-0.01	0.00
Year*Self-employed	-0.01	0.01

United States: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right voting (N=10,585)

Reference category: Left-wing parties	Right-wing parties	
	b	s.e.
Intercept	-1.74	0.19
1960 (ref.)	-	-
1964	-0.65	0.12
1968	0.34	0.13
1972	0.92	0.13
1976	0.36	0.14
1980	0.85	0.17
1984	0.91	0.17
1988	0.76	0.19
1992	0.38	0.21
1996	0.42	0.23
2000	0.76	0.25
2004	0.96	0.27
No/other religion (ref.)	-	-
Catholic	0.56	0.19
Protestant	1.43	0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)	-	-
Frequent church attendance	0.18	0.04
Manual class (ref.)	-	-
Service class	0.93	0.10
Routine non-manual class	0.46	0.11
Self-employed	0.48	0.16
Year*Service class	-0.02	0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class	0.00	0.00
Year*Self-employed	0.01	0.01
Year*Catholic	0.00	0.01
Year*Protestant	-0.02	0.01

Appendix C: Chapter 3

C.1 Model selection and additional analyses

Goodness-of-fit statistics of multilevel linear regression models of class voting¹ on year

Model	df	Log Likelihood	AIC	BIC
Routine non-manual class				
Null model	3	-32.77	71.54	81.25
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals)	7	-16.52	47.04	69.69
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals)	11	-11.86	45.72	81.32
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	4	-18.04	44.08	57.02
Random Slope (Linear Year)	6	-17.31	46.62	66.04
Service class				
Null model	3	-81.44	168.88	178.58
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals)	7	-45.88	105.77	128.42
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals)	11	-43.43	108.86	144.46
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	4	-45.19	98.38	111.32
Random Slope (Linear Year)	6	-41.06	94.12	113.54
Self-employed				
Null model	3	-102.89	211.77	221.48
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals)	7	-87.07	188.13	210.79
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals)	11	-83.77	189.53	225.13
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	4	-86.44	180.89	193.83
Random Slope (Linear Year)	6	-72.19	156.38	175.80

¹ measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)

Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting¹ on linear year

Model	LR χ^2 (df)	Compared to	P-value
Routine non-manual class			
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	29.46 (1)	Null model	0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year)	1.46 (2)	Random intercept	0.4819 n.s.
Service class			
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	72.50 (1)	Null model	0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year)	8.26 (2)	Random intercept	0.0161 **
Self-employed			
Random Intercept (Linear Year)	32.88 (1)	Null model	0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year)	28.51 (2)	Random intercept	0.0000 ***

* p. < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

¹ measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)

Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting¹ on LR position of left-wing parties / LR party system polarization

Model	LR χ^2 (df)	Compared to	P-value
Routine non-manual class			
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties)	3.76 (1)	Null model	0.0659 *
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)	1.72 (2)	Random intercept	0.4238 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization)	8.08 (1)	Null model	0.0045 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)	2.23 (2)	Random intercept	0.3271 n.s.
Service class			
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties)	6.25 (1)	Null model	0.0124 **
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)	0.23 (2)	Random intercept	0.8927 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization)	10.53 (1)	Null model	0.0012 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)	3.57 (2)	Random intercept	0.1679 n.s.
Self-employed			
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties)	47.51 (1)	Null model	0.0000 ***
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)	0.39 (2)	Random intercept	0.8227 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization)	48.96 (1)	Null model	0.0000 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)	1.55 (2)	Random intercept	0.4616 n.s.

* p. < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

¹ measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)

Second-stage parameter estimations of multilevel linear regression predicting the level of class voting measured in 'gross' (i.e. uncontrolled) log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party

	Routine non-manual class		Service class		Self-employed and farmers	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Null Model						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.534***	0.071	0.851***	0.109	1.548***	0.165
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.079***	0.014	0.167***	0.037	0.131***	0.021
Level 2 Variance	0.062***	0.020	0.151***	0.052	0.364***	0.114
-2 Loglikelihood	89.9		232.6		202.5	
Model I						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.559***	0.072	0.903***	0.116	1.562***	0.170
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)	-0.155***	0.032	-0.266***	0.045	-0.152***	0.053
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.055***	0.007	0.096***	0.018	0.105***	0.018
Level 2 Variance	0.065***	0.019	0.172***	0.052	0.381***	0.116
-2 Loglikelihood	28.9		138.5		165.9	
Model II						
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.574***	0.068	0.915***	0.113	1.579***	0.165
Linear year * 10 (1985=0)	-0.174***	0.029	-0.285***	0.044	-0.192***	0.039
<i>Variance Components</i>						
Level 1 Variance	0.049***	0.005	0.079***	0.016	0.086***	0.012
Level 2 Variance	0.060***	0.018	0.169***	0.051	0.370***	0.111
Random Slope linear year	0.006***	0.004	0.018*	0.009	0.015*	0.008
-2 Loglikelihood	19.6		120.9		142.2	

Appendix D: Chapter 4


D.1. Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of multinomial logistic regression models in table 4.1 (Ho: Odds are independent of other alternatives)

Hausman test of IIA (N=11.832)				
Omitted	chi2	df	P>chi2	evidence
Model I				
Old-Left	223.0	60	0.000	against Ho
New-Left	15.4	60	1.000	for Ho
Religious	10.0	59	1.000	for Ho
Liberal Right	38.9	60	0.984	for Ho
Model II				
Old-Left	17.3	62	1.000	for Ho
New-Left	-77.2	62	---	--- ^a
Religious	-72.0	62	---	--- ^a
Liberal Right	473.0	62	0.000	against Ho
Model III				
Old-Left	899.8	66	0.000	against Ho
New-Left	-80.4	66	---	--- ^a
Religious	-270.2	65	---	--- ^a
Liberal Right	-1500.0	66	---	--- ^a
Model IV				
Old-Left	-15.0	78	---	--- ^a
New-Left	-34.6	78	---	--- ^a
Religious	123.6	76	0.000	against Ho
Liberal Right	177.1	78	0.000	against Ho

a) Negative test statistic indicate that IIA has not been violated

b) Because the Small and Hsiao Test requires randomly dividing the data into subpopulations, the results differ with each operation. Repeated tests on average suggest no violation of IIA

Small and Hsiao Test of IIA^b (N=11.832)						
	lnL(full)	lnL(omit)	chi2	df	P>chi2	evidence
	-3201.8	-3168.8	66.0	60	0.277	for Ho
	-4130.9	-4097.9	66.1	60	0.275	for Ho
	-3780.1	-3759.1	41.9	60	0.963	for Ho
			(base)			
	-3075.2	-3043.3	63.8	64	0.482	for Ho
	-3981.1	-3950.9	60.5	64	0.601	for Ho
	-3751.1	-3716.2	69.9	64	0.285	for Ho
			(base)			
	-2923.82	-2883.0	81.7	68.0	0.123	for Ho
	-3784.6	-3746.0	77.1	68.0	0.21	for Ho
	-3396.93	-3355.1	83.6	68.0	0.096	for Ho
			(base)			
	-3016.7	-2969.6	94.2	80	0.133	for Ho
	-3793.5	-3747.6	91.8	80	0.172	for Ho
	-3450.0	-3413.0	74.1	80	0.664	for Ho
			(base)			



ICS Dissertation Series

The ICS-series presents dissertations of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology. Each of these studies aims at integrating explicit theory formation with state-of-the-art empirical research or at the development of advanced methods for empirical research. The ICS was founded in 1986 as a cooperative effort of the universities of Groningen and Utrecht. Since 1992, the ICS expanded to the University of Nijmegen. Most of the projects are financed by the participating universities or by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The international composition of the ICS graduate students is mirrored in the increasing international orientation of the projects and thus of the ICS-series itself.

- 1) C. van Liere, (1990). *Lastige Leerlingen. Een empirisch onderzoek naar sociale oorzaken van probleemgedrag op basisscholen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 2) Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, (1990). *Bijstand in Amsterdam, ca. 1800 - 1850. Armeenzorg als beheersings- en overlevingsstrategie*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 3) I. Maas, (1990). *Deelname aan podiumkunsten via de podia, de media en actieve beoefening. Substitutie of leereffecten?* Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 4) M.I. Broese van Groenou, (1991). *Gescheiden Netwerken. De relaties met vrienden en verwanten na echtscheiding*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 5) Jan M.M. van den Bos, (1991). *Dutch EC Policy Making. A Model-Guided Approach to Coordination and Negotiation*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 6) Karin Sanders, (1991). *Vrouwelijke Pioniers. Vrouwen en mannen met een 'mannelijke' hogere beroepsopleiding aan het begin van hun loopbaan*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 7) Sjerp de Vries, (1991). *Egoism, Altruism, and Social Justice. Theory and Experiments on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 8) Ronald S. Batenburg, (1991). *Automatisering in bedrijf*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 9) Rudi Wielers, (1991). *Selectie en allocatie op de arbeidsmarkt. Een uitwerking voor de informele en geïnstitutionaliseerde kinderopvang*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 10) Gert P. Westert, (1991). *Verschillen in ziekenhuisgebruik*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 11) Hanneke Hermesen, (1992). *Votes and Policy Preferences. Equilibria in Party Systems*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 12) Cora J.M. Maas, (1992). *Probleemleerlingen in het basisonderwijs*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 13) Ed A.W. Boxman, (1992). *Contacten en carrière. Een empirisch-theoretisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen sociale netwerken en arbeidsmarktposities*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 14) Conny G.J. Taes, (1992). *Kijken naar banen. Een onderzoek naar de inschatting van arbeidsmarktkansen bij schoolverlaters uit het middelbaar beroepsonderwijs*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 15) Peter van Roozendaal, (1992). *Cabinets in Multi-Party Democracies. The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 16) Marcel van Dam, (1992). *Regio zonder regie. Verschillen in en effectiviteit van gemeentelijk arbeidsmarktbeleid*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 17) Tanja van der Lippe, (1993). *Arbeidsverdeling tussen mannen en vrouwen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 18) Marc A. Jacobs, (1993). *Software: Kopen of Kopiëren? Een sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek onder PC-gebruikers*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.

- 19) Peter van der Meer, (1993). *Verdringing op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt. Sector- en sekseverschillen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 20) Gerbert Kraaykamp, (1993). *Over lezen gesproken. Een studie naar sociale differentiatie in leesgedrag*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 21) Evelien Zeggelink, (1993). *Strangers into Friends. The Evolution of Friendship Networks Using an Individual Oriented Modeling Approach*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 22) Jaco Berveling, (1994). *Het stempel op de besluitvorming. Macht, invloed en besluitvorming op twee Amsterdamse beleidsterreinen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 23) Wim Bernasco, (1994). *Coupled Careers. The Effects of Spouse's Resources on Success at Work*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 24) Liset van Dijk, (1994). *Choices in Child Care. The Distribution of Child Care Among Mothers, Fathers and Non-Parental Care Providers*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 25) Jos de Haan, (1994). *Research Groups in Dutch Sociology*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 26) K. Boahene, (1995). *Innovation Adoption as a Socio-Economic Process. The Case of the Ghanaian Cocoa Industry*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 27) Paul E.M. Ligthart, (1995). *Solidarity in Economic Transactions. An Experimental Study of Framing Effects in Bargaining and Contracting*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 28) Roger Th. A.J. Leenders, (1995). *Structure and Influence. Statistical Models for the Dynamics of Actor Attributes, Network Structure, and their Interdependence*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 29) Beate Völker, (1995). *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgotten...? Institutions of Communism, the Transition to Capitalism and Personal Networks: the Case of East Germany*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 30) A. Cancrinus-Matthijsse, (1995). *Tussen hulpverlening en ondernemerschap. Beroepsuitoefening en taak-opvattingen van openbare apothekers in een aantal West-Europese landen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 31) Nardi Steverink, (1996). *Zo lang mogelijk zelfstandig. Naar een verklaring van verschillen in oriëntatie ten aanzien van opname in een verzorgingstehuis onder fysiek kwetsbare ouderen*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 32) Ellen Lindeman, (1996). *Participatie in vrijwilligerswerk*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 33) Chris Snijders, (1996). *Trust and Commitments*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 34) Koos Postma, (1996). *Changing Prejudice in Hungary. A Study on the Collapse of State Socialism and Its Impact on Prejudice Against Gypsies and Jews*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 35) Joeske T. van Busschbach, (1996). *Uit het oog, uit het hart? Stabiliteit en verandering in persoonlijke relaties*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 36) René Torenvlied, (1996). *Besluiten in uitvoering. Theorieën over beleidsuitvoering modelmatig getoetst op sociale vernieuwing in drie gemeenten*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 37) Andreas Flache, (1996). *The Double Edge of Networks. An Analysis of the Effect of Informal Networks on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 38) Kees van Veen, (1997). *Inside an Internal Labor Market: Formal Rules, Flexibility and Career Lines in a Dutch Manufacturing Company*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 39) Lucienne van Eijk, (1997). *Activity and Well-being in the Elderly*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 40) Róbert Gál, (1997). *Unreliability. Contract Discipline and Contract Governance under Economic Transition*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 41) Anne-Geerte van de Goor, (1997). *Effects of Regulation on Disability Duration*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 42) Boris Blumberg, (1997). *Das Management von Technologiekooperationen. Partnersuche und Verhandlungen mit dem Partner aus Empirisch-Theoretischer Perspektive*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 43) Marijke von Bergh, (1997). *Loopbanen van oudere werknemers*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 44) Anna Petra Nieboer, (1997). *Life-Events and Well-Being: A Prospective Study on Changes in Well-Being of Elderly People Due to a Serious Illness Event or Death of the Spouse*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 45) Jacques Niehof, (1997). *Resources and Social Reproduction: The Effects of Cultural and Material Resources on Educational and Occupational Careers in Industrial Nations at the End of the Twentieth Century*. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.

- 46) Ariana Need, (1997). *The Kindred Vote. Individual and Family Effects of Social Class and Religion on Electoral Change in the Netherlands, 1956-1994*. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 47) Jim Allen, (1997). *Sector Composition and the Effect of Education on Wages: an International Comparison*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- 48) Jack B.F. Hutten, (1998). *Workload and Provision of Care in General Practice. An Empirical Study of the Relation Between Workload of Dutch General Practitioners and the Content and Quality of their Care*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 49) Per B. Kropp, (1998). *Berufserfolg im Transformationsprozeß. Eine theoretisch-empirische Studie über die Gewinner und Verlierer der Wende in Ostdeutschland*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 50) Maarten H.J. Wolbers, (1998). *Diploma-inflatie en verdringing op de arbeidsmarkt. Een studie naar ontwikkelingen in de opbrengsten van diploma's in Nederland*. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 51) Wilma Smeenk, (1998). *Opportunity and Marriage. The Impact of Individual Resources and Marriage Market Structure on First Marriage Timing and Partner Choice in the Netherlands*. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 52) Marinus Spreen, (1999). *Sampling Personal Network Structures: Statistical Inference in Ego-Graphs*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 53) Vincent Buskens, (1999). *Social Networks and Trust*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 54) Susanne Rijken, (1999). *Educational Expansion and Status Attainment. A Cross-National and Over-Time Comparison*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 55) Mérove Gijssberts, (1999). *The Legitimation of Inequality in State-Socialist and Market Societies, 1987-1996*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 56) Gerhard G. Van de Bunt, (1999). *Friends by Choice. An Actor-Oriented Statistical Network Model for Friendship Networks Through Time*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 57) Robert Thomson, (1999). *The Party Mandate: Election Pledges and Government Actions in the Netherlands, 1986-1998*. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.
- 58) Corine Baarda, (1999). *Politieke besluiten en boeren beslissingen. Het draagvlak van het mestbeleid tot 2000*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 59) Rafael Wittek, (1999). *Interdependence and Informal Control in Organizations*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 60) Diane Payne, (1999). *Policy Making in the European Union: an Analysis of the Impact of the Reform of the Structural Funds in Ireland*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 61) René Veenstra, (1999). *Leerlingen - Klassen - Scholen. Prestaties en vorderingen van leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs*. Amsterdam, Thela Thesis.
- 62) Marjolein Achterkamp, (1999). *Influence Strategies in Collective Decision Making. A Comparison of Two Models*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 63) Peter Mühlau, (2000). *The Governance of the Employment Relation. A Relational Signaling Perspective*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 64) Agnes Akkerman, (2000). *Verdeelde vakbeweging en stakingen. Concurrentie om leden*. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
- 65) Sandra van Thiel, (2000). *Quangocratization: Trends, Causes and Consequences*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 66) Rudi Turksema, (2000). *Supply of Day Care*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 67) Sylvia E. Korupp (2000). *Mothers and the Process of Social Stratification*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 68) Bernard A. Nijstad (2000). *How the Group Affects the Mind: Effects of Communication in Idea Generating Groups*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 69) Inge F. de Wolf (2000). *Opleidingspecialisatie en arbeidsmarktsucces van sociale wetenschappers*. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
- 70) Jan Kratzer (2001). *Communication and Performance: An Empirical Study in Innovation Teams*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 71) Madelon Kroneman (2001). *Healthcare Systems and Hospital Bed Use*. ICS/NIVEL-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 72) Herman van de Werfhorst (2001). *Field of Study and Social Inequality. Four Types of Educational Resources in the Process of Stratification in the Netherlands*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.

- 73) Tamás Bartus (2001). *Social Capital and Earnings Inequalities. The Role of Informal Job Search in Hungary*. ICS-dissertation Groningen.
- 74) Hester Moerbeek (2001). *Friends and Foes in the Occupational Career. The Influence of Sweet and Sour Social Capital on the Labour Market*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 75) Marcel van Assen (2001). *Essays on Actor Perspectives in Exchange Networks and Social Dilemmas*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 76) Inge Sieben (2001). *Sibling Similarities and Social Stratification. The Impact of Family Background across Countries and Cohorts*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 77) Alinda van Bruggen (2001). *Individual Production of Social Well-Being. An Exploratory Study*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 78) Marcel Coenders (2001). *Nationalistic Attitudes and Ethnic Exclusionism in a Comparative Perspective: An Empirical Study of Attitudes Toward the Country and Ethnic Immigrants in 22 Countries*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 79) Marcel Lubbers (2001). *Exclusionistic Electorates. Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 80) Uwe Matzat (2001). *Social Networks and Cooperation in Electronic Communities. A theoretical-empirical Analysis of Academic Communication and Internet Discussion Groups*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 81) Jacques P.G. Janssen (2002). *Do Opposites Attract Divorce? Dimensions of Mixed Marriage and the Risk of Divorce in the Netherlands*, ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 82) Miranda Jansen (2002). *Waardenoriëntaties en partnerrelaties. Een panelstudie naar wederzijdse invloeden*, ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 83) Anne Rigt Poortman (2002). *Socioeconomic Causes and Consequences of Divorce*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 84) Alexander Gattig (2002). *Intertemporal Decision Making*, ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 85) Gerrit Rooks (2002). *Contract en Conflict: Strategisch Management van Inkooptransacties*, ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 86) Károly Takács (2002). *Social Networks and Intergroup Conflict*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 87) Thomas Gautschi (2002). *Trust and Exchange, Effects of Temporal Embeddedness and Network Embeddedness on Providing and Dividing a Surplus*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 88) Hilde Bras (2002). *Zeeuwse meiden. Dienen in de levensloop van vrouwen, ca. 1850 – 1950*. Aksant Academic Publishers, Amsterdam.
- 89) Merijn Rengers (2002). *Economic Lives of Artists. Studies into Careers and the Labour Market in the Cultural Sector*, ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 90) Annelies Kassenberg (2002). *Wat scholieren bindt. Sociale gemeenschap in scholen*, ICS-dissertation, Groningen
- 91) Marc Verboord (2003). *Moet de meester dalen of de leerling klimmen? De invloed van literatuuronderwijs en ouders op het lezen van boeken tussen 1975 en 2000*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 92) Marcel van Egmond (2003). *Rain Falls on All of Us (but Some Manage to Get More Wet than Others): Political Context and Electoral Participation*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 93) Justine Horgan (2003). *High Performance Human Resource Management in Ireland and the Netherlands: Adoption and Effectiveness*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 94) Corine Hoeben (2003). *LETS' Be a Community. Community in Local Exchange Trading Systems*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 95) Christian Steglich (2003). *The Framing of Decision Situations. Automatic Goal Selection and Rational Goal Pursuit*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 96) Johan van Wilsem (2003). *Crime and Context. The Impact of Individual, Neighborhood, City and Country Characteristics on Victimization*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 97) Christiaan Monden (2003). *Education, Inequality and Health. The Impact of Partners and Life Course*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 98) Evelyn Hello (2003). *Educational Attainment and Ethnic Attitudes. How to Explain their Relationship*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.

- 99) Marnix Croes en Peter Tammes (2004). *Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan. Een onderzoek naar de overlevingskansen van joden in de Nederlandse gemeenten, 1940-1945*. Aksant Academic Publishers, Amsterdam
- 100) Ineke Nagel (2004). *Cultuurdeelname in de levensloop*. ICS- dissertation, Utrecht.
- 101) Marieke van der Wal (2004). *Competencies to Participate in Life. Measurement and the Impact of School*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 102) Vivian Meertens (2004). *Depressive Symptoms in the General Population: a Multifactorial Social Approach*. ICS -dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 103) Hanneke Schuurmans (2004). *Promoting Well-Being in Frail Elderly People. Theory and Intervention*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 104) Javier Arregui (2004). *Negotiation in Legislative Decision-Making in the European Union*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 105) Tamar Fischer (2004). *Parental Divorce, Conflict and Resources. The Effects on Children's Behaviour Problems, Socioeconomic Attainment, and Transitions in the Demographic Career*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 106) René Bekkers (2004). *Giving and Volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 107) Renée van der Hulst (2004). *Gender Differences in Workplace Authority: An Empirical Study on Social Networks*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 108) Rita Smaniotta (2004). *'You Scratch My Back and I Scratch Yours' Versus 'Love Thy Neighbour'. Two Proximate Mechanisms of Reciprocal Altruism*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 109) Maurice Gesthuizen (2004). *The Life-Course of the Low-Educated in the Netherlands: Social and Economic Risks*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 110) Carlijne Philips (2005). *Vakantiegemeenschappen. Kwalitatief en Kwantitatief Onderzoek naar Gelegenheid en Refreshergemeenschap tijdens de Vakantie*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 111) Esther de Ruijter (2005). *Household Outsourcing*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 112) Frank van Tubergen (2005). *The Integration of Immigrants in Cross-National Perspective: Origin, Destination, and Community Effects*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 113) Ferry Koster (2005). *For the Time Being. Accounting for Inconclusive Findings Concerning the Effects of Temporary Employment Relationships on Solidary Behavior of Employees*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 114) Carolien Klein Haarhuis (2005). *Promoting Anti-Corruption Reforms. Evaluating the Implementation of a World Bank Anti-Corruption Program in Seven African Countries (1999-2001)*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 115) Martin van der Gaag (2005). *Measurement of Individual Social Capital*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 116) Johan Hansen (2005). *Shaping Careers of Men and Women in Organizational Contexts*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 117) Davide Barrera (2005). *Trust in Embedded Settings*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 118) Mattijs Lambooij (2005). *Promoting Cooperation. Studies into the Effects of Long-Term and Short-Term Rewards on Cooperation of Employees*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 119) Lotte Vermeij (2006). *What's Cooking? Cultural Boundaries among Dutch Teenagers of Different Ethnic Origins in the Context of School*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 120) Mathilde Strating (2006). *Facing the Challenge of Rheumatoid Arthritis. A 13-year Prospective Study among Patients and Cross-Sectional Study among Their Partners*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 121) Jannes de Vries (2006). *Measurement Error in Family Background Variables: The Bias in the Intergenerational Transmission of Status, Cultural Consumption, Party Preference, and Religiosity*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 122) Stefan Thau (2006). *Workplace Deviance: Four Studies on Employee Motives and Self-Regulation*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 123) Mirjam Plantinga (2006). *Employee Motivation and Employee Performance in Child Care. The effects of the Introduction of Market Forces on Employees in the Dutch Child-Care Sector*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.

- 124) Helga de Valk (2006). *Pathways into Adulthood. A Comparative Study on Family Life Transitions among Migrant and Dutch Youth*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 125) Henrike Elzen (2006). *Self-Management for Chronically Ill Older People*. ICS-Dissertation, Groningen.
- 126) Ayse Güveli (2007). *New Social Classes within the Service Class in the Netherlands and Britain. Adjusting the EGP Class Schema for the Technocrats and the Social and Cultural Specialists*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 127) Willem-Jan Verhoeven (2007). *Income Attainment in Post-Communist Societies*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 128) Marieke Voorpostel (2007). *Sibling support: The Exchange of Help among Brothers and Sisters in the Netherlands*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 129) Jacob Dijkstra (2007). *The Effects of Externalities on Partner Choice and Payoffs in Exchange Networks*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 130) Patricia van Echtelt (2007). *Time-Greedy Employment Relationships: Four Studies on the Time Claims of Post-Fordist Work*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 131) Sonja Vogt (2007). *Heterogeneity in Social Dilemmas: The Case of Social Support*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 132) Michael Schweinberger (2007). *Statistical Methods for Studying the Evolution of Networks and Behavior*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 133) István Back (2007). *Commitment and Evolution: Connecting Emotion and Reason in Long-term Relationships*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 134) Ruben van Gaalen (2007). *Solidarity and Ambivalence in Parent-Child Relationships*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 135) Jan Reitsma (2007). *Religiosity and Solidarity – Dimensions and Relationships Disentangled and Tested*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 136) Jan Kornelis Dijkstra (2007). *Status and Affection among (Pre)Adolescents and Their Relation with Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 137) Wouter van Gils (2007). *Full-time Working Couples in the Netherlands. Causes and Consequences*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 138) Djamilia Schans (2007). *Ethnic Diversity in Intergenerational Solidarity*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 139) Ruud van der Meulen (2007). *Brug over Woelig Water: Lidmaatschap van Sportverenigingen, Vriendschappen, Kennissenkringen en Veralgemeend Vertrouwen*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 140) Andrea Knecht (2008). *Friendship Selection and Friends' Influence. Dynamics of Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 141) Ingrid Doorten (2008). *The Division of Unpaid Work in the Household: A Stubborn Pattern?* ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 142) Stijn Ruiter (2008). *Association in Context and Association as Context: Causes and Consequences of Voluntary Association Involvement*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 143) Janneke Joly (2008). *People on Our Minds: When Humanized Contexts Activate Social Norms*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 144) Margreet Frieling (2008). *'Joint production' als motor voor actief burgerschap in de buurt*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 145) Ellen Verbakel (2008). *The Partner as Resource or Restriction? Labour Market Careers of Husbands and Wives and the Consequences for Inequality Between Couples*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 146) Gijs van Houten (2008). *Beleidsuitvoering in gelaagde stelsels. De doorwerking van aanbevelingen van de Stichting van de Arbeid in het CAO-overleg*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 147) Eva Jaspers (2008). *Intolerance over Time. Macro and Micro Level Questions on Attitudes Towards Euthanasia, Homosexuality and Ethnic Minorities*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 148) Gijs Weijters (2008). *Youth Delinquency in Dutch Cities and Schools: A Multilevel Approach*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 149) Jessica Pass (2009). *The Self in Social Rejection*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.

- 150) Gerald Mollenhorst (2009). *Networks in Contexts. How Meeting Opportunities Affect Personal Relationships*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 151) Tom van der Meer (2009). *States of Freely Associating Citizens: Comparative Studies into the Impact of State Institutions on Social, Civic and Political Participation*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 152) Manuela Vieth (2009). *Commitments and Reciprocity in Trust Situations. Experimental Studies on Obligation, Indignation, and Self-Consistency*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 153) Rense Corten (2009). *Co-evolution of Social Networks and Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 154) Arieke J. Rijken (2009). *Happy Families, High Fertility? Childbearing Choices in the Context of Family and Partner Relationships*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 155) Jochem Tolsma (2009). *Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Majority and Minority Groups in the Netherlands. An Investigation into the Impact of Social Mobility Experiences, the Local Living Environment and Educational Attainment on Ethnic Hostility*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 156) Freek Bux (2009). *Linked Lives: Young Adults' Life Course and Relations With Parents*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 157) Philip Wotschack (2009). *Household Governance and Time Allocation. Four studies on the combination of work and care*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 158) Nienke Moor (2009). *Explaining Worldwide Religious Diversity. The Relationship between Subsistence Technologies and Ideas about the Unknown in Pre-industrial and (Post-)industrial Societies*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 159) Lieke ten Brummelhuis (2009). *Family Matters at Work. Depleting and Enriching Effects of Employees' Family lives on Work Outcomes*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 160) Renske Keizer (2010). *Remaining Childless. Causes and Consequences from a Life Course Perspective*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 161) Miranda Sentse (2010). *Bridging Contexts: The interplay between Family, Child, and Peers in Explaining Problem Behavior in Early Adolescence*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 162) Nicole Tieben (2010). *Transitions, Tracks and Transformations. Social Inequality in Transitions into, through and out of Secondary Education in the Netherlands for Cohorts Born Between 1914 and 1985*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 163) Birgit Pauksztat (2010). *Speaking up in Organizations: Four Studies on Employee Voice*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 164) Richard Zijdeman (2010). *Status Attainment in the Netherlands, 1811-1941. Spatial and Temporal Variation Before and During Industrialization*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 165) Rianne Kloosterman (2010). *Social Background and Children's Educational Careers. The Primary and Secondary Effects of Social Background over Transitions and over Time in the Netherlands*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 166) Olav Aarts (2010). *Religious Diversity and Religious Involvement. A Study of Religious Markets in Western Societies at the End of the Twentieth Century*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 167) Stephanie Wiesmann (2010). *24/7 Negotiation in Couples Transition to Parenthood*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 168) Borja Martinovic (2010). *Interethnic Contacts: A Dynamic Analysis of Interaction Between Immigrants and Natives in Western Countries*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 169) Anne Roeters (2010). *Family Life Under Pressure? Parents' Paid Work and the Quantity and Quality of Parent-Child and Family Time*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 170) Jelle Sijtsema (2010). *Adolescent Aggressive Behavior: Status and Stimulation Goals in Relation to the Peer Context*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 171) Kees Keizer (2010). *The Spreading of Disorder*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 172) Michael Mäs (2010). *The Clustering Puzzle. Explaining Clustering and Polarization of Opinions*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 173) Marie-Louise Damen (2010). *Cultuurdeelname en CKV. Studies naar effecten van kunsteducatie op de cultuurdeelname van leerlingen tijdens en na het voortgezet onderwijs*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.

- 174) Marieke van de Rakt (2011). *Two generations of Crime: The Intergenerational Transmission of Convictions over the Life Course*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 175) Willem Huijnk (2011). *Family Life and Ethnic Attitudes. The Role of the Family for Attitudes Towards Inter-marriage and Acculturation Among Minority and Majority Groups*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 176) Tim Huijts (2011). *Social Ties and Health in Europe. Individual Associations, Cross-National Variations, and Contextual Explanations*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 177) Wouter Steenbeek (2011). *Social and Physical Disorder. How Community, Business Presence and Entrepreneurs Influence Disorder in Dutch Neighborhoods*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 178) Miranda Vervoort (2011). *Living Together Apart? Ethnic Concentration in the Neighborhood and Ethnic Minorities' Social Contacts and Language Practices*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 179) Agnieszka Kanas (2011). *The Economic Performance of Immigrants. The Role of Human and Social Capital*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 180) Lea Ellwardt (2011). *Gossip in Organizations. A Social Network Study*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 181) Annemarije Oosterwaal (2011). *The Gap between Decision and Implementation. Decision making, Delegation and Compliance in Governmental and Organizational Settings*. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
- 182) Natascha Notten (2011). *Parents and the Media. Causes and Consequences of Parental Media Socialization*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
- 183) Tobias Stark (2011). *Integration in Schools. A Process Perspective on Students' Interethnic Attitudes and Interpersonal Relationships*. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
- 184) Giedo Jansen (2011). *Social Cleavages and Political Choices. Large-scale Comparisons of Social Class, Religion and Voting Behavior in Western Democracies*. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.

Curriculum Vitae

Giedo Jansen was born in Nijmegen (Netherlands) on March 3rd, 1984. He completed his secondary education (VWO) at the Stedelijke Scholengemeenschap Nijmegen (SSgN). In 2002, he started studying Sociology at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. He received his master's degree in 2006 after writing his master thesis on the public resistance to surveillance in the Netherlands. Between September 2006 and February 2011 he worked as a junior researcher at the department of Sociology of the Radboud University of Nijmegen and the Inter-university Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). From January to March 2009 he visited Nuffield College (University of Oxford) as a Junior Visiting Scholar to collaborate with Prof. Dr. Geoffrey Evans and Prof. Dr. Nan Dirk De Graaf on an international project studying how social divisions explain political choices in cross-national perspective. As of May 2011, Giedo Jansen holds a position as Postdoctoral Researcher at the Political Science Department of the Radboud University Nijmegen on the research program "Contagious Conflict: Learning from Industrial Conflict".

